



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THE HEALTH AND PERFECTION OF MAN

What is health? What is it to be healthy? Our first answer must inevitably be the answer of St. Augustine, when confronted with the theoretical problem of time: "If no one asks me, I know the answer; if I want to explain it to the one who asks me, I do not know it." In both cases the first sensation of one who aspires to theorizing is that of perplexity. I think, therefore, that this initial perplexity has its source in two principal reasons, capable of reduction to these two assertions: first, the idea of health has a complex structure, and, second, the idea of health has a variable structure. Without a thorough study of this complexity and this variability, the construction of the medical anthropology that our historical level requires would not be possible. We will try to point out the fundamental lines of both.

I.

The idea of health has a complex structure. Is it not the case? Reflection on one point is sufficient to note that, in our Western world in the

Translated by William U. Genemaras.

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second half of the twentieth century, health is defined according to quite diverse criteria, all of which are partially valid.

There is, in the first place, the subjective or the emotional criterion. In this case the one who makes the decision concerning the state of health is the subject of that state, and he does so by means of one of two cardinal judgments: "I feel healthy," or "I feel sick." The "feeling" that man has of his own life, the "feeling of self," is the decisive factor; man esteems himself "sound" in so far as he is a *self-feeling subject*. Then who is sick? "The one who goes to the doctor," wrote Von Weizsäcker. Under its apparent triviality this statement contains a profound truth, but not a whole truth. One actually can be well or sick without knowing it, sometimes feeling and believing the contrary and being mistaken about one's own condition: a serious matter, calling for various precise measures.

Western science, enemy of subjectivity from its birth, has preferred to adhere to an objective criterion. The *métro*n of medical knowledge is "the sensation of the body," according to one of the most discussed writings of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* (*De prisca medicina* l. i. 588-90). Conceived in one way or the other, this adherence to the *somatos aisthesis* has been the principle rule of occidental medicine and, for many, continues to be so. Oriented by it, the "scientific" doctor asserts a man to be healthy by observing him as a *perceptible object*.

But the "objectivity" of health can be established from two points of view which are quite distinct: the one, morphological or structural, and the other, operative, dynamic, or functional.

When one adopts the point of view that I have just called morphological or structural, one holds as sick a man in whose body there is a visible deformation (an alteration of his macroscopic or microscopic form) or a material reality different from what that body should be. Health, according to this, is the state "morphologically normal" of the living body, and the "norm" is understood as the absence of "lesions" (pertaining to the "anatomic lesion" of Morgagni, the "cellular lesion" of Virchow, or the "biochemical lesion" of Peters) and of "foreign bodies" (a calculus, a poison, or a pathogenic germ). Radiographic examination in series (recruits, students, etc.) is perhaps the example most demonstrative of this way of understanding sickness and health.

Things change when the "objectivity" of the discriminative criterion is of the operative or functional kind. Healthy, in this case, is the man

whose vital functions exhibit an efficiency which is judged "normal." Now, this efficiency and the norm according to which it is judged can be referred to three orders of reality: the particular function of the different organs and systems that compose the human body ("functional tests" of a circulatory, renal, neurological, etc., kind), the entire activity of the individual in the society to which he belongs (conduct, professional work, military service), and the work of the person in the course of his life (creations, intellectual, artistic, political, etc.). In all these cases man appears before the inquirer as an active reality, productive or creative.

We see now that the idea of health possesses a complex structure. Under plea of example and exercise, we will examine a curious passage by Kant: "Because of my flattened and narrow thorax, which leaves little space for the movement of my heart and lungs, I have a natural disposition to hypochondria that in former years reached to a hatred of life. But the reflection that the cause of this cardiac difficulty was perhaps only mechanical and that, therefore, could not be abolished, convinced me not to worry about it; and in this way, while I felt the oppression in the breast, serenity and cheerfulness ruled in my head. In society, instead of showing the unstable temperament that characterizes hypochondriacs, I could express myself freely and naturally. And as in life we feel happier for that which we do in free use of it than for that which we delight in it, spiritual work can oppose a stimulating feeling of life to the impediments that appertain only to the body. The oppression has continued, because its cause resides in my bodily constitution; but, on the other hand, withdrawing my attention from those feelings, as if they were not mine, I have managed to impede their influence over my thoughts and my actions."¹

This is an important and suggestive passage. Leaving aside Kant's commentary—from which could be derived a complete treatise on medical anthropology—we will simply ask: When Kant was writing these lines, was he well or ill? The answer will depend on the point of view taken by the inquirer, because in the individual reality of the man, Immanuel Kant, the feelings of health (joy, freedom) coincided with the feelings of illness (pressure on the thorax), and an evident anomaly of his body (deformation of the thorax, deficiency in the functioning of

1. "Von der Macht des Gemüths durch den blossen Vorsatz seinen krankhaften Gefühle Meister zu sein," in *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, Book III, Part I.

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the respiratory and circulatory apparatus) with the excellence, not less evident, of that which we could well call the "biographical production" of his person (the works and longevity of Kant). Undoubtedly, the reality of the vital state that we call health and the idea that we form of that reality possess a complex structure.

Not only is the idea of health complex; it is also, as I said, historically variable. What in one historical situation is maintained as "illness" can, in another, be a special form of "health." In addition, the mode of understanding what "health" might be changes with the mentality of man and, consequently, with time and place.

In certain primitive societies of Siberia the trance of the shaman belongs to the "normality" of his life; he is for his fellow members an exceptional man, but not a sick man. What would be thought of him in the midst of a civilized European or American society: an individual who seriously, and not for fraud, firmly professes to have traveled to far lands and to dominate fire and spirits during his ecstatic trances? What judgment would he merit from those who deal with him?

On the other hand, the interpretation of what health and sickness might be changes historically. For an Assyrian, human sickness, insofar as it derives from the complex semantic designated by the word *shertu*, connotes the moral and religious impurity of the sick person. For an ancient Greek the morbid state was in many cases an impurity at the same time religious and physical (*lyma, miasma*). To be "healthy" was equivalent in both cases to being "pure." How can we forget, confronted by these conceptions of health and sickness, that the romantic sensibility (see Novalis) made the terms "sickness" and "distinction" synonymous? For a romantic a sick man capable of suffering "spiritually" his own sickness was a man much more "pure" than the most firm and robust person in complete health.

In regard to human life and insofar as conceived by the mind of man, the idea of health is, essentially and indubitably, a historic idea, a "creation" changing through times and places. There are few things more suggestive than to pursue through the ages, from the paleolithic to the present, the different attitudes of the human spirit toward that mode of living that we call "health." Within the limits of this short space I will have to be satisfied to present synoptically the attitudes adopted by men of the Western world, from Alcmaeon of Crotona to the present day.

My exposition will have a systematic character and not a chronological one. I will begin by distinguishing two cardinal modes of understanding the health of man, one pertaining to the naturalist view of the human being and the other to personalistic anthropology. Following these, I will distinguish, then, in each of these conceptions of health, oppositions between them which correspond to two other basic attitudes of the spirit: the classical attitude and the romantic or baroque, in the sense that Eugene D'Ors gave the term. Thus, there will appear, in terms of this double system of co-ordinates, the four principal types of the Occidental idea about health.

II.

Medieval philosophy conceived the reality of man as a unity of two constitutive moments, metaphysically distinct: the "nature," and the "presupposed" or "person"; the *natura ut quo*, that by which one is, the aggregate of the operations in which the being of man is realized physically, and the *suppositum ut quod*, that which one is, the center or presupposition of the free and intelligent acts by which man is a person. If I digest, feel, and think, it is because the capacity and even the necessity of digesting, feeling, and thinking belong to my "nature"; that I digest, feel, and think this or the other is a fact which is in some form dependent on the "presupposed" or "personal center" that freely regulates and orients—whatever might be the extent of my freedom—the movements of my nature.

We will accept this view of human reality as a heuristic scheme without entering into discussion of the profound anthropological problems that it poses. This being admitted, it is evident that in the history of western anthropology it should be possible to delineate two principal lines or orientations: that of those people for whom man is *completely* and *solely* nature, and that of the others who look at man as a reality at the same time natural and personal—more concisely, pure naturalism and personalism.

For the followers of pure anthropologic naturalism the reality of man would be exhausted in his physical or psychosomatic operations. This view is then blind to the personal "intimacy" of the human individual, or at the most, considered as a mere epiphenomenon of its nature. Thus liberty, responsibility, and morality are viewed as simply properties and affections of human nature, from which it is inferred that they

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belong constitutively and even exclusively, in metaphysical reality and psychological modality, to the two cardinal states of human nature—health and sickness. The perverse or malignant exercise of liberty would be a vital activity phenomenally distinct from fever or vomiting but metaphysically comparable one to the other. The “good will,” then, would pertain to “good health” as much as would the feelings of somatic well-being.

But this naturalistic idea of human health has realized itself historically according to the two canons of perfection that I mentioned before, the classic and the romantic. It will be well, therefore, to separate with care the two series of concepts that result from this realization.

The “classic” mentality has conceived of health as normality, equilibrium, or harmony. The “isonomy of the potencies” of Alcmenon of Crotona, the first natural scientific notion of man’s health, is perhaps the most ancient example, pure and simple, of a conception of human hygiene at once naturalistic and classical. According to Alcmeon, the man is healthy in whose nature is found harmoniously balanced the diverse contrapositions or “enantiosis” that form the hot and the cold, the humid and the dry, the sour and the sweet, and the rest of the “potencies” of the animal nature. Of equal anthropological significance as the isonomy of Alcmeon is the *eukrasia* or “good mixture” of the Hippocratic writings, although in this case the equilibrium might be referred not so much to the “potencies” or natural “properties” (hot, cold, etc.) as to the “humors that support them materially. For more than twenty centuries—until well into the eighteenth century—medical men of the Occident continued to conceive of health as the proper and harmonic constitution of the individual humors.

Plato tries to move “beyond Hippocrates” (*Phaedrus* 270c), and, in effect, he does so, because he considers that without the right order of the soul—*sophrosyne*—the health of man is not possible. Virtue, health, and *sophrosyne* constitutes a unitary complex, as he tells us in a beautiful passage from the *Philebus* (63e).² Without *emetria* or “right order” among the diverse components of the soul (beliefs, impulses, sentiments, and knowledge), individual human health would not be pos-

2. Passages similar to these or complementary in their meaning are found in *Gorgias* 526d, *Phaedo* 89d, *Republic* iii. 408e, *Laws* xii. 960d, and *Epistle* x. 358c. I have studied in some detail the Platonic attitude in confrontation with the problem of the relations between *sophrosyne* and health in “Die Platonische Rationalisierung der Besprechung und die Erfindung der Psychotherapie durch das Wort,” *Hermes*, LXXXVI (1958), 298–323.

sible. But, moving "beyond Hippocrates," Plato—the Plato of the *Philebus*—limits himself to complete the Alcmeonic and Hippocratic idea of health with the right order of the soul. This is, definitively, equilibrium, harmony, right and well-measured proportion. It would not be difficult to show that in Aristotle as well there is a strong relation between the idea of health and the ethical doctrine of the "just mean" (*mesotes*), according to which virtue would be a habit well centered and proportioned between the vicious extremes of excess and defect (*Nicomachean Ethics* ii. 9. 1109-20).

In one form or another this conception of human health as a harmonious equilibrium of the potencies or properties constituting the nature of man remains in the medical tradition of the Western world. It would be a very easy task to prove it documentally. But I am concerned now not with demonstrating what is evident to all but rather with supporting by means of concrete historic arguments the anthropological thesis which I have pointed out, that is, the fundamental relationship of liberty, responsibility, and morality to the idea of health, conceived according to the assumptions of naturalistic anthropology.

A passage from Galen will make very clear what is referred to as Hellenic naturalism: "Those who think that all men are capable of virtue, just as those who think that no man could be just by his own choice . . . have not seen but half of the nature of man. Men are born neither all enemies nor all friends of justice; they come to be what they are because of the humoral constitution of their body."³ Fever and the enmity toward justice would be only different forms of the same generic disorder; the morbid disorder of the humoral crisis, the rupture of the *eukrasia*. As to the expert in the correction of the disorders of human nature, it is the doctor who in principle ought "to treat" technically the injustice and the sinfulness of men.

Is it necessary to recall that in another form this is also the ethical doctrine of modern naturalism? Crime is the consequence of somatic anomaly more or less visible, affirms Lombroso in *L'Uomo delinquente*. The political is nothing but "medicine on a large scale," maintains Virchow. Since the nineteenth century the doctor has believed that in

3. Galen *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur* c. 11. Similar passages may be seen in the writings *De propriorum animi cuiusdam affectum dignotione et curatione* and *De de cuiuslibet animi peccatorum dignotione et medela*. For Galen the "sins" (*hamartemata*) would be disorders of human nature and therefore incumbent on the doctor.

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the near future he can be a maker of "men of good will." The medical techniques of the twentieth century—neurosurgery, endocrinology, psychopharmacology, depth psychotherapy, experimental genetics—seem to open resolutely the way towards accomplishment of this splendid and remarkable program.⁴

For the naturalist mentality, "health" and "perfection" of man are coincident concepts; human perfection is "physically" conceived, and physiology includes morality. Not a few followers of pure naturalism think, complementarily, that the health of man and therefore his total perfection consists in equilibrium, harmony or rule, in the good internal and external proportion of his specific and individual nature. An organism's capacity for "centering"—for adopting, in confronting the internal and external medium, a solidly "centered" vital position—is the best index for measuring "the height of his being," wrote Kurt Goldstein recently.⁵

But, opposed to this classical version of naturalistic anthropology, there is another that we may very well call "romantic"—Eugene d'Ors would say "baroque"—if we may use these two adjectives as names of a basic attitude of the human spirit and not as denominations of particular and transitory historical events. According to the "romantic" or "baroque" version of naturalism, the perfection of human nature—the total perfection of man—consists not in equilibrium but in creative disequilibrium; it is not harmonious proportion but a perfective violence. In sum, it should not be defined as a "rule" but as a "supernormality." Understood as mere equilibrium, "normality" would be vulgarity or commonness. The human individual would attain his maximum perfection exalting himself and making himself "genial" by means of his talents.

Plato clearly distinguishes two kinds of madness: morbid madness or

4. I will be satisfied to copy some lines from the biologist Jean Rostand: "Prolongation of existence, choice of the sex of children, posthumous fertilization, generation without the male parent, transformation of sex, pregnancy in a retort, modification of the organic characters before or after birth, chemical regulation of the temperament and character, genius or virtue on request . . . , all this appears at present as a proper or possible achievement of the science of tomorrow" ("Inquietudes d'un biologiste," in *Les Nouvelles littéraires*, XI [1958], 20).

5. *Der Aufbau des Organismus* (Hagg, 1934), p. 314. Consequently, for Goldstein—as for Lubarsch, Schilling, Aschoff, Grote, and others—health is security and equilibrium, and sickness is disequilibrium and threat (*ibid.*, pp. 266–72).

exalted lunacy (*Timaëus* 86*b*) and creative madness, diversified into the four species that he calls prophetic, telestic or ritual, poetic, and erotic (*Phaedrus* 244*a*–265*b*). The first is a sickness; the second gives perfection to human nature. Opposed to the doctrines of the *Charmides* and the *Philebus*, in which the perfection of man is equilibrium and harmony, these pages of *Phaedrus* teach clearly that man cannot be perfect if he does not become disequibrated and carried away by passion. Schelling tells us the same thing, in spite of the astronomic distance between his thought and that of Plato. The highest operation of the human mind, the unveiling of the metaphysical identity of nature and spirit, is the specific work of the genius: only by being “genial”—only by becoming disequibrated in an act of energetic creation—would man be able to approach the highest perfection of his nature.

For him who understands the perfection of man in this way, what, then, is health? Two attitudes seem possible. One may believe, in effect, that the perfection of individual human nature requires or includes health, with health conceived as capacity of disequilibrium or of expansion: the man will be called “healthy” whose nature can be expanded or disequibrated, without morbid alteration, to the full extent required by the strenuous creative outburst in which perfection consists. When in the *Phaedo* Socrates says that his zealous investigation of reality left him exhausted (*Phaedo* 99*d*), he seems to understand the health of his individual nature in just this way. However, one may also believe that the perfection of man—in Schelling’s system the genial act of spiritualizing nature—is not possible without nature’s losing the equilibrium that we usually call health; in other words, without becoming sick. The romantic experiencing of sickness (the romantic hero is always feverish and infirm) and the theory of the genius that post-romantic naturalism elaborated (the thesis underlying the formula “genius and madness”) are two clear examples of that extreme and exacting idea of human perfection.

The “romantic” or “baroque” mentality—in the most ample sense of these two adjectives—does not conceive perfection without disequilibrium. But is that mentality present only in those violent, idealistic, and impassioned men that people are accustomed to call “romantics”? Far from it! Aristotle, scarcely a “romantic” philosopher, held that without a certain excess of melancholy—without, then, a certain humoral disequilibrium, a certain *dyskrasia*—human excellence is not possible

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(Problem 954a, b). And that most serene Goethe, this time following the Stagirite, wrote centuries later:

Proper to the genius of poetry
this element: melancholy.⁶

Would perfection without disequilibrium be, finally, a rigorously superhuman perfection?

III.

Since the time that Christianity was realized historically, man has always seen in himself something more than pure "nature"; he has always thought of himself as being also "person," "rational substance," or "spirit."⁷ Man "is" his own nature. Expressions such as "I am blond," "I am dyspeptic," or "I am impassioned" are grammatically and metaphysically unobjectionable. Man "is" his soul and body. But, this being true, it seems that the expression "I am" acquires a special depth when its predicate is constituted by the more intimate and proper acts of the person who speaks, and not by the properties or the material realities of his nature: "I am my thought," "I am my love," "I am my freedom." With a little rectification of the well-known contraposition of G. Marcel between *être* and *avoir*, one could say that man "is" his nature "in having it," and that he "is" his person—his personal life—"in being it."⁸ The "I" and the "I am," Scheler taught, can have very different levels in the reality of the man who pronounces these words. Stated in another way: for personalistic anthropology, the "nature" of man—his body, his diverse psychical powers—is found to be unitarily regulated

6. Concerning the function of melancholy in Aristotelian anthropology and in the ulterior vicissitudes of the psychological problem of the genius, see J. Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères* (Liège and Paris, 1932); H. Flashar, "Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik," *Hermes*, LXXXIV (1956), 12-48; and E. Zilsel, *Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs* (Tübingen, 1926).

7. Permit me to use these three words without having historically and systematically studied the meaning of each one. I limit myself to indicating that with the word "spirit" I am referring to the "personal spirit" of each human individual and not to the *Geist* of the idealist philosophy.

8. Therefore, "doing it." Man "is" personally, in the strict sense of the term, that what of himself he "does" freely. Up to what point can man "make" his own nature? For the time being, making it his own, accepting it. Personally, "I am thin" in the proportion in which I make "mine"—I accept—my own thinness.

On the notion of "persona" in present-day philosophy see the *Ethics* of Scheler and the work of X. Zubiri, "The Problem of Man," *Index*, XII (1958), 3.

from an "intimate center" that transcends it; a center in which freedom and responsibility have their origin, their seat, and their condition of imputation. Moral perfection and excellence of spirit are reached by man through the operations of his individual nature, but they do not belong ultimately and formally to his nature.

The contrast with the naturalist conception cannot be more flagrant. For naturalism, the freedom and responsibility of man are expressions of human nature and consequently depend essentially on health and sickness. For personalism, on the other hand, responsibility is not formally and ultimately imputable to the nature of man, and therefore his admitted dependence on health and sickness is never more than partial and accidental. "Bad conscience" is not in itself a sickness, although it can engender it, and criminal impulses are perfectly compatible with the best health and the most perfect beauty of the body. There is nothing more "anti-Lambrosian" than the idea of man which underlies the present-day detective story. Vice versa, the most sublime spiritual perfection, in the moral order as well as in the intellectual and artistic order, can coincide with the most detestable natural health. To demonstrate this, we have Theresa of Jesus, Theresa of Lisieux, Novalis, and Kant.

But, just as in the case of pure naturalism, we could not understand completely the personalist idea of health if we did not distinguish in it the two modes of conceiving it that I have called "classic" and "romantic."

There is, in effect, a conception at once "personalist" and "classic" of health and perfection. Health and perfection are in this case modes of human reality essentially distinct, but not independent of each other. Both together would consist in the harmonious composition of two elements: the psychic and somatic equilibrium of human nature on the one hand and the orderly moderation in the exercise of one's own freedom on the other. The perfection of man would be the result of combining health and equanimity, the latter understood not as simple *emmetria* or the right ordering of the soul but as the serene and well-measured exercise of personal freedom. A minstrel of Christian classicism so highly respected as Fray Luis de Leon says:

Let me be awakened by the birds
With their delightful singing, unlearned,
Not the grave concerns

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By which is always followed
He who to another's will is subjected.⁹

Fray Luis aimed at Christian perfection and wanted to achieve it through health and equanimity. Would the partisans of a "romantic" conception of personal perfection—wild and impassioned—think in this way? Would they want the trill of the birds to awaken them? Without subjecting themselves to another's will, moved to personal action from the depths of their own souls, would they not usually find themselves awake before the lark begins his morning song? The perfection of man here consists in utilizing the possibilities granted by his nature—his capacities and talents of all kinds—in the service of a noble and arduous task, conceived and desired beyond that nature, in the transphysical and personal center, where his liberty resides and from where it springs.

But here as well there are two ways of conceiving the relation between perfection and health and therefore of health itself. For some, the creative and perfective violence in the exercise of personal liberty and the disequilibrium or decentering of the nature that necessarily accompanies this exercise should not by rights upset the state of health. Even by use of force, the attainment of perfection is and ought to be compatible with an ultimate respect for the order of nature; moreover, this is required. This is the spiritual attitude of Christian mystics and ascetics. Ignatius of Loyola wrote to a nun who had asked advice concerning her spiritual perfection: "With a sound body you could do much, with a sick one I don't know what you could do." He is then perfect—he approximates perfection—who, without, sickness consumes his health in the accomplishment of a high undertaking, and he is healthy whose nature is capable of being disequibrated and decentered without being morbidly affected in all that the forceful surrender to such an undertaking requires from him; that is, saintliness, heroism, intellectual or artistic work, or political action. In short, perfection is here the result of combining health and magnanimity, the responsive elasticity of nature, and the voluntary ordering of life toward noble and arduous ends.

But not everyone has thought in this way. Novalis, believing in the personal spirit and being highly romantic, held as true that in this world

9. Fray Luis de Leon was classic and serene in his poetry (and, at that, not always, as Damas Alonso has so ably demonstrated); but at the same time he was melancholic and bilious in his life.

there could not be perfection for man without sickness. To be truly eminent—to fulfill with success the avid effort that the spiritual perfection of his person demands from his nature—man has to feel a breaking of the natural equilibrium of which health consists. Human life would be a kind of infirmity of the relation between the spirit and nature; to live with the purpose of perfection is to know that you are sick and to know how to “utilize” your own sickness. Novalis wrote that “we still know very poorly the art of utilizing sicknesses. Probably, these are the stimulus and the most interesting subject matter of our meditation and our activity.” It does not appear unfair to affirm that, for Novalis and a considerable number of the romantics, sickness is man’s health at its highest. But I have already said that romanticism is more an attitude of the spirit than a concrete historical event. When, well into the twentieth century, Victor von Weizsäcker maintained that human sickness is “a sighing of the creature” and “a development of the conscience produced by a corporal event”—and, at the same time, “a corporal event produced by a development of the conscience”¹⁰—his words gave new life and new force to the romantic and personalist thought of Novalis.

But, whether classic or romantic in its orientation, personalism is gradually gaining strength and realization in the anthropology and medicine of our century. Fifty years ago everyone thought, without a shadow of a doubt—better, perhaps, to say everyone believed—that medicine was pure “science of nature,” of “nature” without adjectives. Today, those are legion who believe and think that medicine, insofar as it is scientific, is and should be “science of *human* nature”; therefore, of a “nature” specified by its belonging to the personal being that we call “man.”

In the conception of personalism is inscribed the present-day idea of health; sometimes in a resolutely and perhaps ingenuously religious manner. In a convention dedicated to the “medicine of the person” (Bossey, 1948), forty doctors from nine countries and of four religious faiths unanimously subscribed to the following concept of human health: “*Health* means something more than a mere not being sick; it consists in a turning of the body, the soul, and the spirit toward God. For that reason, it demands from us an attitude of responsibility, hon-

10. “Stücke einer medizinischen Anthropologie,” in *Arzt und Kranker* (Stuttgart, 1949), p. 147; “Nasci hic in corpore mortali, incipere aegrotare est,” wrote St. Augustine (*En. in Psalmos* cii. 6).

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esty, disinterestedness, and internal freedom and love; in short, an induction without conditions, in the order legislated by God." Other times, the relation of health to the person is expressed more cautiously and reflexively, in a way that we may well call prereligious or humanistic. R. Siebeck has written that "health is not complete without a satisfactory answer to the question: Health for what? We do not live in order to be healthy, but we are and want to be healthy in order to live and to produce."¹¹ To human health belongs constitutively a "for what?" that is not included within itself. The aspiration to an end that transcends it is inscribed in an inevitable way in the physical and metaphysical structure of man's health; an end that day by day must be proposed to him by the vocation and freedom of the person possessing this health. But the connection between health and the end is of such an intimate and individual kind that only when rightly ordered toward the latter can the former acquire value and fulfilment, and this is the reason why Plato could say that health and *sophrosyne* follow virtue (*arete*) as her court follows a goddess (*Philebus* 63e). Health, a concept belonging to the order of nature, and, consequently, to what is nature in man, is actually specified and individualized when man is person.

IV.

Insofar as he is servant and agent of the perfection of man, what will be the mission of the doctor within the conceptions of an anthropology sharply personalistic? Naturalism—the ancient as well as the modern—attributes to the doctor three principal missions: to cure the sick, to prevent disease, and—since for him morality belongs to nature—to make "men of good will." A society of sound, just, and happy men—in whom, by virtue of scientific and technical knowledge, nature might be faithful to itself—constitutes and will always constitute the utopia of the crassly naturalistic medical man.

But it happens that man is not *pure* nature; to the point that some like Ortega have said hyperbolically that man does not have "nature," because what he has is "history."¹² For both the misery and greatness of man, the health of his nature—the hygiene of his body and of his spiritual faculties—can coincide with the "bad will" of his personal

11. *Medizin in Bewegung* (Stuttgart, 1949), p. 486.

12. It is a question, as I say, of a hyperbolic expression and not of a formal thesis. In other parts of his work Ortega qualifies this statement.

intimacy; although in some cases—for example, in that of the integrants of the morbid entity that Anglo-Saxon psychiatry calls *moral insanity*—the “bad will” has a strong causal determination and even a quasi-necessity of a pathological character. The most healthy man can be unjust, and the most just man can have a sickly life. With or without dramatization the figure of Job is constantly before us. In this case what will be the third mission of the doctor? Besides curing disease and preventing it, what might he do in the service of the perfection of the human being?

Man is *at the same time* nature and person. From one point of view he is personal nature, and from another, as X. Zubiri and G. Marcel used to say, he is incarnated spirit. The task of knowing and treating a man as man requires that one consider *at the same time* what in human reality is nature and person in a unitary, solitary, and indissoluble way. But, this being so, it is also true that the moral disorder of human reality (the “sin,” understood as a discordance between the life of a man and the moral beliefs that he professes) and the physical disorder of that reality (the “infirmity,” conceived as an afflictive and dangerous alteration of nature) should not be confused with each other; and the mission of the doctor does not consist in erasing and preventing the sin but in curing and preventing sickness. The doctor should know and treat the “whole man,” but always *from* the physical and psychosomatic side of a reality at once natural and personal—perhaps better: “physiopersonal”—of that “whole man.” How? What should be the conduct of the doctor face-to-face with the intimacy of the sick man? This is my formula: The moral ends and ultimate beliefs of human existence cannot and should not be foreign to the *consideration, esteem, and the operation* of the doctor, not only because medical practice ought to find itself deontologically ordered by a set of moral rules, but also because the sickness itself is on occasions the expression or cause of a secret moral and belief disorder in the psychological intimacy of the patient. Nevertheless, at the same time, and because of the essential imperative of what in itself is the activity of the doctor, the moral ends and ultimate beliefs of human existence ought to remain free from the *determining decision* of the therapist and hygienist. The doctor can and ought to collaborate with the politician and with the religiomoral equator; but, insofar as he is a medical man, he should not—even more, he cannot—assume the functions of

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both one and the other. The personal intimacy of the sick man—his freedom and ultimate beliefs—should be, for the doctor, the object of immense respect, even if he is far from sharing those beliefs and although in his conscience he might think that they should be substituted by others objectively “better.” The mission of the doctor consists in seeing that the sick man becomes well without ceasing to be “himself,” and this in the two areas, the social and the private, in which his operation is realized.

Let us consider the social aspect of medical activity. In regard to social activity, should medicine be confused with politics? Perhaps, according to Virchow’s phrase, politics is “medicine on a large scale”; but, in such a case, the technician of that “medicine” should not be the doctor but the politician, the inventor and orderer of the collective ends of man. As a doctor, the medical man cannot be a politician. I do not say that he *should* not, but that he *cannot*. Being a politician, converting himself to inventor and orderer of collective ends, he loses, *ipso facto*, his own being.

On the occasion of his retirement festivity Kretschmer just told his Western audience that: “Public health is not before all things a problem of bacteria, but rather a problem of ethics.” When the specter of the great epidemics has been almost totally eradicated from the planet, such a judgment is a great and opportune truth, and the psychiatrist Kretschmer, in proclaiming it, has executed a strict duty of the medical man. But, as a doctor, Kretschmer cannot and should not go beyond this. To order that people live in fact ethically—to point out to the people the collective ends which are ethically good and to order that such ends be fulfilled—is not incumbent on the doctor but is the mission of the politician and the pastor of souls. To be the counselor of the politician—to point out to him and to the people what is true and what is convenient—is not the same as assuming the mission of the politician.

Are things different in the private sphere of medical activity? In giving premarital counsel, prescribing a pharmacological treatment or a plan of life for a sick person, the doctor can be seen in the role of inventing and proposing vital ends new to the person who consults him. Today, the data of physical exploration, the auscultation, the chemical analyses, the radiographic or endoscopic pictures, and the electrographic curves do not suffice; if he is to fulfil his mission rightly,

his mind must penetrate into the psychic and moral intimacy of the patient. The intelligence and will of the doctor must necessarily operate in the secret zone of life where the ultimate beliefs lie and where the most personal ends are decided upon and ordered. But for what? To change these beliefs for others, in favor of the authority that he as a doctor has over the person who has sought his help? If those beliefs were morbid, of course! However, if they are not so, he ought to respect them with infinite delicacy and attain the cure while taking them into account. By proceeding in any other way, he ceases to be a doctor and becomes a moral vampire, a proselytist, or a seductor. Perhaps this is the maximum temptation and danger of doctors who are personally and technically more efficient.¹³ If the unavoidable task of treating the "whole man" is huge and immeasurable (*ungeheuerlich*), in the precise expression of von Weizsäcker, it could also be—as L. van Krehl lucidly warned more than thirty years ago—impious, profane, and a transgression against the sacred domain of the personal intimacy (*Freventlich*). The moral greatness of the doctor consists in operating with technical efficacy and without moral blemish in the midst of these risks.

I asked before: Insofar as he is servant and agent of the perfection of man, what will be the mission of the doctor of personalist mentality? The answer is clear: this doctor will not take upon himself, on his own account, the task of making men better; but with the resources of his science and his art—traditional therapy, public health, dietetics, psychosurgery, psychopharmacology, depth psychotherapy, social psycho-prophylaxis—he will try to give to men the conditions, resources, and possibilities of a psychic and somatic kind so that, freely and creatively, making the best possible use of their health, they may live better. Great is the mission of the doctor, that of aiding men in the right and efficient exercise of their own liberty. But he who truly exercises his liberty, he who sees himself in the critical position of giving a precise answer to the "for what" of his health, can he cast out of his soul the "poignant feeling" of which Garcilaso sang and "Azorin" has made real? More than once have I copied the great writer's clear and profound words: "Eternity, abysmal eternity of pain! The human species

13. Concerning the relation between the activity of the doctor and seduction, see J. Rof Carballo, "El Problema del seductor in Kierkegaard, Proust, and Rilke," *Cuadernos hispanoamericanos*, Nos. 102, 103, 1958.

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will progress marvelously; there will be accomplished the most fruitful transformations. Close to a balcony, in a city, in a house, there will always be a man whose sad and meditative head rests upon his hands. They cannot take from him his poignant feeling."

Adapting this brief meditation to our theme, we will try to divine the life of man of the future. Through the conjoined efforts of the doctor and of the society to which he belongs, this man is healthy of body and of soul. His somatic and psychic functions are as perfect as one would wish. This man, to boot, uses the capacities of his organism for the realization of an ambitious personal work: his good health depends not on jovial vegetation but on creating, with humanity and magnanimity. But, because he is free and creative, he cannot be a happy creature. He will surely know gaiety but will still, on a balcony, in a city, in a house, sometimes rest his head upon his arm, meditative and sad. They cannot take from him his poignant feeling. That this "poignant feeling" remain only intimate and personal, that it not be contaminated and aggravated by ailments of body and soul, that when it occurs it be as guest of a vigorous nature and not as a defect of a sick nature, would not this be now and always the best contribution of the doctor to human perfection?

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THE PROBLEM OF INVARIANCE IN ANTHROPOLOGY¹

In Iroquois and Algonquin legend there is the story of a girl who submits in the dark of night to a man she believes to be her brother. Every detail seems to identify him: physical appearance, clothing, a scratched cheek attesting to the heroine's virtue. When formally accused by her, the brother reveals that he has a second self (*Sosie*) or, more precisely, a double; the bond between them is so strong that everything befalling the one is automatically transmitted to the other: the torn garment, the wounded face. In order to convince his incredulous sister, the young man kills his double before her eyes, but with this single blow he pronounces his own death sentence, since their destinies are one.

Now, the victim's mother would like to avenge her son; she is a powerful sorceress and ruler of the owls. There is but one way to avoid her vengeance: the sister must be united with the brother, who will pass himself off as the double whom he has killed. The idea of incest is so

Translated by James H. Labadie.

1. Extract from the inaugural lecture of the chair of social anthropology at the Collège de France, given in Paris, January 5, 1960.

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inconceivable that the old woman will not suspect the deception. The owls will not be duped, however, and they will denounce the guilty pair, who will nonetheless succeed in escaping.

The European listener has no difficulty in recognizing in this myth a theme rooted in the Oedipus legend: the very precautions taken to avoid incest serve only to render it inevitable; in both cases the *coup de théâtre* results from the identity of characters first presented as distinct beings. Is this mere coincidence—with different causes explaining that in both cases the same motifs are arbitrarily joined—or does the analogy spring from deeper reasons? In effecting the comparison have we not touched on a significant fragment of a whole?

An affirmative answer would constitute the brother-sister incest of the Iroquois myth as a permutation of that between mother and son in the Oedipus legend. The conjecture making the Indian myth inevitable—double personality of the masculine hero—would be a permutation of Oedipus' double identity, presumed to be dead but still living, a condemned child and a triumphant hero. To complete the demonstration we should have to discover in the American myths a transformation of the Sphinx episode, the only element of the Oedipean legend still lacking.

Now in this particular case (and this is why we have chosen it in preference to others) the test would be truly crucial: as Boas was the first to remark, riddles or enigmas are, along with proverbs, a genre almost completely absent among North American Indians. If, therefore, enigmas were to be found in the semantic entourage of American myth, they would be not the effect of chance but rather a proof of their necessity.

In all of North America we know of but two "enigma" situations unquestionably of native origin: among the Pueblo Indians of the Southwest there exists a family of ceremonial buffoons, described in myths as being born of an incestuous relationships, who ask riddles of their spectators. Now it will be recalled that the sorceress of the myth described above, who menaces the life of the hero, is a mistress of the owls. There are also Algonquin myths in which owls, or sometimes their ancestors, ask riddles of the hero under pain of death. Thus in America, too, riddles offer a doubly Oedipean character: on the one hand through incest and on the other hand through the owl, in which we may see an American Sphinx in transposed form.

Thus among peoples separated by history, geography, language, and culture, the same correlation between riddle and incest seems to exist. For the sake of comparison, let us construct a model of the riddle, expressing as best we can its constant properties in the various mythologies, and let us define it from this point of view as a question to which its is postulated that there is no answer. But, without here going into all the possible transformations of this statement, let us reverse the terms with this result: an answer for which there is no question.

This appears to be an utterly meaningless formula. And yet it is striking that there are myths, or fragments of myths, for which this symmetrical and inverse structure constitutes the dramatic mainspring. Time does not permit the recounting of American examples. I shall simply recall the death of Buddha, rendered inevitable when a disciple fails to pose the expected question, and, closer to us, the old myths reworked in the Grail cycle, in which the action is suspended by the hero's timidity in the presence of the magic vessel when he dares not ask "what it is used for."

Do these myths have an independent existence, or must they be considered as one species of a vaster genus of which myths of the Oedipean type merely form another species? Repeating the previous procedure, we shall seek to discover whether, and to what degree, the characteristic elements of one group may be viewed as permutations (which shall here be inversions) of elements characteristic of the other group. And this is indeed what happens: from a hero who abuses sexual intercourse, since he goes so far as to commit incest, we pass to a chaste and abstinent hero; a subtle character, who knows all the answers, yields to an innocent, does not even know how to question. In the American variants of this second type, and in the Grail cycle, the problem to be resolved is that of the *gaste pays*, that is, of summer revoked. Now all the American myths of the first "Oedipean" type are related to an eternal winter, which the hero revokes when he solves the riddles and heralds the approach of summer. To oversimplify greatly, Parsifal appears as an Oedipus in reverse—a hypothesis we would not have dared to envisage had it been necessary to compare a Greek source with a Celtic source but which imposes itself in a North American source, where the two types are present in the same peoples.

The demonstration is not yet concluded. As soon as it is established, within a semantic system, that there is between chastity and "the answer

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without a question" a relationship homologous to that between incestuous intercourse and "the question without an answer," it must also be admitted that these two statements, sociobiological in form, have also a homologous relationship with the two statements in grammatical form. Between the solution of the riddle and the incest there is a relationship, not external and in fact but internal and in reason, and this is why civilizations as different as those of classical antiquity and primitive America may associate them independently from each other. Like the solved riddle, incest brings together terms destined to remain separated: the son unites with the mother, the brother with the sister, as does the answer in successfully joining the question, contrary to every expectation.

In the Oedipus legend the marriage with Jocasta does not arbitrarily follow the victory over the Sphinx. Aside from the fact that myths of the Oedipean type (of which we now offer a precise definition) always assimilate the discovery of incest to the solution of a living riddle personified in the hero, on different levels and in differing languages, their various episodes re-echo each other, and they provide the same demonstration that is found in the old Grail myths in inverted form. The audacious union of masked words, or of blood relatives unknown to each other, engenders rotting and fermentation, unleashes natural forces—remember the Theban plague—while sexual impotence (as well as impotence to plot a proposed dialogue) dries up animal and vegetable fecundity.

To these two prospects which might attract his imagination—those of a summer or a winter equally endless, but one of which would be shameless to the point of corruption, the other pure to the point of sterility—man must resolve to prefer the balance and periodicity of seasonal rhythm. In the natural order this corresponds to the function fulfilled on the social level by exchanging women in marriage, exchanging words in conversation, on condition that both be practiced with the frank intention of communicating, that is, without ruse or perversion and especially without ulterior motive.

We have been content here to sketch the broad lines of a demonstration, to illustrate this problem of invariance which social anthropology is attempting to resolve along with other sciences but which, in social

anthropology, appears as the modern form of a question it has always asked: that of the universality of human nature.

Do we not turn our backs on this human nature when, in order to detect our invariants, we replace the data of experience with models for which we devote ourselves to abstract operations as does the algebraist with his equations? We have occasionally been accused of this. But aside from the fact that the objection is of little weight for the practitioner—who knows with what painstaking fidelity to concrete reality he pays for the liberty he grants himself in taking a broad view for a few brief moments—I should like to mention that, in proceeding this way, the social anthropologist is merely picking up on his own account a forgotten part of the program outlined for him by Durkheim and Mauss.

In the preface to the second edition of *Règles de la méthode sociologique* Durkheim defends himself against the accusation of having mistakenly separated the collective from the individual. This separation is necessary, he says, but he does not rule out the possibility that in the future "there will be conceived the possibility of a quite formal psychology, which would be a sort of common ground of individual psychology and of sociology. . . . It would be necessary," Durkheim continues, "to attempt to learn, by the comparison of mythic themes, of popular legends and traditions, of languages, how social representations recall and exclude each other, how they fuse with each other or are clearly distinguished." This research, he concludes, lies somewhat in the jurisdiction of abstract logic. It is curious to note how close Lévy-Bruhl would have been to this program had he not at first chosen to relegate mythic representations to the antechamber of logic, and had he not made the separation irremediable by later renouncing the notion of prelogical thought. But in this, as the English say, he "threw out the baby with the bath water" by denying to the "primitive mentality" the cognitive character he had conceded to it at the beginning and consigning it entirely to the area of affectivity.

More nearly faithful to the Durkheimian conception of an "obscure psychology" underlying social reality, Mauss oriented anthropology "toward the search for that which is common to all men. . . . Men communicate through symbols . . . but they are able to have these symbols, and to communicate through them, only because all have the same instincts."

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Is not such a conception, which is also the author's, open to another criticism? The objection will be raised that, if our final aim is to reach certain universal forms of thought and morality (for the *Essai sur le don* ends in moral conclusions), why give a privileged place to the societies you call primitive? Should one not, by hypothesis, obtain the same results by taking any given society as a point of departure? It is this last problem which I should like to consider.

This is all the more necessary in that certain ethnologists and sociologists, who are studying societies in rapid transformation, may contest what seems to be the conception I implicitly form of primitive societies. It is possible to believe that their supposedly distinctive characteristics are but an illusion, the effect of our own ignorance of what really takes place. Objectively, these characteristics do not correspond to reality.

There is no doubt that the character of ethnographical inquiry is modified as the tiny savage tribes we used to study are absorbed into larger groups whose problems tend to resemble our own. But if it is true, as Mauss has taught us, that ethnology is an original mode of understanding, rather than a source of particular understandings, we must simply conclude that ethnology today is administered in two ways: in the pure state and in a diluted state. To seek to deepen its study precisely where its method is being blended with other methods, where its object is being confused with other objects, does not show a healthy scientific attitude.

What, then, are the reasons for our predilection for these societies which, for want of a better term, we call "primitive," though they certainly are not?

Let us admit frankly that the first reason is of a philosophical order. As M. Merleau-Ponty has written: "Each time the sociologist [but he is thinking of the anthropologist] returns to the living sources of his knowledge, to that which operates in him as a means of understanding the cultural formations furthest removed from himself, he spontaneously philosophizes." And, as a matter of fact, research in the field, where every ethnological career begins, is the mother and nursemaid of doubt, the philosophical attitude par excellence. This "anthropological doubt" consists not merely in knowing that one knows nothing but in resolutely exposing what one thinks he knows, even one's own ignorance, to the insults and denials inflicted upon one's dearest ideas and habits by those ideas and habits which may contradict them to the

highest degree. Contrary to what may seem apparent, we believe that it is in its most strictly philosophical method that ethnology is distinguished from sociology. The sociologist objectivizes, for fear of being duped. The ethnologist does not have this fear, since he is not condemned in advance to extirpate all its nuances and details, even its values—everything, in a word, in which the observer of his own society runs the risk of being implicated.

The anthropologist does, however, risk one danger in choosing a subject and an object radically distant from one another: that understanding, lawful prize of the object, may not reach its intrinsic properties but limit itself to expressing the relative and ever changing position of the subject in relation to the object. It is, in fact, quite possible that his supposed ethnological understanding may be condemned to remain as bizarre and inadequate as that which an exotic visitor would have of our own society. The Indian Kwakiutl, whom Boas sometimes used to invite to New York as an informant, was indifferent to the spectacle of skyscrapers and streets filled with automobiles. He reserved all his intellectual curiosity for the dwarfs, giants, and bearded ladies on exhibit in the Times Square area, for the workings of the Automat, and for brass knobs at the ends of the bannisters. For reasons that I cannot go into here, all these things brought his own culture into the picture, and what he did was to seek evidence of that culture in certain aspects of ours.

In their own way, do not ethnologists yield to the same temptation when they allow themselves, as they so often do, to interpret native customs and institutions anew, with the unavowed aim of making them conform more closely to the theories of the day? The problem of totemism, which several of us hold to be diaphanous and insubstantial, for years weighed heavily on ethnological thought, and we now realize that this importance grew out of a certain taste for the obscene and the grotesque, which was like an infantile malady of religious science: negative projection of an uncontrollable fear of the sacred, from which the observer has been unable to free himself. Thus, the theory of totemism was constituted "for us," not "in itself," and there is no guarantee that in its present forms it does not proceed from a similar illusion.

Ethnologists of my generation are confused by the repulsion which the research to which he had devoted his life inspired in Frazer. "A tragic chronicle," he wrote, "of man's errors: follies, vain efforts, lost time,

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frustrated hopes." We are scarcely less surprised to learn, in the *Carnets*, what a Lévy-Bruhl thought of myths, which, according to him, "no longer have any effect on us . . . [they are] strange, not to say absurd and incomprehensible . . . tales . . . [and] it requires an effort to take any interest in them." We have, to be sure, acquired a direct knowledge of the forms of exotic life and thought lacking in our predecessors; but is it not also true that surrealism—that is, a development within our own society—transformed our sensibilities, and that we owe to it the discovery, or rediscovery, of a lyricism and an integrity in the heart of our own studies?

Let us then resist the charms of a naïve objectivism, while we understand that the very precariousness of our position as observers provides us with unsuspected guaranties of objectivity. Insofar as so-called primitive societies are very far removed from our own, we may encounter in them those "acts of general functioning," mentioned by Mauss, which may well be "more universal" and have "more reality." In these societies (and I am still quoting Mauss) "one grasps men, groups, and behaviors. . . one sees them move as if mechanically, one sees masses and systems." This observation, obviously enjoying the advantages of distance, no doubt implies certain basic differences between these societies and ours: astronomy does not merely require that the heavenly bodies be distant; it is just as important that time there flows in a different rhythm; otherwise the Earth would have ceased to exist long before the birth of astronomy.

The societies called "primitive" are, to be sure, situated in history; their past is as old as ours, since it goes back to the beginnings of the species. In thousands of years they have undergone all kinds of transformations: they have passed through periods of prosperity and crisis; they have known wars, migrations, adventure. But they have specialized along paths different from those we have chosen. In some ways they may have remained close to very ancient conditions of life; this does not exclude the possibility that in other ways they may be farther from these conditions than we are.

While a part of history, these societies seem to have developed or retained a special wisdom which impels them to resist desperately every modification of their structure which would permit history to intrude upon them. Those which had until recently best preserved their distinc-

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tive character appear to us as societies predominantly inspired by a desire to maintain their own existence. Their way of exploiting their environment assures them at once a modest standard of living and the protection of their natural resources. Despite their diversity, their rules governing marriage offer to the view of demographers a common characteristic, which is an extreme limitation and constant maintenance of the fertility rate. Finally, a political life based on consent and admitting no decisions other than unanimous ones seems in them to be conceived for the purpose of excluding the use of that motive force in group life which utilizes such differentiating factors as party in power and opposition, majority and minority, exploiters and exploited.

In a word, these societies, which might be called "cold" because their internal environment approaches zero in historical temperature, are distinguished from the "hot" societies by their limited effective force and their mechanical method of functioning. The "hot" societies have appeared at various spots in the world since the neolithic revolution; in them, differentiations among castes and classes are endlessly sought after for the energy and upward movement they provide.

The importance of this distinction is primarily theoretical, for there probably exists no concrete society which, in its entirety and in each of its parts, corresponds exactly to one or the other type. The distinction remains a relative one in another sense as well if it is true, as we believe, that social anthropology follows a double motivation: a retrospective one, since primitive ways of life are on the point of disappearing, so that we must hasten to learn what lessons we can from them; and a prospective one, to the extent that we, aware of an evolution increasing in speed, already feel ourselves to be the "primitives" of our own great-grandchildren and seek to validate ourselves by drawing closer to those who were—and will continue to be for a short time—what some of us persist in remaining.

Neither, on the other hand, do the societies which I called "hot" possess this character in an absolute sense. When, after the neolithic revolution, the great city-states of the Mediterranean basin and the Far East instituted slavery, they constructed a type of society in which differentiations among men—some dominating, others dominated—might be utilized for the production of culture, at a speed inconceivable and unhoped for up to that time. In terms of this formula the mechanistic revolution of the nineteenth century represents less an evolution

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oriented in the same direction than it does the faulty outline of a different solution: still, for a long time, based on the old abuses and the old injustices while, at the same time, making possible the transfer to culture of that dynamic function which the protohistoric revolution had assigned to society.

If the anthropologist—God forbid—should be asked to predict the future of humanity, he would doubtless conceive it not as a prolongation or an extension of current forms but rather as a model of integration progressively unifying the characteristics proper to cold and hot societies. His effections would resume a connection with the old Cartesian dream of placing machines at the service of men. They would follow the traces of this idea in the social philosophy of the eighteenth century even as far as Saint-Simon, who, by announcing the transition from “the government of men to the administration of things,” anticipated both the anthropological distinction between culture and society and the conversion which appears to us at least possible from the progress of the theory of information and from electronics: progress from a type of civilization long since inaugurated by historical “becoming,” at the price of a transformation of men into machines, to an ideal civilization which would succeed in transforming machines into men. At that point, when culture would have been integrally charged with the task of forging progress, society would be freed from the age-old curse which forced it to enslave men in order to make progress possible. History would henceforth be quite alone, and society, placed outside and above history, would once again be able to assume that regular and quasi-crystalline structure which, the best-preserved of primitive societies teach us, is not contradictory to humanity. It is in this admittedly Utopian view that social anthropology would find its highest justification, since the forms of life and thought which it studies would no longer be of mere historic and comparative interest. They would correspond to a permanent possibility of man, over which social anthropology would have a mission to stand watch, especially in man’s darkest hours.

To Jean Ullmo

THE CONSECRATION OF HISTORY:
AN ESSAY ON THE GENEALOGY OF
THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

How did it become possible to *philosophize* about history? Man has generally sought to locate himself in natural space rather than in historical time. The various oriental philosophies give no place to history. "Humanistic" Greece herself, in other respects so eager to explore human conduct in all its characteristic dimensions and in all its aspects, prudently recoiled from anything which might give value to time or cause history to appear as the specifically human mode of existence. No other culture, perhaps, carried so far the concern for harmonizing human relationships, and yet the idea of progress was completely lacking in it.¹ The organization of the terrestrial city always remained the central point of the reflection of Greek poets and philosophers, who

Translated by Wells F. Chamberlin.

1. Cf. Kostas Papaioannou, "Nature and History in the Greek Conception of the Cosmos," *Diogenes*, No. 25 (Spring, 1959), pp. 1-27

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were almost all teachers and law-givers—but they never thought to situate the true destiny of man in the historical world, much less to grant man a place in the universe which would make him forget the precariousness of his condition and his subordination to that which surpasses him. And, if we listen to Aristotle: "The life of moral virtue," he says, "is happy only in a secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human, ἀνθρωπικαί."² Naturally, "it is true that, being a man and living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in virtuous action, and so will need external goods to carry on his life as a human being, πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπωνεσθαι."³ But we must take care not to assert "that man is superior to the other animals . . . since there are other things far more divine in their nature than man, for instance, to mention the most visible (φανερωτάτα), the things of which the things of which the celestial system is composed."⁴ Aristotle was referring to the stars—and, indeed, it was in the circular motions of the luminaries, much more than in the human domain, that the classic Greeks saw that which is manifested in being with the greatest splendor. If we limit ourselves to the specifically human—as do those whom Plotinus designates under the frankly disdainful term οἱ ἀνθρωπικώτεροι⁵—we risk losing contact with the Good that revolves in the cosmos and is our sole guaranty against the senseless non-being which threatens us from every side. Under these conditions the question of knowing whether or not history has meaning, and whether or not it is provided with an appropriate logic which expresses the profound structure of our being, appears meaningless.

Resistance to history grows as we leave Greece. But, whether, as in Chinese cosmology, the world "repeats itself" in concentric zones fitted into each other, from the human body to the ends of the earth, or whether, as for the Greeks, it is the "model" to which human relationships must conform, it is always conceived as a totality with a unity which nothing can and certainly nothing will break. Whatever the

2. *Nicomachean Ethics* x. 8. 1. 1178a.9–10. (Trans. Harris Rackham ["Loeb Classical Library" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926)], p. 619).

3. *Ibid.* x. 8. 6. 1178b.5–7.

4. *Ibid.* v. 7. 4. 1141a.33–62.

5. *Second Ennead* i. 9: "the too human," or "the common earthly men" (*Plotinus Complete Works*, trans. Kenneth S. Guthrie [London: Bell, 1918], II, 616).

differences which, in other respects, may separate the cosmological doctrines of pre-Christian Antiquity, these doctrines all agree on the essential idea that the microcosm corresponds exactly to the macrocosm and that it *is* or *must be* the same thing. Religious veneration of the cosmos, the will to participate in the inviolability and the perennality which are proper to Nature, and also the desire to guarantee one's self against the intrusion of the historical arbitrary and its risks through the "naturalistic" (cyclical) concept of time—such impulses made the thought of a break between the two realms inconceivable or, rather, intolerable. If we contrast the vegetative impulse, which has no self-awareness and is at the lower end of our scale, with the pure and equitable norm which comes down from above, or if we contrast the calm cosmos of Justice with the titanic forces which operate in the sublunar world—even then, the two orders do not cease to be intimately joined, and there is value in their connection.

Nowhere else does this bond appear with such force as in the central notion of the "mandate from heaven" which, through the sovereigns who are its depositaries, civilizes the terrestrial world. Just as "August Heaven" orders time and establishes the rhythm of the seasons, so does the principal function of a prince consist in assuring agreement between this celestial order of the seasons and the order of human work. It is knowledge of the laws of heaven which confers this mandate and which entails the submission of everything belonging to the earth. Such is the origin of Confucianism's "cosmic" citizenship and of the importance given to the observation of rites which constitute more or less a collaboration of man with the laws of Nature. In the Ming-t'ang, a kind of "House of the Calendar," the sovereign had to stay successively during the year in rooms corresponding to the four seasons of the year, adapting colors, foods, etc., to the requirements of the cosmic correspondences. While this institution was perhaps merely an intellectuals' exaggeration, it illustrates nevertheless the obsession with an ordered and single world, the need felt by ancient cosmological thought to integrate human relationships to the cosmos from which they cannot and must not be severed.

The Judaeo-Christian tradition alone seeks to understand the past and the future as the regulating perspectives of existence and to show in history the revelation and the realization of an order of ends which are transcendent to those of Nature and the cosmos. Indeed, historical

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consciousness appears for the first time in Jewish prophecy and in Jewish spirituality, which see in Jehovah the God of the history he has lived and is living with his people. Unlike the Aristotelian god, this God is not the *contemplator* of an eternal cosmos existing independently of him. He is a *creator* God who has drawn the world out of non-being and who maintains it in being by an act of *will*. On the other hand, this God manifests himself essentially through the eminently historical act of the Covenant that links him with the chosen people, all history itself being the history of the relationships between God and his people and of the faithfulness and unfaithfulness of Israel.

NATURE AS A CREATURE

The Judaeo-Christian conception of a God who transcends the world has devaluated the cosmos and transformed it into an object of creation, into a creature. The idea of creation places God as Will above the world. God's thoughts are essentially acts of will, or *deeds*, and the world is his work—a creature which subsists only by virtue of the will which created it and which is present only to bear witness to the glory of God as well as to the substantial nullity of all that is. In itself, every creature is so made that it can be brought back to non-being, since of itself it possesses no possibility of persisting in being. "The heavens are telling the glory of God."⁶ but, "When thou hidest thy face, they are dismayed; when thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust."⁷ It is understandable that the notion of *physis* was never developed by the Jews as an intelligible structure or as an ethical model. According to Leo Strauss,⁸ the Hebrew term for 'nature' is unknown to the Hebrew Bible.⁹

The Greeks sought "salvation" in the knowledge and contemplation of a cosmos which is completely a harmony and of which God is himself a part. In the Judeo-Christian idea, all is based in God, and God alone is important: "The Lord reigns; he is robed in majesty . . . Yea, the world is established; it shall never be moved."⁹ The enigma created

6. Ps. 19:1.

7. Ps. 104:29

8. *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 81.

9. Ps. 93:1, 96:10.

by the course of the world is resolved in the certainty of the permanence of God:

Of old thou didst lay the foundation of the earth,
and the heavens are the work of thy hands.
They will perish, but thou dost endure;
they will all wear out like a garment.
Thou changest them like raiment, and they pass away;
but thou art the same, and thy years have no end.¹⁰

Far from guaranteeing the possibility of salvation by its eternal presence, Nature is deeply tainted by the sin and the imperfection of man. For the Greeks the nature of this sin is shown in the *hubris* which violates the order established by Justice, which is immanent in the cosmos, and it is precisely this Justice, comparable to the "geometrical equality" which Plato says is "mighty, both among gods and men,"¹¹ which saves being and maintains the world. But here culpability emanates from nowhere. It does not result from any transgression of the objective order. It belongs to the very essence of man. Established in the very depths of the human being, sin places him solely and exclusively before God and his impenetrable will:

Against thee, thee only, have I sinned,
and done that which is evil in thy sight . . .
Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity,
and in sin did my mother conceive me.¹²

It is no longer a question of salvation through knowledge, but of salvation through the fact that God, who can abandon man without appeal, can also retrieve him. God's *mercy* is also his essence. His presence manifests itself not only in the act by which he firms the unsteady world but also and particularly in his relationship with man. It is not a question of making one's self similar to God by "imitating" his essential activity, but of bending without reservation under the domination of his power. Man is consequently required to serve God, to be the "servant of God" and the "son of his handmaid."¹³ The absolute power of the creator implies the absolute obedience of the creature.

10. Ps. 102:25-27.

11. *Gorgias* 508a (*Dialogues*, trans. Benjamin Jowett [New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1927], p. 200).

12. Ps. 51:4-5.

13. Ps. 116:16.

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This God who is entirely will does not manifest himself only in the mercy which relates him directly to the human individual—as originator of the Covenant, he affirms his power over the whole of history.

COVENANT AND ELECTION

Since God wills all that concerns man, human history, ceasing to be an avenue without deep meaning, becomes impregnated with divine substance. Very early, the agrarian festivals which were based on the eternal periodicity of the natural existence were transformed in Israel into celebrations of the historic acts of God, into historical *commemorations*. And so, in the spring, for the traditional lunar festival there was substituted the celebration of the salvational act of God causing the Israelites to come out of Egypt. Here the circular motion of Nature assumes a radically new sense and is subordinated to historical time which manifests the divine will of salvation. For Yahweh is the terrible "man of war," the God-king who goes "before them"¹⁴ and who by turns leads his people and abandons them in anger. Absolute master of the universe, he has chosen, by an act in which no ethical judgment is involved,¹⁵ an elect people to whom he has promulgated his law and whose history he conducts, punishing his people's infidelity and rewarding their fidelity. Consequently, we find references to a covenant with Noah, to another with Abraham in which Yahweh announces the great future of the people of Israel, and finally to the one concluded by Yahweh with the whole collective body and its mediator, Moses:

and I will take you for my people, and I will be your God . . . if you will obey my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be my own possession among all peoples; for all the earth is mine, and you shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.¹⁶

This "faithful God,"¹⁷ who keeps covenant and is merciful "to a thousand generations" with those who love him and keep his commandments, promises Israel to force all its enemies into submission and to set it "high above all nations that he has made."¹⁸ "And when the

14. Cf. Exod. 13:21 and 15:3; Num. 14:14, etc.

15. The Bible insists upon the character of the election as being beyond good and evil: Deut. 9:4-5.

16. 6:7, 19:5-6.

17. Deut. 7:9.

18. Deut. 26:19.

Lord your God gives them over to you, and you defeat them; then you must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with them, and show no mercy to them."¹⁹

It was after this Covenant, this election, this superhuman promise which was made them, that the people of Israel located themselves in a universal historical perspective and sought to reveal, in the centuries of terror they had to endure, the sign of God's providential plan. With their prophets there appeared for the first time that particular species of men for whom the reading of the news is truly, as Hegel put it, a "realistic morning prayer." And never perhaps was history so absurd as at the time men first wanted to find a meaning in it! Isaiah (10:32) describes for us the anguish of the people of Jerusalem watching from their walls for the arrival of the Assyrian army and thinking they see in the distance Sennacherib "shake his first at the mount of the daughter of Zion." For more than two centuries the Near East had lain broken beneath the chariots of the conqueror "who made the earth tremble, who shook kingdoms, who made the world like a desert."²⁰ History had been for centuries the history of unspeakable catastrophes. Indescribable cruelties fell upon this little world, which saw its kings beheaded, flayed, impaled, or buried alive, chained by the jaws like dogs; and which saw its soldiers slaughtered en masse, its population deported to distant provinces, its cities reduced to heaps of ruins. In the face of such calamities it was impossible to dilute anguish by coloring it with reason. This anguish had to be oriented, organized, given form and consistency, and driven deep into the collective memory. Consciences had to be made sensitive to the history which encircled them. For all this the prophets were able to find a language. In them, event became Word, and through this Word flaming cities and desolate countryside appeared as if illuminated by God's lightning. One had to live through history as through a sinister theophany—it was the Eternal of the armies who was venting his anger on these lands of abomination in order to punish his people for having served other gods and ignored the Law.

Then I said, "How long, O Lord?"

And he said:

"Until cities lie waste

19. Deut. 7:2.

20. Isa. 14:16-17.

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without inhabitant,
and houses without men,
and the land is utterly desolate,
and the Lord removes men far away,
and the forsaken places are many
in the midst of the land."²¹

But after a total expiation, including the destruction of the temple, devastation, and exile, the Law shall be re-established, and Israel shall flower again.

As Judaism became more profound, it became clear that the salvation willed by God was no longer the victory of a particular people over the others but the salvation of all nations. As soon the disturbing figure of the "servant of Yahweh" appears in the second cycle of Isaiah's prophecies, Israel's historical privilege takes on a purely spiritual meaning and is subordinated to the spiritual mission: "I will give you as a light to the nations, that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth."²² However, this universalism profoundly disturbed the Judaeo-centric conception of history. Any nation or empire which collaborates even fortuitously in the work of Israel's salvation finds itself a partner in the action of God as an instrument of divine providence. Thus, in Isaiah we see Cyrus himself feted as the Messiah. He is God's "anointed" (45:1), charged by him with the freeing of Israel and the rebuilding of the temple (44:28). This history, which began with the fall of Adam and which was renewed by the Covenant, is the history of the long preparation of the Messianic kingdom, destined to create a universal religious society and at the same time to make Jerusalem the capital of the universal order: "For the nation and kingdom that will not serve you shall perish; those nations shall be utterly laid waste" (60:12).

This temporal dream, formulated at the very moment when the political existence of Israel was reduced to nothing, was linked with apocalyptic and eschatological prophecy which expects, from the "completing of time," the total transfiguration of men and of things.

SUBORDINATION OF THE WORLD TO ESCHATOLOGICAL HISTORY

The natural God does not manifest himself only in the act of covenant

21. Isa. 6:11-12.

22. Isa. 49:6.

or of mercy. When the psalmists speak of divine mercy, the *anger of God* is always mentioned—or rather, they conceive of God's mercy as the cessation of his anger. Yahweh is "merciful and gracious," that is, "he will not always chide, nor will he keep his anger for ever."²³ And so, in the prophetic proclamation of the "Day of the Lord," Yahweh, the God who, in the original conception, triumphs over darkness at the beginning of each year, becomes the lord of apocalyptic history who will obtain victory *in the end*. Thus conceived, eschatology immediately appears to be "counterphysical," since the future "Day of the Lord" is announced as a threat of total destruction of the natural universe. Thus, the final salvation will be found in the possibility of annihilation, which lies perpetually at the side of existence, and in the eschatological imminence of nonbeing which will annihilate all the certainties of reason and will tear man definitively away from the natural determinants of his being. This is how Amos (5:19) describes a man surprised by the Day of the Lord: "as if a man fled from a lion, and a bear met him; or went into the house and leaned with his hand against the wall, and a serpent bit him"!

Prophetic rapture is nothing, more than an ecstatic cry for the liberating end of all things. Here what the Greeks considered as the sole and eternal reality is only an object shorn of all its power and which can be unexpectedly dissolved by the will of the supernatural God. With this God are associated the new visions of the Man-God, of Satan, of the struggle between light and darkness, and of the announcement of the apocalyptic destruction which will precede "new heavens and a new earth."²⁴ And, thus, as physical reality was drained of its substance, the view became historical and bound the history of the universe and the history of mankind into a single history of salvation. Henceforth, man will see history as a great cosmic drama unfolding between creation and destruction, having a determined direction between a beginning and an end which are strictly defined and having as its apogee a single, unrepeatable event—the appearance of the Savior. "Let thy kingdom come and the world crumble away"—this prayer of the early Christians brought the Persian and Jewish apocalyptic visions which preceded Christianity to an extreme of tragic violence, since it assumed that the

23. Ps. 103:8-9.

24. Isa. 65:17, 66:22.

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time of waiting which was going to transform completely the horizon of the world had already been fulfilled.

Christianity inherited from the Old Testament the notion of a single God, creator of the universe, and the formula of creation *ex nihilo*, itself of Biblical origin,²⁵ became the technical term used by all Christian writers to designate the ultimate founding of the universe. And what has begun must also end when the drama has been played out. Jesus, as did all his era, awaited the end of the existing age (*αἰών*). Then "the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light, and the stars will be falling from heaven, and the powers in the heavens will be shaken."²⁶ The world becomes merely an episode in a *history* which does not emanate from it but which surpasses it in all directions, since before the world there was the solitude of God and after it there will be a kingdom which will not be of this world. And, in the gospel of John, Jesus himself does not appear as the enunciator of the last and total revelation. Another will come,²⁷ and, if Christ does not leave, the Paraclet, the Spirit of Truth, cannot come, but between the two lies the last Aion of the world's history, the empire of the Antichrist. Everything had its time—the catastrophic end as well as the ultimate transfiguration, but the world as such was expressly denied by both, to the extent that the expression *ὁ κόσμος οὗτος*, "this world," finally became synonymous with *ὁ αἰὼν οὗτός* and meant a certain *historical epoch*, an Aion opposed or even hostile to the future Aion which will cause the "new heavens and a new earth" to appear.²⁸

In correlation with this eschatological depreciation of the world, another conception comes to light and places the soul above the cosmos, conferring upon it a privileged status in reference to the whole of created things.

SUBORDINATION OF THE WORLD TO THE DEIFIED SOUL

The mind and the world, which up to that time were on an equal footing, are separated. The individual is distinguished from the world,

25. II Macc. 7:28.

26. Mark 13:24-25.

27. John 15:26 and 16:7, 13.

28. II Pet. 3:13. Cf. Clement of Alexandria *Ad. Cor.* vi: "The present Aion and the future Aion are two enemies."

and in it he no longer sees a *being*, but merely a fugitive *state*, a "form." "The form of this world is passing away."²⁹ What Plato considered as a "perfect living being," what he venerated as a "blessed god," here becomes a contingency; a dream from which one must awaken, a fugitive spectacle which exists only in so far as man turns away from God and is abandoned to himself. "And the world passes away, and the lust of it."³⁰ Its only essence is desire, which imprisons the soul in the here-below and turns it from its center. The world is an appearance which assumes body and consistency only through the state of servitude which characterizes "psychic" man reduced to the life of desires. The term "cosmos" now takes on a purely anthropological sense and means a certain affirmative attitude toward the world, a certain positive evaluation of the goods of this world which turns the soul away from divine life, light, and freedom. *Amare mundum* will come to mean *non cognoscere deum*.

We have reached the diametric opposite of the ancient veneration of the cosmos. On the day when Paul contrasted liberation by Jesus with the old slavery under the στοιχεῖα, "the elemental spirits of the universe" (Gal. 4:3), the formula for the reversing of all the ancient values had at last been found. These "elements" which Hellenism, from the Ionians to Plotinus (II. i. 4), held as incorruptible and as guarantors of the world's eternity, are now put down as evil-doing powers which subjugate man and make him a stranger in his own land. Halfway between the light of the extracosmic God and the world were placed the στοιχεῖα, forming a dome of magic opacity, a hermetically sealed cover completely separating the high and the low, the spiritual breath from the unbreathable air of a suffocating existence, the life-giving light from the gaping cavern of horror which envelops the world. For the Gnostic, the στοιχεῖα which surrounds him conceals the utmost in conceivable terror. Paul also knew their δυνάμεις and ἀρχαί, their "powers" and their "dominations." He also thinks that the "elements" are the archons, the "rulers of this age" (I Cor. 2:6), even "the god of this world" (II Cor. 4:4), the one who crucified the "Lord of Glory" and blinded the unbelievers that they might not see the light of Christ shining. The man who is ensnared in matter, who knows only the "psychic" life, lives un-

29. I Cor. 7:31.

30. I John 2:17.

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der the tyranny of the elements, but he who has received the Pneuma and the Gnosis (Christian or other), overcomes "the weak and beggarly elemental spirits,"³¹ since he has rediscovered the innocence of the state anterior to creation or the freedom of the "new creation" inaugurated by Christ. And so, after having been for the Greeks the foundations of the perfect and eternal world, the "elements" are transformed into the evil-doing tyrants of a shadowy world, and finally they will see their power expire on the threshold of the emancipating light.³²

Thus the world was stripped of what is sacred, and man convinced himself that his soul alone is divine and spiritual. And it is precisely this gnostic-Christian anthropocentrism which separated, in the most decisive way, the last representatives of Hellenism from the new thinking. "The Gnostics," said Plotinus in his great treatise against them, "do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their 'brothers,' but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities of heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are!" (ii. 9. 18.) They consider "the souls of both themselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine, while refusing immortality to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though they be composed of elements more beautiful and purer than we" (ii. 9. 5). Plotinus contrasts forcefully the old Hellenic modesty with this exaltation of man: "If even man holds a great superiority over animals, there must be a far greater superiority in those stars which exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish order therein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence."³³ Man's true greatness consists in "turning toward the whole" (ii. 9. 9) and not in reducing the whole to himself.

In the same way, the Judaeo-Christian claims seemed to Celsus to be

31. Gal. 4:9.

32. Byzantium will complete this semantic revolution. In the *στοιχεῖα* people will no longer see anything but the magic spirits which imprison the vital force of beings and cast lands under their spell. (Modern Greeks still have this conception when they talk of the *στοιχεῖα* and bewitched places: *στοιχειωμένοι τόποι*.) Similarly, Emperor Romanus I had the top cut off a pillar which was supposed to be the *στοιχείου* of his enemy, Czar Simeon of Bulgaria. And, if we think of the *στοιχεῖα* of Euclid, we can measure the magnitude of this dislocation of the perspectives.

33. For Plotinus, the stars are divinities, "in view of their regular motion, and their carrying out a magnificent revolution around the world" (*Ennead* ii. 9. 9; *Complete Works*, trans. Guthrie, II, 615). For the Gnostic, they are "tyrants" who misuse their power over the world, and the planets are the wicked archons who, in seven-fold ranks, close against us the way to the peace of the eighth heaven.

the height of absurdity. Latter-day Judaism had already established man at the center of the universe—apparently the world had been made for man, and not man for the world. The apocalypticians of Celsus' time had carried this anthropocentrism to its utmost consequences, and it was against this reduction of God to his unique relationship with man that Celsus reacted:

After this he [Celsus] continues as usual by laughing at "the race of Jews and Christians," comparing them "all" to "a cluster of bats or, ants coming out of a nest, or frogs holding council round a marsh, or worms assembling in some filthy corner, disagreeing with one another about which of them are the worse sinners. They say: 'God shows and proclaims everything to us beforehand, and He has even deserted the whole world and the motion of the heavens, and disregarded the vast earth to give attention to us alone; and He sends messengers to us alone and never stops sending them and seeking that we may be with Him for ever.'" In the words which he [Celsus] invents he asserts that we are "like worms who say: 'There is God first, and we are next after Him in rank since He has made us entirely like God, and all things have been put under us, earth, water, air, and stars; and all things exist for our benefit, and have been appointed to serve us.'"³⁴

It seemed that the Greek universe had suddenly crumbled. It is true that the Greek Fathers, fed on platonism, saw in the splendor of the creation a theophany, a partial and limited expression of the divine perfection, but it is no longer a question of a philosophy or a science which might bring the Logos out of the cosmos. And so for Saint Augustine, the problems of the cosmos have become utterly insignificant. In his eyes, all philosophy reduces to two themes—knowledge of God and knowledge of one's self (*noverim te, noverim me*). And, in its monologue to the soul, reason asks

Now what do you want to know?
I desire to know God and the soul.
Nothing more?
Absolutely nothing.³⁵

On the one hand, the exterior world becomes a pure phenomenon of the mind—it is out of itself that the soul draws the sensations and the

34. As quoted by Origen in his *Contra Celsum* iv. 23. (trans. Henry Chadwick [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953], pp. 199–200).

35. *Soliloquia* I. i. 7 (*The Soliloquies of Saint Augustine*, trans. Thomas and Gilligan, [New York: Cosmopolitan, 1943], p. 17).

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images which make up the material world, and, in order to form it, the soul gives up something of its substance. And, insofar as it turns toward the exterior world, the soul becomes exhausted through this loss of substance. It turns away from the one thing necessary to it and falls into a state of decay from which Grace alone can uplift it. On the other hand, the enjoyment of God (*fruitio Deo*) is the supreme goal toward which every human effort must be directed, and, whatever may be its splendors, the material world does not deserve to hold our attention except to the extent that it is related to the life of the soul, itself conceived as a restless impulse which drives man to come out of himself, to transcend himself and abandon himself wholly to the adoration of God.

Now it is clear that the conception of a Nature with a structure in itself and an intelligibility for itself could reappear only by virtue of the rediscovery of Aristotelian physics in the thirteenth century. But what Nature lost in autonomy, history gained in depth. The idea of the unity of universal history, the periodization of history from the beginning to the end of time, the conception of the progressive advance of the human race, raising itself by successive "ages" from ignorance to truth, from time to eternity—all these directing ideas of the modern historical consciousness were made possible and can become comprehensible only by virtue of the Judaeo-Christian image of history.

GOD AS PROVIDENCE

First of all, the notion of a single God, both creator and providence, imposed a radical revision of the old conception of history. Indeed, it was impossible to believe, as Saint Augustine said, that this all-powerful God "from whom all nature, mean and excellent . . . derive and have being . . . would leave the kingdoms of men and their bondages and freedoms loose and uncompromised in the laws of His eternal providence."³⁶ This essentially mystic idea that the unity of history and the succession of empires both originate and end in the providential plan of God is not found in Bossuet alone.³⁷ Hegel uses exactly the same arguments when he sets out to explain his unconditional faith in the rationality of events.³⁸

36. *De civitate Dei* v. 11. *The City of God*, trans. John Healey (London: J. Dent, 1945), I, 156.

37. *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, Part III, chap. i.

38. *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Meiner, pp. 29-30 (Cf. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* by G. W. F. Hegel, trans J. Sibree (London: Bell, 1890), pp. 13-14.

Saint Augustine recoiled from admitting that this infinitely good God, who created not only heaven and earth but also "the most base and contemptible creature . . . the bird's feather . . . the herb's flower . . . the tree's leaf" could have left universal history outside his providence. In the same way, Hegel refused to believe that God can "hover above history as above the waters."³⁹ Furthermore, when he proposes to explain the basis of his philosophy of history which is at the same time theogony, theognosy, and theodicy, he falls back upon the arguments of the Bishop of Hippo:

It was for a while the fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God, as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it be allowed that Providence manifests itself in such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal History? This is deemed too great a matter to be thus regarded. But Divine Wisdom, i.e. Reason, is one and the same in the great as in the little; and we must not imagine God to be too weak to exercise his wisdom on the grand scale.⁴⁰

Nothing could better illustrate the *hubris* of modern historicism. Five thousand years of history represented for Hegel a matter "greater" than the entire universe, and it would be considering the creator God as "too weak" if we disputed the cosmic interest which the human adventure may offer. In any case, although Hegel did go much further than did Bossuet, who was satisfied with juxtaposing divine providence and human motivations as well as he could, what Hegel really did was to "logicize" the old theology of history rather than to "secularize" it. Moreover, Hegel was not afraid to speak of history as a "divine process,"⁴¹ and Marx with his visions, which are astounding in more than one way on the "humanism of Nature," could wax ironic at will upon this Hegelian notion in which history was disguised as a "divine process of man."⁴² Marx saw an insurmountable contradiction here. In fact, by accepting the conclusions of this theology of progress while seeking to escape from its premises, Marx succeeded only in making his intention more enigmatic. He wanted to isolate from what he called

39. *System der Philosophie* (Jubilee ed.; Stuttgart: Frommanns, 1958), III, 432, par. 549.

40. *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, p. 42 (*Lectures . . .*, trans. Sibree, p. 16).

41. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

42. Marx, *National Ökonomie und Philosophie* (Kiepenheuer, 1951), p. 259.

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"the natural history of man"⁴³ an intelligible process, tending, moreover, to produce the final "leap" into the realm of freedom. And this shows how impossible it is to assign to history as such the aim of bringing about human reconciliation and the "resurrection of Nature," without presupposing as the subject of the evolution a providential and demiurgical consciousness, and without accepting the theological basis of the concepts of "progress" and "development."

THE NEW CONCEPTION OF TIME

We owe to Christianity the introduction into philosophy of the idea of progress and the idea of the historicity of man as a basic characteristic of his structure. At the same time that the idea of the cosmos was giving way, the cyclical conception of time, which is, moreover, derived from the idea of the cosmos, also collapsed. The image of the circle, which represented for the ancients the outstanding symbol of perfection and eternity, now indicates the major sin of a world that has lived without hope. Aristotle saw no difficulty in comparing human life to a vicious circle.⁴⁴ And already the psalmist sees in the circle the symbol of the damnation of the impious.⁴⁵ In Dante's hell, the just who did not know the true faith, the patriarchs and great men who lived "before Christianity" are "for such defects, and for no other fault . . . lost; and only in so far afflicted, that without hope we live in desire."⁴⁶ The Christian's existence is entirely nourished by hope, entirely turned toward the future. We understand how unbearable, as Saint Augustine said,⁴⁷ the conception of the eternal cyclical return must have been for him. Indeed, such an idea of time came into violent contradiction with all the themes controlled by the idea of the historical incarnation of the Savior and the eschatological hope which was associated with it. In this respect the Augustinian refutation of the eternal cyclical return is highly significant:

As Plato the Athenian philosopher taught in the academy that in a certain unbounded space, yet definite, Plato himself, his scholars, the city and school,

43. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

44. *Problems* xvii. 3.

45. Ps. 12:8:

46. *Inferno*, IV, 40-42 (trans. J. A. Carlyle in *The Divine Comedy* [New York: Modern Library, 1932]).

47. *De civitate Dei* xii. 20 (trans. Healey, I, 363).

should after infinite ages meet all in that place again and be as they were when he taught this. God forbid I say that we should believe this. "For Christ once died for our sins, and rising again, dies no more, nor hath death any future dominion over Him."⁴⁸

Here we see the appearance of the possibility of a time structured by substantially new events. And it is remarkable that this refutation of the eternal cycle, without which there would be no modern concept of history, is based solely upon the supernatural argument of the Passion and the Ressurrection of Christ. Indeed, the Christian sees in this a single event which recapitulates all anterior history and inaugurates all posterior history. Then there is introduced the notion of a time oriented in a progressive direction, a before and an after, a past running from the creation to the fall and from the fall to the redemption, a future running from the redemption to the end of time. Profane history is itself sustained by sacred history, which gives it life and a privileged meaning in relationship to the "vain repetitions" of the natural life.

THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF CHRISTIANITY

Christianity, the religion of an erudite and syncretistic age, was obliged to locate itself in reference to Judaism and to Hellenism, of which it felt it was more or less the heir. It could do this only by locating itself historically, by becoming aware of its time (*καίρὸς*) as a historical moment. Furthermore, the very objections of its opponents incited Christianity to assume a self-consciousness which was clearly historical. Why, asked Marcellinus of Saint Augustine, why was it necessary that the Law given by God to Moses had to be improved?⁴⁹ A revelation which needs perfecting indicates an imperfect revelation and the possibility of its remaining so always. Why, asked Celsus⁵⁰ and Porphyry,⁵¹ did God allow so long a period of time to pass before willing the redemption of mankind? Such questions were all the more disturbing because the deep conviction of the Christians that they were the "new Israel," the "new people," or, more generally, that each was "the new man," placed them forthwith in a historical perspective in the eminent sense of the term,

48. *Ibid.* xii. 13 (trans. Healey, I, 356).

49. *Corresp.* Letter 136.

50. In Origen *Contra Celsum* iv. 8 (trans. Chadwick, p. 189).

51. Cf. St. Augustine *Epistle* 102. qu. 2: *De tempore christianae religionis*.

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since it implied the idea that the radical renewing of the world brought by Christianity was at the same time the end result of all the efforts of the past.

This is a renewing which does not imply an absolute break in historical continuity: We have here the germ of an interpretation of the becoming of truth and of the world to which philosophy, from Bossuet to Marx, would give legal authority, whereas it was only the expression of a conception of history which was purely and simply autocentric. In more precise terms, it gave birth to three ideas which direct the modern historical consciousness: the idea of history as the "*education of the human race*," the idea of an *evolution of humanity* comparable to the various ages of life, and, finally, the idea of the "*co-called universal history*," which found in Marx both its first critic and its last faithful follower.

HISTORY AS THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE

When it reflected upon its own antecedents, the Christian mind indeed had the vision of a progress being accomplished through the efforts which God makes to educate humanity. Men are sinners lost in darkness, but, as Clement of Alexandria said, the Logos assumed the functions of a teacher in order to guide the world toward the Christian light. Thus Tertullian and Augustine thought of the human race as a single individual who, in the different ages of his life, lets himself be educated by God, progressing in knowledge through "degrees of perfection" as he goes through the stages of his own development.

Beginning with this conception of the pedagogical work accomplished by God in history, we shall see developing in modern times all the philosophies of the history of the human mind, in which each historical epoch appears as a moment in the revelation of the Spirit. From Lessing (*Education of the Human Race*) to Hegel, history will be conceived as a progressive revelation in which the result is set forth as the prime mover, as the first veritable beginning. And that was the explicit postulate of the theology of progress. By causing to appear, for the first time in history, an internal progress in the evolution of religious beliefs, Christian thought assumed the immanence of final and total truth in the partial institutions which are the reference marks of history and which give it meaning.

A step forward was taken by Clement of Alexandria when he pro-

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posed the integration of philosophy. There are two Old Testaments, the Jewish Law and Greek philosophy, as avenues of access to the New Testament. Before the advent of Christ there was the Law, and no one doubts that it was willed by God in order to prepare the advent of faith. And this continuity in revelation must also include in some way the philosophy which "educated the Greeks and directed them toward Christ in the same way as the Law of the Jews."⁵²

Hegel will not forget the lesson. Christian religion will appear in his system as the still inadequate expression of the final Truth, a moment in the pedagogical progression toward philosophy, a stage of which the historical significance will be only that of having prepared minds to receive absolute knowledge *in the time* of philosophy and the absolute knowledge *belonging* to philosophy. As we shall see, the philosophical overtaking of the Christian religion announced by Hegel—and in the same way, the "practical" overtaking of philosophy in and by the total transfiguration of the material world preached by Marxism—presupposes the notion of "the accomplishment of time" which had been used originally by the theological mind to reconcile the intense historical consciousness which the new religion had of itself with its still deeper certainty of possessing an absolute and therefore non-temporal truth.

This completely new experience of the historicity of existence prompted the seizure upon time as a process of pedagogical maturing, in which the intellectual experiences of the past appeared as uncompleted forms, without maturity, subordinated to a future destiny which surpasses them. It then became possible to answer the questions of Celsus and Porphyry and to show, for example, that the Incarnation was delayed only because mankind had to have a long and multiple experience in order to reach the point of feeling the need of the Redeemer and of assuming his message. Man had to serve in time the apprenticeship in divinity which alone would make him capable one day of receiving it.

Augustine will answer Marcellinus in the same way—that revealed religion is no ready-made truth, given for all eternity, but that it assumes that there is a history, a series of gradations in which each stage constitutes the requisite condition for the next. The modifications which revealed religion has undergone from the Law of Moses to the Incarnation are also explained by the very evolution of humanity, an evolution

52. Clement of Alexandria *Stromateis* i. c. 5:

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which can be compared to the various ages of life and which makes man become increasingly capable of receiving the truth:

Quoties nostrae variantur aetates! adolescentiae pueritia non reductura cedit; juvenus adolescentiae non mansura succedit; finiens juventutem senectus morte finitur. Haec omnia mutantur ne mutatur divinae providentiae ratio, qua fit ut ista mutantur. . . Aliud magiser adolescenti quam puero solebat, imposuit.⁵³

This was a decisive formula, one which will be found again, in stronger or in weaker form, in all the later philosophico-historical meditations from Florus, who divided Roman history into four periods corresponding to childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age,⁵⁴ to Herder, to Hegel, who considered the modern period as the "senile age of the mind," and to Marx, who spoke confusedly of a "social childhood of mankind" and who quite seriously distinguished the Greeks as "normal children" from the abnormal and precocious children represented by the other peoples of Antiquity.⁵⁵

Saint Augustine will take the decisive step by bringing the Roman Empire into the horizon of this metaphysics of history. Prudentius already thought that the Roman domination had been willed providentially by God so that peoples would first unite under a single law, then under a single faith: "For the time of Christ's coming, be assured, was the way prepared which the general good will of peace among us had just built under the rule of Rome."⁵⁶ The deep significance of "the great successes and triumphs of the Roman power" had to be discovered in the fact that Rome prepared the peoples it pacified to receive Christ:

53. St. Augustine *Corresp.* Letter 138. Cf. *Writings of Saint Augustine, Letters*, trans. Sister Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D. (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1953), III, 37: "Childhood, never to return, gives place to youth; vigorous manhood, doomed not to last, succeeds to youth; old age, putting an end to vigorous manhood, is itself ended by death. All these are changes, yet the method of Divine Providence by which they are made to change does not change. . . The master gives a different task to the youth from the one assigned to the boy."

54. Florus, *Epitome, ad init.* (cited in J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* [London: Macmillan & Co., 1928], p. 23, n. 1.).

55. *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (Dietz, 1935), pp. 269-70 (trans. N. I. Stenrot [Chicago: Charles Kerr, Inc., 1913], p. 312).

56. Prudentius *Contra Symmachum* ii. 578-636 (in *Prudentius*, trans. H. J. Thomson ["Loeb Classical Library" (Harvard University Press, 1953)], II, 57).

"En ads, Omnipotens, concordibus influe terris! jam mundus te, Christe, capit, quem congrege nexu Pax te Roma tenant."

Augustine, who had witnessed the crumbling of the Roman peace, was able to cast a freer glance over the mass of events. In his thought, extended entirely toward God, events lost their consistency and became a repertory of detailed arguments which could be used arbitrarily to prove theses which in themselves were external to historical becoming. And, consequently, the Romans received world empire from God because they subordinated the purely earthly passions to the noble desire of glory "whereby they desired to survive after death in the memories and mouths of such as commended them."⁵⁷ By the immense prosperity and by the greatness of Rome, God showed the power of the civic virtues, even without true religion, in order to make it understood that, when the true religion is added to such virtues, men become citizens of another city—the city of God, transcending history but alone capable of fecundating the earthly city.

Without this God, terrestrial governments are great thefts, *magna latrocinia*.⁵⁸ The earthly city, left to itself, is the city of sin and the devil, *civitas diaboli*.⁵⁹ Human history, however, has not been surrendered to chance and to death: by means of the ephemeral works of mankind, the divine architect builds this city of God "of which the king is Truth, the law Charity and the measure Eternity": "Architectus aedificat per machinas transitorias domum manentem."⁶⁰

A whole image of universal history could come out of this theohistorical parallelism. The river of time no longer meant oblivion and dissolution. For Clement of Alexandria, all the history of human knowledge resembled the course of two rivers, Jewish Law and Greek philosophy, and at their confluence Christianity had gushed forth, as a new direction, carrying with it in its course all the contributions of the past. Formerly, a man was proud to be descended from Nestor, and he gloried in being counted among the *Trojugenae*. Now, men wanted to ennoble the past by making of it a series of echelons resulting in the

57. *De civitate Dei* v. 12 ff. (trans. Healey, I, 163 [v. 14]).

58. *Ibid.*, iv. 4 (trans. Healey, I, 115: "Set justice aside then, and what are kingdoms but fair thievish purchases?")

59. *Ibid.* iv. 1.

60. *Sermon* 362. 7.

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present development, to save the past by giving it an appearance of preparation—*Preparatio Evangelica*, according to Eusebius of Caesarea. He will strive to show how Jewish religion, Greek philosophy, and Roman law were combined to make the world capable of receiving the Christian revelation.⁶¹

History had really ceased being an object of true knowledge. Men cared little about human things—and, in any case, their concern for them did not assume the form of a true recital of events or a coherent analysis of real relationships. Yet they were eager to see proofs of the divinity which is immanent in history, and, above all else, they had the absolute certainty of forming the center of a historical system which included all mankind. Universal chronology, invented by Isidore of Seville in the seventh century, in which everything was dated as before or after the birth of Christ, shows what the center of perspective was from which emanated the light which conferred meaning on all events.

Fabulous notions were substituted for the still meager knowledge of worlds outside Europe, such as India and China, but the idea of the mystical unity of humanity in Jesus Christ made possible for the first time the conception of history as embracing the whole of humanity—a universalist conception of history which was given concrete form by the adoption of a single chronological framework for all events. Centuries disappeared in visions and dreams, but, at the same time that the idea of the unity of the human race was imposed, there was also imposed the idea of the division of universal history into a well-defined number of periods—six periods corresponding to the six days of the Biblical creation, or four periods corresponding to the four empires mentioned in the Book of Daniel.

The result of a mystic glance into the mysteries of the providential order of God and belonging in its original formulation to a vast apocalyptic literature which was handed down to Christianity, this schema of the four epochs was destined paradoxically to exercise a sovereign power over modern philosophic thought. Theoretically, it should have lost all meaning as soon as a rational conception was formed of it, but the contrary occurred. Hegel sacrificed his dialectic to it when, contrary to the ternary schematism we find everywhere else in his work and which he constantly abuses, he presented an image of

61. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 51.

"universal" history divided into "four empires" and ending in a true epiphany of God in the "spiritual light of the present."

At the dawn of modern times Jean Bodin denounced the quaternary division of history as an illegitimate relic of the visions of the prophet Daniel.⁶² And Voltaire made fun of Bossuet for omitting the history of China from his schema of providential history. The secularized theology of progress has had only the effect of accentuating this exclusivism and of shrinking even more the image of history. One would think Marx adequately forewarned against the optical illusion which is at the base of "the so-called historical evolution." According to him, "the so-called historical development amounts in the last analysis to this, that the last form considers its predecessors as stages leading up to itself."⁶³ One could not state it better. But why should his own conception have been removed from this mirage effect? For it certainly was not "putting dialectic back on its feet" to substitute for the Hegelian idea of the "four historical empires" an image in which "the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production" appeared "as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society."⁶⁴

For all its having substituted the "economic formation of society" for the "progressive attainment of liberty," this vision was no more "scientific" or "materialistic" than the dissertations of Paulus Orosius: "de regnorum mutatione Dei providentia facta," in which we see how God arranged in a sovereign manner the succession of the great empires—Babylonian, Macedonian, African, and Roman—which have followed each other since the beginning of time.

Having said this, it is important not to press too much the sense of the Christian propositions concerning time and history. In the believer's view, what we call history has meaning only insofar as it obtains life from the transcendency which goes beyond it.

62. *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566), Cap. vii: *Confutatio eorum qui quatuor monarchias . . . statuunt*; see *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History* by John Bodin, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), "Refutation of Those Who Postulate Four Monarchies and the Golden Age," pp. 291 ff. (cf. Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38, and Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 57).

63. *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, p. 263 (trans. Stone, p. 301).

64. *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, p. 13 (trans. Stone, p. 13).

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SUBORDINATION OF THE HISTORIC TO THE SACRED

Thucydides did not know a *sense of history*, but that did not prevent him from creating, in his *Peloponnesian War*, both a historical work ἐς αἰὲς⁶⁵ and the last tragedy in which we still sense that Aeschylus' feeling of destiny is alive. With the coming of Christianity, history had accepted a providential goal, and this did not stimulate Christians at all to grant to real history, both that of the present and that of the past, the interest which they were reluctant to see in the political or economic life. In making all the faithful members of a single mystic Corpus, the new religion tore them loose from the political gangue from which the citizen of Antiquity had never been able to free himself. The ancient *politeia* vanished before the Christian "*politeuma*" which "is in heaven."⁶⁶ As this radical experience of inner freedom became more and more clear to itself, the more were political and social reality drained of every essential significance. "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." Perhaps no other words uttered by Christ were of greater significance for this world. They have lent themselves to varying interpretation, from that of Tertullian, who stated with superb tranquility, "nobis nulla magis res aliena est quam publica,"⁶⁷ to that of the unknown author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* in which the kingdom of heaven appears for the first time as giving life from within to terrestrial cities, to that of Dante, who first explicitly recognized a value proper to the State. God and Caesar—this new polarity was capable of expressing the non-temporality of the early Christians, for whom Mammon meant all of reality, as well as the ideal of theocratic politics from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas. The idea of complete submission to established authorities (even pagan ones!) and the theory of regicide developed in *parte guelfa* could both appeal to this expression, which was enigmatic in its implications, yet perfectly clear in its liberating intent. To proclaim the absolute independence, because it is based in God, of an existence fecundated by faith, hope, and charity in the face of the world of facts (his-

65. Thucydides (i. 22) says he has left a lasting monument to posterity, a "possession forever." He wanted to serve "as many as shall wish to see the truth of what both *has* happened, and *will* hereafter happen again, according to human nature—the same or pretty nearly so" (trans. Henry Dale [New York: Harper & Bros., 1861], p. 14).

66. Phil. 3:20.

67. *Apologeticum* par. 38.

torical, political, and others): to show that this world, whether absolutely evil or relatively good, will always be inadequate for the profound essence of the soul—this was a completely new freedom, in which it has been possible to base the most diverse historical interpretations without altering its substance. Indeed, one might consider the State to be the beast of the Apocalypse (as Saint Augustine did), or make it a part of the Dionysian illuminations (as did Thomas Aquinas and Bartholomew of Lucca), or proclaim with Boniface VIII, “ego sum Caesar, ego imperator”—and yet historical, social, and political reality did not cease to stand for the soul’s mere outer aspect.

It was not until the time of Marsilius of Padua, or even that of Machiavelli, that Napoleon’s saying, “politics is destiny,” began to be true. Dante went further than any other mediaeval thinker in his attempt to establish the autonomy of the political *felicitas*. The terrestrial city, far from representing the *civitas diaboli*, caused the very possibility of grace to appear: *praeambula gratiae*. Human work belonged henceforth to the same theophanic universe which the cathedrals celebrated. And so Dante could speak of the happiness of this life as something entirely distinct from the felicity of the eternal life.⁶⁸ Happiness here below not only can be attained through natural reason, which appears fully in the work of the philosophers (*quaeper philosophos tota nobis apparuit*), but also constitutes the ultimate end assigned to man as a perishable being. It is perfectly clear that by the active life in the city, enlightened and guided by reason, and contemplative beatitude, which is the final end of man as an immortal, Dante did not at all intend to make the work of history an end in itself or the encompassing reality of all the possibilities human nature contains.

We must still not forget that for Christianity the last epoch of universal history is the one which will see the reign of the Antichrist and which will end with the Day of Wrath of the Last Judgment. If it is true that the modern philosophies of progress are merely secularizations of the former theology of history, they are such particularly insofar as they eliminate this image of the catastrophic end of history and transform the “City of God,” which is outside time, into a social state which is attainable inside time by means of scientific, political, economic, or other kinds of progress.

68. *De monarchia* I, chap. i ff.

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The reign of the Antichrist and the end of the world were fixed constellations hanging over the Christian horizon. It was evident truth for the early Christians, who lived in expectation of the event—and also for Roger Bacon, in whom we thought we saw the first indications of the modern idea of progress.⁶⁹ Roger Bacon, who had reflected upon the steam engine, the steamboat, and the airplane, was deeply convinced of the imminent coming of the Antichrist.⁷⁰ In his “experimental science” he exalted the sovereign force which would give power to those possessing it—therefore, the Church had to favor the idea of experimental science “in its fight against the infidels, and particularly in view of the perils which will threaten us in the time of the Antichrist!”⁷¹

We have come a long way from the initial apocalypse. Perhaps nothing more clearly demonstrates the breadth of the transformation of Christian feeling about the cosmos than the active, aggressive attitude which comes to light in this conception of Bacon. From here it took only a step to assert the eternity of the world and the existence of a matter independent of God. It is true that such theses were never orthodox, but for the new thought they were a kind of permanent temptation against which the doctrinal authorities never ceased to struggle. Up to that time, man wanted to free himself from Nature, in the name of the invisible God and the spiritual soul, in order to direct all his energies toward an acosmic love for Jesus Christ and toward the imitation of his divine life. In the future, Nature is to recover her rights, and she will owe this to the rediscovery of Aristotelian physics.

Indeed, the medieval universe was still the Greek cosmos, except that it was created by an omnipotent God, that it will disappear as such at the end of time, and that it is interpreted in an anthropocentric manner completely foreign to the ancient feeling for the cosmos.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE COSMIC HIERARCHY

The cosmos of Heraclitus is an order which “is the same for all,” imposing itself in a single and identical way upon all the beings who collaborate in the beauty and perfection of the universe. Reality is now conceived as a hierarchy in which each being is defined by the place it occupies therein and by the function it performs. All creatures are ar-

69. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

71. Ét. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris: Payot, 1944), p. 482.

ranged according to a hierarchical order of perfection, from the most perfect, which are angels, to the least perfect, which are bodies. The rank of creatures is their very being itself.

Created in the image of God, king of Nature through the order of creation, participating in the nature of Christ, who is both eternal God and eternal man (Adam), man occupies a central place in this hierarchical universe. He is the goal and the end of creation: all Nature was created for him. We have seen how scandalized Celsus was by this anthropocentric conception of the early Christians. Gregory of Nyssa will see in it the highest point of creation, the intermediary by which the visible world is spiritualized and is joined to God. For Nemesius, one of the first to write a work of "anthropology," man is a universe in reduced form, a "microcosm"; his dual membership in the world of bodies and in that of spirits makes him the crux and middle of all natures. And, since it was through the defection of man that all of Nature was exiled from its principle, the return of man to God, according to Maximus the Confessor, will involve the return of the whole world.

In the whole of the theophanies which constitute the universe, man is the part of creation which is capable of willing and thereby of freeing himself from the sin which results from his union with Nature. He will make himself like God or he will degrade himself, as he turns toward spiritual goods or toward those of the body. This is the source of the eminently historical character of his being. Other natural beings have no history; that is, they can be only what they are and as they are. To the contrary, man has a history because of his freedom, which makes him capable of determining to a certain extent the place he will occupy in the hierarchy of beings. He is capable, through the decision of his own free will, of growing or of shrinking insofar as his participation in the divine is concerned. And it is precisely this new experience of freedom and of its relationships with divine providence and divine grace which gives human society primacy over Nature. Just as the degree represented by man marks the limits and a kind of horizon line between the pure angelic intelligences and the universe of natures, so does human society represent a higher form of the natural order.

Thus it was that the social world could appear and place itself above the natural world, without, however, opposing it. The appearance of the modern opposition between Nature and history presupposes the complete destruction of the medieval world.

RE-EVALUATION OF MODERN SOCIETIES¹

A complex of transformations, carried into effect with varying tempos since the beginning of the era of industrial revolutions, has disrupted a certain number of human societies: societies which the ethnologists often call "modern" in opposing them to those labeled "traditional."

The unprejudiced observer of these transformations in their historical perspective, and of the realities to which they have led today in a sociological perspective, recognizes that, whatever may be the value of the interpretations and the systems proposed by the great social thinkers of the nineteenth and of the beginning of the twentieth centuries (a value that is far from being outmoded), there is, nevertheless, none whose doctrines allow it to dominate the aggregate of technical, economic, social, psychological, and cultural facts which characterize the modern industrial societies, European and North American, of the

Translated by William J. Harrison.

1. This text represents the introductory report which the author was asked to present to the colloquium on "Progress in Liberty" held in Berlin from June 16 to 22, 1960.

second half of the twentieth century. For the person who does not have a dogmatic faith in the universal and enduring value of these thoughts, the mystic belief in prophetic and superhuman spirits, these limits are foreseeable and rational. They stamp, to cite only a few names, the work of Saint-Simon as well as that of Comte and of Durkheim, of Simmel, Tönnies, Pareto, or even that of Marx and the theoretical writings of Lenin. Each of us can find, in one or another of them, and according to his personal interests, inspirations and suggestive—sometimes even brilliant—explanations. But, for example, neither the "law of three classes" nor the categories of "élite" determining "economic factor," "superstructure," "proletariat," "class struggle," or "imperialism, last stage of capitalism" allow one to account for the fundamental phenomena which the contemporary social sciences, and particularly sociology, economics, demography, social psychology, and cultural anthropology, bring into focus in the world of today.

Hence the usefulness of a re-evaluation of modern industrialized society in the light of the results (albeit still very incomplete) of these sciences and of the problems which they lay bare. I do not make the absurd claim of setting forth in this short paper a complete accounting of this re-evaluation, but only of casting light, in a necessarily simplified, indeed (as it has been recommended to me to introduce a discussion) deliberately "provoking" manner, upon some points which seem to me important. The discussion will bring others into view.

I. TECHNICAL MILIEU AND TECHNICAL CIVILIZATION

In order to re-evaluate industrial societies and to be able to understand them in their fundamentals, I believe it indispensable to introduce from the very first the concepts of "technical milieu" and of "technician civilization." In the pre-machine-age civilizations of western Europe, that is to say, until the end of the eighteenth century, a natural, omnipresent milieu predominates, governing the town as much as the country. The title "natural milieu" is additionally justified when it is applied to the societies of the past and those of the present which utilize only motor forces of natural energy, such as animal power, wind, or water.

Since the end of the eighteenth century the pace of technical progress has continued to rush forth and its rate of acceleration to increase. For motor forces of natural energy, the industrial revolutions substitute motors of thermal, electric, and atomic energy. The large number of

transformations gives rise to institutions, structures, new forms of organization, production, a new quality of civilization. Mankind's technical acquisitions up to the end of the eighteenth century were numerous and of great richness. Nevertheless, the prodigious career of the mechanical exploitation of new forms of energy and the soaring flight of the applied sciences define a new stage in the psychosociological conditioning of many by his medium, leading to the new technical civilization, in one period of which we are living.

An enormously widespread and closely interwoven tissue of techniques characterizes man's new milieu in industrialized societies. Industrial mechanism, that is to say, the sum of machines and production apparatus crowding the workshops and offices of business concerns, is only a part of this. The technical milieu is made up of the aggregate of techniques (production, transport, communication, intercourse, leisure) which transform more each day the conditions of man's existence, penetrate every instant of his life, and ceaselessly permeate additional areas. The individual is thus submitted to a host of stresses, excitations, and stimulants—pressures scarcely known a short time ago. The sum of these techniques creates, inducts, and intensifies about him that which, in the aggregate, we call a technical milieu.

The technical milieu that can be observed in diversely constructed societies presents some common traits, both in the functioning of institutions and in the behavior of individuals. The complex aggregate of the "facts of civilization" (concept borrowed from Marcel Mauss) forms a civilization. Today the sum of the facts of civilization (for example, scientific organization of labor, mass production, mass media, advertising, consumer attitudes, mass tourism, leisure-time behavior, etc.) common to diverse industrialized societies constitutes that which we denote by the term "technician civilizations." There have been in the history of mankind civilizations which have lived and died apart from contact with techniques discovered by other human groups. Henceforth, over the whole area of the planet this isolation will be less and less possible. Technical civilization, fortified with prodigious means of circulation, is essentially universalist. The appearance of the technical milieu, with different extents, densities, and rhythms, is a universal phenomenon which is not bound uniquely to urbanization, for it can also be seen to insinuate itself into rural regions. Its emergence is particularly brutal in certain underdeveloped sections. Masses of humans

stagnate there, even in our day, in a natural milieu with agriculture handicapped by unfavorable soil and climatic conditions, by the absence of irrigation, of fertilization and, in general, of technical equipment, and the persistence, in the cultural context, of traditional attitudes foreign (or hostile) to the productivity of labor, as well as a galloping demographic expansion, does not protect them from famine. The wretchedness of the countryside, the mirages of industrialization, have impelled crowds towards the towns; São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Casablanca, Calcutta, among many other agglomerations not prepared to absorb this influx, surround themselves with the sordid *bidonvilles* and *gourbivilles* of North Africa, *Callampas* of Chili, *faveles* of Brazil, *bustees* of India, shanty towns of Johannesburg, etc. to which the "models" of mass communication and of technical civilization penetrate too quickly. Masses, uprooted from their natural milieu and not integrated into the new milieu of modern societies, often know, and at their lowest level, cinema, radio, television, illustrated magazines (sex and crime) before they know the elements of physical well-being (housing, food, clothing) and basic education.

The re-evaluation of modern societies should be elaborated through two fundamental questions: *What does technical progress bring today to the average citizen belonging to these societies—the man or woman in the street—considered: (1) as consumer, and (2) as producer?*

II. MODERN SOCIETY AND THE CONSUMER

Let us distinguish here the consumption of material commodities and that of cultural commodities.

a) Industrialization—having as principal means the rational organization of labor, the increase of fast and accurate equipment, mechanization both in industry proper and in agriculture, and mass production—has caused the volume of consumer goods to rise sharply. The various strata have all, though unequally, benefited from this evolution. For his housing, food, and clothing the citizen of modern societies enjoys as consumer the quantity and quality of products distributed by technical progress. He tends today—and this is true even among the working and peasant populations—to acquire the modern instruments of comfort: automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, household equipment. Certainly, there are still today in these societies underdeveloped groups, including the underprivileged, the *lumpenproletariat*,

slum-dwellers, persecuted ethnic minorities. But in the aggregate the balance is clearly positive. If the *functional* quality of the objects put at the disposal of the consumer is on the increase, their *aesthetic* quality is often questionable. There is, however, a growing awareness of this problem (industrial design, institutes of industrial aesthetics, campaigns in favor of "functional design," etc.), and here, too, there has been perceptible recent progress.

b) The picture is more complex and, in short, darker if one considers the citizen as a consumer of cultural commodities.

General education, furnished by the state, has spread: elementary education in particular, but also secondary and advanced, although in the Western societies there is room for great progress in the democratization of the later stages, to which many have little access (for lack of places or scholarships) or from which (through submission to the sociocultural context) the children of workers and small rural landowners hold aloof. At this point one must underline the ambivalence of the action of mass media, which are capable of assuring the diffusion of information, of arousing curiosity and new interests, of increasing education, of widening the horizon, of integrating the individual with his region, his country, and his planet, of developing his taste, his intellectual and artistic (musical, for example) culture. A good televised broadcast of ballet can awaken or strengthen in the viewer an interest in choreography or the history of the dance. In agricultural regions of France surveys have shown small landowners who had never left their villages to be truly intrigued and enriched by a film of exploration of the Upper Niger. These media are, however, also capable of degrading.

With a sympathy divested of any superiority complex, and accepting the possible validity of a new "culture of the people" entirely different from the humanism that has been inherited from the Greco-Roman culture and is a frame of reference for the majority of intellectuals, let us consider the cultural consumer commodities diffused by the mass media in industrialized societies. Consider the actual manner in which a very great number of men and women occupy their free time daily, watching films, television broadcasts, listening to radio variety programs, reading magazines with wide circulations which are (say their publishers) "adapted" to the masses and which, reciprocally, "attract" them. Let us acknowledge that anarchy in the commercial production of these goods is a great danger—a subject we shall treat of later. Let

us also acknowledge from the experiences of dictatorial regimes (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy), or those with an official ideology and single party (U.S.S.R., China), the evils of totalitarian shaping of minds by the State, the evils of centralization of mass media which the State abuses in order to impose doctrines, beliefs, information, and ideologies on the individual and to "cast" him in a series of prefabricated molds, according to the requirements of the moment.

We must note as well something which concerns the consumption of both material and cultural commodities—the terrible weapon which the mass media constitute in modern societies as an instrument of manipulation. The individual can be psychologically (intellectually and affectively) manipulated to accept a war or follow a dictatorship, as well as to buy a new product or obey a new need; indeed, the mass media have the power to inject new needs with a calculated efficiency. Immediately after the war, Detroit marketing-research technicians, working for General Motors and Ford, reported to me their certainty of reaccustoming (or accustoming) a growing number of Americans to change automobiles at least every two years. The facts have not proved them wrong. I have seen also in the United States, in the schools of both white and colored children, the rapid development of the need for a family television set.

So much for the manipulation of the consumer in his free time. Later we shall meet the manipulation of the producer, during working hours, in the factory or office.

Another aspect of the consumption of material goods should be mentioned here: the young workman, having left his factory in Pittsburgh, Billancourt, Frankfurt, or Milan, tends to see the same cinema or television programs, to listen on the radio to the same variety programs, the same songs, the same jazz records, to glance through the same magazines as the son (or daughter) of his foreman, his engineer, his department head, and, more generally, as the "bourgeois" children of the middle classes. One encounters him more and more frequently, during his paid vacations, in the same "organized" vacation clubs, on a sunlit beach. Certainly the social relations and even the conflicting tensions created by the work situation persist in the factory or office. But outside the place of work the consumption of mass media exercises a tempering action upon the "proletarian culture," the "class-conscious" categories of Marxism. The workman, once the factory gates are left

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behind, becomes a consumer, similar to millions of other members of industrialized society. This fact is becoming more and more clear, and its range of influence on the future of our societies can be immense. I would add that, during some recent journeys in Yugoslavia and behind the Iron Curtain, in the U.S.S.R. and in Poland, I noted how much the young people there were influenced and often even mesmerized by mass-media consumer goods of Western origin—a universalist trait of technical civilization beyond the differences of economic structure of societies.

III. MODERN SOCIETY AND THE PRODUCER

How can one re-evaluate modern societies, subject to the incessant application of technical progress, from the producer's point of view? Here, too, the effects are multivalent.

a) It is commonplace to insist on the benefits brought to the productive man by technical progress. However, they are still forgotten today by too many intellectuals who have little familiarity with the realities of modern labor or who are nostalgic for the idealized ages of craftsmanship, a sort of Golden Age of humanity (some astonishing statements by Jean Giono appeared recently in an important Parisian weekly.² Technical progress has, in industrialized societies, widely cut into man's toil; it has abolished child-labor and exploitation by employers, rendered many workshops more salubrious, diminished the dangers of accident and of occupational diseases. Certainly, there is still an enormous amount to be done; but it is enough for him who knows something of present-day working conditions in, for example, the metal industry, textiles, or even in the mines, to compare them with those described by factory inspectors in the last century. It is enough to cite the considerable shortening of the working day (which, in the cotton industry in France in 1834; was still about fifteen hours, for workmen, women, and more often than not, for children) and the growth of national income per person, particularly the increase in buying power of various categories of workmen.

However, if physical fatigue has been reduced by technical progress, nervous fatigue (caused by the sounds of machines and particularly of chains, the constant or intermittent concentration, the responsibility

2. *L'Express*, April 21, 1960.

for costly equipment, etc.) has greatly increased. While *length* of the work period has diminished, its *intensity* has often increased, although even today many semiskilled tasks where man is a stopgap of mechanization tend to be done away with by the automatization of production. On the whole, seen from this angle, the balance of modern societies is positive.

b) From other aspects it is much less so. In a widely distributed report Otto Lipmann, the great German psychologist later banished by the Third Reich, stressed more than thirty years ago the decline "of man's role in production," the *Entseelung* of labor in industrialized societies.⁸ While multiplying the number of workers in the industrial field,⁴ the "scientific" organization of labor imposes upon them repetitive and compartmentalized tasks which demand only a brief period of execution devoid of initiative, of technical intelligence, and of direct contact with the raw material (metal, wood, leather, textile fiber, etc.); standardized, interchangeable, depersonalized tasks, often with no possibility of professional promotion; fragmentary tasks devoid of a personal sense of achievement, of accomplishment, of intellectual and effective participation in a community; tasks which do not permit the participation, still less the fulfilment of the profound inclinations of the personality.

We should point out that strict specialization in very divided tasks, rigorously limited and repeated, is a phenomenon encountered at the most varied levels of professional life and which everywhere carries harmful psychic effects. In Paris I have met a specialist in bone surgery who, having made a success of the operation for club foot, had just celebrated (with tedium) his three hundredth operation for that deformity.

We must note, too, that to the manipulation of the consumer by mass media corresponds the manipulation of the producer by the unscrupulous practitioners of psychological techniques in the service of the contractor or of the employer-state. Finally, and without entering into statistical analyses, the trend in modern societies which leans towards the multiplication of repetitive and compartmentalized tasks is

3. "Das Anteil des Menschen am Produktions-Effekt" (French trans. in *Journal de psychologie*, January 15, 1928).

4. In the United States today their number clearly is declining, compared to those in the tertiary field. It will soon be the same in other developed countries.

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accompanied by a trend in the opposite direction which creates new skilled occupations: for instance, the controllers of machines and, above all, the various skilled specialists in repair and maintenance whom the introduction of automation techniques and particularly of electronic apparatus tends to increase today.

IV. THE NEW SISYPHUS

Seen in its entirety, this process does not permit the hope that, during the coming decades and despite the progress of automation, modern societies will be able to offer to all their citizens tasks which will permit them to engage their personalities and to derive real satisfaction from their work.

Indeed, even admitting that the automation of production should one day manage to abolish all these fabricative tasks, comparable to those that characterized the work of men during past millenia, a grave problem already begins to be posed. For work, as Freud has stressed,⁵ is not merely a restricted activity carried out for practical purposes. When it corresponds with a certain engagement of the personality (which is far from always being the case) it constitutes an important factor of fulfilment for the individual whose integration it assures into reality and, particularly, into communities ranging from the work team to society as a whole. Technical progress is likely to have, even now, an unbalancing action on the psyches of many individuals by depriving them of an essential activity for which it provides no substitute, unless it be the possibility of fulfilment outside work, in leisure time.

But the picture is still more complex. The prophets of automation, seeing the work week of thirty, indeed, of twenty, hours, already on our horizon, are convinced that the worker will, during the "four Sundays" of the week, devote himself to the joys of genuine culture—music, painting, great authors of the present and of the past, and artistic pilgrimages. Now, observation of what is happening (for very different reasons, moreover) at the same time in prosperous societies, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and in austerity economies (Poland, Yugoslavia) or in countries with underdeveloped sections, like Argentina, shows that many workers devote their increased leisure to working: this is the curious contemporary phenomenon of "double (or

5. *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (Vienna, 1929); French trans.: *Malaise dans la civilisation* (Paris: Denoël & Steele, 1934).

even triple) employment." In modern societies, which are of particular interest to us here, the worker, taken in the context of social "models" and of emulation and subject, moreover, to the constant introduction of new (or strengthened) needs, seeks to earn more money in order to increase his comfort, improve his household equipment, his housing, etc. A survey made in Akron, center of the rubber industry in 1958, showed that approximately 17 per cent of the workers hold, apart from their factory work, a second full-time job and that, moreover, about 40 per cent of them ply a second part-time trade, very often a tertiary "service," for instance, at a beauty shop or a real-estate agency.⁶ In France "black market" work has spread so widely that, during the winter of 1958-59, it provoked a protest movement of the craftsmen's unions.

Caught in the infernal cycle of production-consumption, the man-in-the-street, even assisted by automation, risks becoming a new Sisyphus, condemned to roll without respite a burden which always falls back, crushing in him the values of thought and of culture, and which delivers him during his free time (*peau de chagrin* gnawed by proliferating "needs") to the anarchic action of mass media let loose.

V. FINAL REMARKS

In concluding this outline it is important to emphasize that a re-evaluation of modern societies, and thus an assessment of the technical milieu and of its effects on the individual, demands on our part a rigorous attempt at clairvoyance, going beyond the visual so dear to the humanist intelligentsia; casting aside any hint of superiority, every prejudice disdainful toward a new culture that is trying to find itself. Technical civilization (is it, in fact, really a civilization?) is a stage of the immense Promethean adventure for which the ground was laid thousands of years ago but into which our species has thrown itself in the last century and a half with increasing fervor and something akin to frenzy: I mean the adventure of mankind at grips with the products of its genius.

In the course of this adventure, the incessant technical changes fall, as it were, on societies more or less fortified by tradition. Many North Americans who have stayed for long in Western Europe say frankly

6. Harvey Swados, "Less Work—Less Leisure," pp. 353-63 in E. Larrabee and R. Meyer-sohn (eds.), *Mass Leisure* (Glencoe, Ill.; Free Press, 1958).

that even today their fellow citizens lack an "art of living" and of enjoying themselves. This observation, in which there is some truth, cannot be a source of pride to the European confronted with analogous problems which he himself has not resolved. The art of living in the new technical milieu is lacking in Europeans just as it is in Americans: if the former cope with it better, on the whole, than the latter do, it is because of the older traditions of their pre-Machine Age societies.

Since there are other reports especially devoted to the "culture of the masses" in modern societies, we will not dwell on these problems. At the conclusion of this global re-evaluation we can, however, recommend a strictly objective attitude, free from both pathetic maledictions and naïve apologies, with regard to the applications, as much cultural as material, of technical progress. The mastery of these abundant techniques, a fundamental condition of their humanization, demands from man today not an "increase of soul" in the sense of Bergsonian spiritualism but a supplement of conscience and of moral forces in order to re-establish the balance broken by the too-savage emergence of its power. Intellectuals, whether imbued with the humanist ideal or with the experimental spirit of the physical sciences, must themselves be the prime movers and actual examples of these struggles with conscience. The social sciences can thus play a fundamental role today by initiating the psychosociological study of the technical milieu, by enlisting the interest of young researchers and a growing public, and by sharpening the awareness of our contemporaries of hidden and daily dangers. Modern societies where the number of men engaged in the tertiary field (administration, offices, business, "services" of every kind) increases to the detriment of occupation in agriculture and even in industry⁷ already present us with a diptych. On one side, we have production, mechanized and automatized with the help of increasingly perfected machines demanding continually shorter periods of weekly work; on the other, we have leisure time in which, overcoming the pathology of "double employment," many men should find the center of gravity of their existence, the location of their dignity and of their happiness.

Can modern societies realize freely this harmonious union, this magnificent possibility—free from totalitarian shaping but also beyond the commercial anarchy of the mass media? Or will it be necessary for the

7. Cf. "Le Repartition de la population active aux U.S.A. en pourcentage du total de 1820 à 1960," in Jean Fourastié, *La Civilisation de 1975* (Paris: P.V.F., 1953), p. 26.

state to practice a sort of enlightened despotism, a despotism advised and guided by a deeper knowledge of the technical milieu and its effects? If this is the case, the wondrous development of the physical sciences must be, I am convinced, accompanied and controlled by equivalent progress in the social sciences and by the judicious application of the social sciences to the problems of the individual and of communities.

TRADITION

There are certain terms which, for reasons no longer discoverable, have taken on an emotional force which impels people either to admire what they seem to stand for or to dislike it. Among such terms are the temporal and the eternal, the dynamic and the static, the unified and the multiple, the universal and the local. At the present time to say that a work of art, for instance, has been "universally admired" is presumably also to say that it is better than one which is admired only in France or Italy or the United States. To say that courage or truthfulness or charity have always been "highly esteemed" is also to say that they are inherently nobler qualities than, for example, originality or wit, which are highly esteemed only in certain epochs. It is this curious aura of emotivity which Professor A. O. Lovejoy in one of his ingenious terminological inventions once called "metaphysical pathos." "Metaphysical pathos" is not merely the name for the power which terms have of stimulating pleasant emotions, of making men feel that the things they name are good. It may also be of an unpleasant sort. It may induce dislike as well as admiration. Where one man speaks of the dynamic with something approaching awe, another calls it "aimless striving" or "spiritual restlessness," forgetting that only a hundred and fifty years ago the German Romantic philosophers could think of no nobler end of man than striving for striving's sake. Hence it is always useful and

for the most part necessary to look closely at those abstractions by means of which we justify our programs. It is for this reason that it may be well to examine one of our own sacred words, "tradition," which seems to have replaced even that perennial favorite of the poets, "nature."

It is one of the peculiarities of terms from which emanate waves of metaphysical pathos that both those who admire and those who dislike what they stand for seldom ask whether they stand for anything whatsoever. "Nature" and its derivatives have been shown to have over sixty-five meanings, and, consequently, when one uses this word, one might be expected to specify in just which of the many senses it is being used. To say that something is "natural" may mean almost anything, from its being something expressive of human as distinguished from animal nature to its being something which has not had to be learned, being innate. It may refer to that which is the peculiar character of one individual as distinguished from all others, and it may also mean that which is held to be commonly and universally present in all men.

In a situation of this sort it will be found that the forensic power of a word varies directly with its vagueness. For, to justify or condemn some act as "natural" or "unnatural," "eternal" or "temporal," "creative" or "mechanical," "organic" or "material," will turn out to be futile as soon as someone asks in precisely what sense such terms are being employed. Indeed, a little experience in argument will show that the demand for clarity will on the whole so annoy one's adversary that he will withdraw from the conversation, charging one with sophistry, splitting hairs, or simple bad faith. To those who are seduced by the metaphysical pathos of a given term, it is unthinkable that anyone else should be unresponsive to its charm. Similarly, a man who admires the frescoes of Piero della Francesca or the *Mass in B-Minor* thinks not only that everyone else admires them but that everyone else should admire them. If he thinks that Fouquet's portrait of Étienne Chevalier is one of the greatest pictures ever painted, he cannot understand how other people can rank Largillière's portrait of Louis XIV above it. And woe to the peacemaker who would attempt to point out that both Fouquet and Largillière were great painters and that their differences were differences in aesthetic conception; that each work of art is an individual being and that it should not be judged as a member of a homogeneous class. He will be set down at once as a fuzzy-minded eclectic; a man without standards, discrimination, or taste. In much the same way, the man who

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uses the term "immortal" in praise seldom if ever asks himself why the immortal should be any better than the ephemeral, nor does he even dream of asking just how many years a thing must endure to be honored with the sacred adjective.

Though I am no believer in ages, one can say with some justice that every period has its favorite words. In Greek such words as "nature," "autarky," and the "one" were of almost magical power. In modern times the seventeenth century saw the rise of the "rational," the eighteenth saw "enthusiasm" gaining ground, the nineteenth went in for the "vital" and the twentieth for the "creative." When one is dealing with the past, one can make some guesses about why certain terms won adherents; but, when it is a question of the present, the answer is hard to find. We are now, for instance, seeing "tradition" emerging as something to be praised, but no one knows why as yet. We have papers on, and propaganda for, the scientific tradition, the Hebraic-Christian tradition, the classical tradition, and the humanistic tradition. We have the Graeco-Roman tradition opposing the Teutonic tradition, the occidental tradition opposing the oriental, the humanistic tradition opposing the tradition of empirical science. In the United States there is much talk of something called the "American way of life," and one of the most popular books in that country has been entitled *The Greek Way*. No one has yet been able to define just what the former consists in, and the only reason why the latter made any sense is that the paucity of records eliminated complexity. Happy the historian who has but one text to go on! With Diogenes Laertius as our only guide, it is easy to write a history of ancient philosophy. And how simple it would be to write a history of France from the 18 Brumaire until Waterloo if one had only the *Memorial de Sainte-Hélène* as evidence of what took place! But what revelation have we that reality is more simple than appearance, that the unity which we attribute to our historical facts is not projected into them by our very method of research, and that the satisfaction which we feel when we have achieved an intellectual unification of diversity is more than the scholar's personal gratification?

Turning now to the word "tradition," we find first that, like all such terms, it is used both in a descriptive sense and in a normative sense. Descriptively, it may assert that there has always been complete uniformity in the things and acts which compose the tradition; but sometimes it may assert that the uniformity "underlies" the obvious diver-

sity. Between these two extremes there is a variety of shades of meaning depending on how much diversity one is willing to admit as not destroying the "essential" unity. Since the only completely homogeneous acts of human beings are those which are essential to life, such as eating and breathing, no one whom I have ever read on the subject—and this includes Joseph de Maistre, the Vicomte de Bonald, and their disciplines—denies that traditions are not absolutely uniform. But, relying on a metaphor which Herder made popular in the eighteenth century, the plant, they assert that traditions grow. If traditions grow and one knows what one means by growth, and if it is better to grow than not to grow, then one can accept a certain kind of change and also preserve the normative sense of one's word. If growth were not admitted, then a tradition would be nothing more than a simple repetition of the same acts, words, gestures; and it is clear that cultural history shows constant diversification rather than persistent repetition. Yet, etymologically, the word denotes the act of passing on something which one already possesses, and both Littré and the *New English Dictionary* give as the primary meaning of the term the legal meaning of handing on, as to one's heirs, one's property. Though one can prove little by pointing to the original meaning of terms, it is likely that part of the pathos of the word "tradition" is a residue from its legal meaning. This prayer that I say, this coat of arms which I bear, this house in which I live, these books which I read—all these have come down to me from my ancestors, generation after generation. In that fact resides no small emotional force, even if what has been handed down is nothing more than the Hapsburg chin or the Bourbon lip.

The notion of growth is, as I have said, far from clear. It involves change; that is certain. But it must be change of a peculiar kind. As Bergson would have pointed out, we do not speak of a snowball's growing when we roll it about to build it up except in a figurative sense—figurative, if the growth of a plant or an animal is the literal sense. But in the case of plants and animals there are two factors which we have to consider: (1) all members of the class change in the same way, following the same course, and (2) there is a terminus to the series of changes. All hens' eggs develop in twenty-one days into chickens and into nothing else, unless someone interferes with their development and boils or fries them. All eggs, once they have reached the point of being chickens, have reached the end of their growth. (If one prefers, one can

substitute the dead hen or cock for the chicken; the argument is the same.) It is, however, clear that one cannot use the term "tradition" in this sense when we are speaking of cultural history. For there are no classes of similar traditions to compare with each other in order to permit us to form a generalized and homogeneous group of things. There is only one Hebraic-Christian tradition, one classical tradition, one humanistic tradition. But where one has only one object, anything that it does may be called either accidental or self-determined. And in all probability if one could explain how any one of these traditions had developed, half at least of its charm would evaporate. For one likes to think that each tradition develops in accordance with an entelechy the behavior of which is a bit mysterious. After all, who knows why a hen's egg turns into a chicken instead of into a duckling?

Not only is there no sheaf of similar traditions by comparing which one could anticipate the growth of any given tradition but in the very nature of things no tradition has a terminus. Consequently, one can never know what it is growing into. Civilizations, in spite of Spengler and Toynbee, or for that matter, Volney, do not die unless the people who made them are exterminated. They change. Fewer people read Greek now than read it fifty years ago, but thousands read the Greek tragic poets in translation, at least in the United States. If this seems implausible, does anyone think that the publishers of the famous paperbacks print them for sport? It needs no proof from me to show that parts of ancient civilizations get absorbed into modern civilizations. Most Occidentals still observe the rituals of some Asiatic religion, and many still are disciplined by a modern form of Roman law. But, as I say, this is a commonplace. Does it lead us to assert that the tradition of Roman law grew into the law of the state of Louisiana? Or that the Greek poetic tradition grew into English translations made by a professor of Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania? If ever there was a rhetorical question, these are rhetorical.

If a given tradition has no ascertainable terminus, all that can be said about its growth is that it increases in size. That seems to be what is meant when the church speaks of "tradition." It is pointed out that certain beliefs which are not found in the Bible were nevertheless held by a great number of people; these beliefs one by one became accepted dogmas of the church, and thus the Catholic tradition grew. No previously held dogmas are rejected, so that the total number of dogmas in-

creases as time goes on. It is also assumed that no new dogma is inconsistent with the total mass of dogmas. This concept of tradition preserves the etymological meaning of the term and at the same time permits change. But usually proponents of tradition are reluctant to admit change in any sense of the word which is not growth. One wants as much permanence as possible. The question in a world where time is admittedly real is, "How much permanence is possible?" The child remains within the man, if the Freudians are right, but he rarely emerges as a child. And, when he does, the man consults a psychiatrist.

One of the ways to retain the past and yet accept change is through the use of the concept of potentiality. The distinction between the potential and the actual is too well known to require explanation here, but it may be well to point out that one knows what is potential only by observing the actual occurring as its end term and occurring so frequently as to be called "inevitable." The nature of a thing, said the inventor of the distinction, is that which it is on the whole. Sometimes he was willing to grant that things go wrong, but that there was a determinate order in natural events he refused to deny. But here again one is frustrated for the simple reason that a single tradition cannot be observed in a number of instances. It is, as we suggested above, the only instance which we have. How can one predict on the basis of observing the first term in a series what the later terms are going to be? This is true even in arithmetic. Is one to say that the dogma of the Corporeal Assumption of the Virgin is potential in the Resurrection of her Son or that the doctrine of universal suffrage is potential in the theory of natural rights? And, if one does say that, does one mean that one has observed a number of cases in which the mothers of incarnate gods were translated into heaven as the Greek heroes were translated into the Islands of the Blessed? Does one mean that universal suffrage is implied in the theory of natural rights as a theorem in geometry is implied in the definitions, axioms, and postulates? When it is a question of what is potential in a belief or set of beliefs, one is indeed usually talking about what is supposed to be implied in them. But in the examples cited the tradition of the Assumption was admittedly the repeated assertion by different people at different times that they believed in its occurrence. And during the ceremony of pronouncing the new dogma, the Holy Father was petitioned three times to declare this belief a dogma not on the ground that it was implicit in any other dogma

but on the ground that it had been believed over the centuries. In the second example the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—to use American illustrations—imply in no sense of that vague term the right of every adult to vote. In fact, it might just as well be argued that the one assurance of preserving these rights is the presence of a benevolent tyrant. I am far from denying that some ideas are implicit in others and that they are inferred from them in the course of history. It might prove difficult to find instances of this happening but surely not an *a priori* impossibility.

The techniques of applying the metaphors of growth and potentiality to tradition serve to let us retain both permanence and change. Another way of doing this is by introducing the concept of levels. Thus one speaks of, let us say, the “classical tradition” as being one and immutable in what is called a “deeper sense,” while growing and therefore changing on the level of perception. It is not difficult to illustrate something like this. It is, for instance, impossible to write a declarative sentence in an Indo-European language without using the subject-attribute form. This form has as its metaphysical model the permanent “thing” with attributes which come and go. Therefore we can say that even Aristotle and Rousseau were in fundamental agreement in that they both believed in what might be called the “metaphysics of the thing.” Moreover, there will in all likelihood be a certain harmony among all writers, regardless of the language they use, for inevitably they write either about the world of their experience or about an imaginary world modeled upon it, though perhaps beautified, aggrandized, diminished, reconstructed, or otherwise modified. In both cases we can say, if we wish, that we have discovered an “underlying unity” in the thoughts of a number of different people. I confess to not understanding why this unity should be called “deeper” or “underlying,” for it is found on the same level as the diversity. But we need not argue about terminology. Such words as “deep,” “profound,” and “internal” are very gratifying to some minds, and, as long as one does not take them seriously, they are harmless.

It is not hard to see how one can find such an underlying unity in a group of writers. Take, for instance, the classical tradition in philosophy. Here one might select such writers as Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, with whom it is prudent to stop. We then point out that Heraclitus made the distinction between the world of perception, the Flux, and the world of the Logos, the

permanent reality; that Plato pointed out that the former is inhabited by temporal copies of the realities in the latter, the Ideas; that Aristotle bridged the gap between the two worlds with his concept of the immanent forms; that Plotinus introduced a graded hierarchy of reality, goodness, and beauty into Aristotle's world and thus made the passage from appearance to reality more comprehensible; that Augustine took over from Plotinus his hierarchical cosmos, made the Ideas of Plato thoughts in the mind of God in accordance with which he created the world; and that Thomas, identifying the God of the Bible with the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, brought the whole tradition to a culmination in his theology.

There is of course a certain truth in this superficial sketch. But it is obvious that this truth is attained by eliminating from the philosophies in question all disagreement. It is simply not true that Heraclitus had any "world" of the Logos at all in the sense that the Platonists had a world of Ideas. There are, in fact, few concepts in philosophy the meaning of which is so disputed as that of the Logos of Heraclitus.¹ Its very obscurity permitted later philosophers to use it as they would. Moreover, it is unlikely that Heraclitus would have insisted on the existence of the Logos if he had not been also impressed with the existence of the Flux. Hence it is wiser to locate the conflict between permanence and change in the heart of his philosophy rather than either of the conflicting beings. As far as Plato is concerned, it is questionable whether he is more interested in developing a theory of two worlds or in combating the relativism and skepticism of the Sophists. As for Aristotle, the historians do indeed award to him the credit for "bridging the gap" between the two worlds; but, when one goes back to his text itself, one finds that something called *Physis* seems to take the place of the permanent order of things—an order never perfectly exemplified in the world of experience. In fact, Aristotle is as critical of what he believes to be Plato's theory of Ideas as he is of the pre-Socratics. If what I say has any justification, the historian interested in traditions would do better to admit that it is he who creates the tradition by selection and organization and not the men about whom he is writing.

Aside from all other considerations, one can write the history of Greek philosophy from the point of view of the adversaries of Plato and Aristotle, the Sophists and the Skeptics. One can write it from the point

1. See, among other works, Clémence Ramnoux, *Héraclite* (Paris, 1959), Index, s.v.

of view of the Hedonists and the Cynics. If it is usually written from the point of view of the Platonists and Aristotelians, that is presumably because the Christian Fathers could use their works to greater advantage than they could use the works of the other Greek philosophers. What might be called the "Platonistic theme" is not any more Greek philosophy than sophistry or skepticism or hedonism or cynicism is. The Stoics and Epicureans were also Greek and also very influential Greeks. One could say with some justification, though not without incurring the criticism that one was indulging in a *boutade*, that the outstanding Greek tradition in philosophy was to agree with no one as far as possible.

In intellectual history one must expect that a man's thoughts are usually developed to combat someone else's thoughts. Much of what we think is thought because we disagree with someone or other. We attempt to fortify the truth as we see it because it is under attack. Even in the Middle Ages, though there might be agreement on the name which would be given to the truth, there was far from unanimity on just what the truth was. Intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, mysticism and fideism, rationalism and voluntarism, trinitarianism and unitarianism—all were in a flourishing state, and each was as it was because of its adversaries. One can speak of Christian philosophy, as Professor Gilson does, only if one first accepts the official definition of what is Christian. But in that case neither Roscellinus nor Abelard nor Johannes Scotus Erigena are Christian philosophers. Yet they themselves were preoccupied with supporting what they believed to be Christian dogma. If one refuses to include those of their ideas which were condemned when one writes a history of the Christian philosophical tradition, one does so in order to create a homogeneous and consistent tradition. But, if homogeneity and consistency are the differentiae of a traditional set of beliefs and practices, then the goal should be the constant repetition of the same beliefs and practices in exactly the same form. The Japanese who destroy the Temple of Ise every twenty years and then rebuild it precisely as it was before would be the perfect traditionalists.

It is obvious that there will be in any set of historical events a certain similarity. This is inevitable, for it is impossible for a human being to depart entirely from the way in which he has been educated. In fact, even if he deliberately sets out to be entirely original, he will plot his course in exactly the opposite direction from that in which he has grown

up. But this is submitting to the past also. Moreover, the very fact that we are human beings will give rise to a similarity of needs, desires, and aims. Everyone is conceived, born, fed, and educated; everyone has some kind of economic and sexual appetites; most people marry and have children; the children have to be reared; the dead have to be disposed of; all people seem to feel the need of communicating with others. Thinking of such things, the ethnologist—and, alas, also the philosopher—discovers uniformity in space and time and becomes eloquent on the subject of the universality of human values. But the moment he proceeds beyond this point and looks into the manner in which a given society will permit such needs to be fulfilled, he finds that the universality is fractured. All people talk to each other. But some people, for example, Japanese women, have to use a form of speech when talking to a man which is used by inferiors talking to superiors. Is that a trivial difference? All people have incest taboos. But in some societies the mother's family is taboo but not the father's. Such examples are commonplaces, but their importance has been overlooked. The more one studies such things, the more one is convinced that there is no need, drive, or appetite the satisfaction of which is not disciplined and controlled by society. When the violation of a taboo may lead to capital punishment and international war, the taboo is not trivial. It is all very well to say that eating is universal, but a man cannot just eat in the abstract: he has to eat something. The searcher after universality should consider not merely the desire but the desire plus its object. Homosexuality is frowned upon in most countries and punished severely in some. Are we frowning upon the existence of a sexual appetite or upon a manner of satisfying it?

We may now turn to the second question—that of the normative value of traditions.

It cannot be denied that a man who never has to change his manner of living is less beset by problems than one who is constantly confronted by new situations. For problems arise precisely because novelty is before one. One would like to use yesterday's solutions to today's problems, but they usually will not work. In times when the social structure is stable there are no famines, no floods, no earthquakes, or other natural catastrophes; when the population shows no alarming increase or drop, when there are no wars, no financial crises, one can get along from day to day in a jog-trot way, repeating the past indefinitely. For the difference between past and future is simply chronological, not qualita-

tive. This is a perfect situation for the lover of tradition. The only novelty which might arise would be created by those recalcitrant individuals who are found in every social group. But they can be easily squelched, since their problems are not those of the group as a whole, and hence their answers are irrelevant to any questions of importance.

If our ways of living have been developed to meet needs which once were real and if they survive in part because some of those needs continue to be felt, then, when traditions are violated or set aside, it may well be because they no longer satisfy any needs. This statement has to be qualified, since few things are ever lost in a society simply because they are no longer useful. In truth any institution, such as the army, metallic money, handicrafts, and magical rites, which may have been originated as useful practices, will survive as good-in-themselves. They may be given new names, but they themselves will live on regardless of the name they bear. The importance of this is seen in the justification of our obsolete practices. One can be sure that the moment an institution is justified on the ground that it is good-in-itself, has what some philosophers call "terminal value," it has lost its utility and is being kept alive as *objets d'art*, ancient monuments, and sterile fruit trees are kept alive: they are beautiful. They are not always called "beautiful"; sometimes they are called "sacred." They are traditional institutions or ways of behaving in the sense that they are retained from the past by what might be called the "inertia of custom."

It is easy to ridicule this, but it is the principle by means of which the fine arts arise from the useful art and religious ritual from magic. The inertia of custom gives stability and hence psychological security to a society. The resistance to change is probably an excellent brake upon too rapid changes. A change may be too rapid when it will create new evils to replace those which it has eliminated. And, annoying though it be to have one's proposals for change analyzed and discussed by committees and the like, the delay in accepting a reform may turn out to be prudent. But there happen to be times when the total situation confronting an individual or a society is so novel that no precedents can be found for solutions to the new problems. I should like to suggest that the middle twentieth century is one such time. If one compares the state of the sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology today with what it was in 1900, one sees at once that an intellectual revolution has occurred. But the same thing is true in the arts. What would Monsieur Ingres have said to Matisse or Jackson Pollak, he who could

not control his temper before a Delacroix? What would Gounod have said to Schönberg, not to mention Krenek, he who shrugged his shoulders in contempt when he heard the English horns in Franck's *Symphony in D-Minor*? What would Flaubert have said to Joyce, Balzac to Sartre, Mérimée to Kafka? Fifty years ago no one would have predicted the Communist revolution in Russia and China; it was supposed to occur first in industrialized countries. But to recount all the fundamental changes which have occurred since 1900 to upset our preconceived notions about social organization, science, and the arts is unnecessary, for no one likely to read this article is unaware of them. On the basis of what tradition can one judge the truths of nuclear physics, the beauty of a non-objective painting, the efficacy of an economic program? The answer is obvious.

I should like to conclude by pointing out that if a tradition, such as the study of the classical languages, to take but one example, is allowed to die out, that is not because of sin. It is probably because only a few people find that it responds to any need which they feel. Sometimes, I realize, people's needs are excited by propaganda and that form of psychological warfare known as advertising. How far this can go I do not know, and it may be true that through an advertising campaign men may be induced to cut their throats and to marry ugly women out of a spirit of Christian charity. But such things are unusual, and generally traditions are not killed but die. They die of inanition and in spite of the common desire to preserve the past as long as possible. We know, for instance, that, in the United States, Greek and Latin were kept in the curriculum as long as the majority of university students could be assumed to be studying for the ministry. And even today when a man is thinking of becoming a clergyman, he studies Greek and Latin, regardless of what others may do. He studies them because he feels it essential to be able to read the Vulgate and the New Testament, not because these languages train the mind or are an integral part of the Western tradition or inform you about the original meaning of a number of modern English words. If the great mass of university students in the United States could be convinced that they needed to know what is written in Greek and Latin and furthermore that they could not read it in translation, they would begin the study of those two beautiful languages. But it would be hard to convince people who face the second half of the twentieth century that the classics are more important than the natural sciences.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Herbert Marcuse

ACTUALITY OF DIALECTIC¹

This note was written in the hope that it would make a small contribution to the revival, not of Hegel, but of a mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterated: the power of negative thinking. As Hegel defines it, "Thinking is, indeed, essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us." What does he mean by "negation," the central category of dialectic?

Even Hegel's most abstract and metaphysical concepts are saturated with experience—experiences of a world in which the unreasonable becomes reasonable and, as such, determines the facts; in which "unfreedom" is the condition of freedom and war the guarantor of peace. This world contradicts itself. Common sense and science purge themselves from this contradiction; but philosophical thought begins with the recognition that the facts do not correspond to the concepts imposed by common sense and scientific reason—in short, with the refusal to accept

1. Written as preface to the forthcoming new edition of my book *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press). I have revised for this edition the 1954 supplement to the bibliography and omitted the epilogue written for the second edition because it treated in a much too condensed form developments which I discuss more fully in my forthcoming book, a study of advanced industrial society.

them. To the extent that these concepts disregard the fatal contradictions which make up reality, they abstract from the very process of reality. The negation which dialectic applies to them is not only a critique of a conformistic logic, which denies the reality of contradictions; it is also a critique of the given state of affairs on its own grounds—of the established system of life, which denies its own promises and potentialities.

Today, this dialectical mode of thought is alien to the whole established universe of discourse and action. It appears to belong to the past and to be rebutted by the achievements of technological civilization. The established reality seems promising and productive enough to repel or absorb all alternatives. Thus acceptance—and even affirmation—of this reality appears to be the only reasonable methodological principle. Moreover, it precludes neither criticism nor change; on the contrary, insistence on the dynamic character of the status quo, on its constant “revolutions,” is one of the strongest props for this attitude. Yet this dynamic seems to operate endlessly within the same framework of life: streamlining rather than abolishing the domination of man, both by man and by the products of his labor. Progress becomes quantitative and tends to delay indefinitely the turn from quantity to quality—that is, the emergence of new modes of existence with new forms of reason and freedom.

The power of negative thinking is the driving power of dialectical thought, used as a tool for analyzing the world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy. I choose this vague and unscientific formulation in order to sharpen the contrast between dialectical and undialectical thinking. “Inadequacy” implies a value judgment. Dialectical thought invalidates the *a priori* opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only within the subject-object totality. All facts embody the knower as well as the doer; they continuously translate the past into the present. The objects thus “contain” subjectivity in their very structure.

Now what (or who) is this subjectivity that, in a literal sense, constitutes the objective world? Hegel answers with a series of terms denoting the subject in its various manifestations: Thought, Reason, Spirit, Idea. Since we no longer have that fluent access to those concepts which

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries still had, I shall try to sketch Hegel's conception in more familiar terms.

Nothing is "real" which does not sustain itself in existence, in a life-and-death struggle with the situations and conditions of its existence. The struggle may be blind or even unconscious, as in inorganic matter; it may be conscious and concerted, such as the struggle of mankind with its own conditions and with those of nature. Reality is the constantly renewed result of the process of existence—the process, conscious or unconscious, in which "that which is" becomes "other than itself"; and identity is only the continuous negation of inadequate existence, the subject maintaining itself in being other than itself. Each reality, therefore, is a realization—a development of "subjectivity." The latter "comes to itself" in history, where the development has a rational content; Hegel defines it as "progress in the consciousness of freedom."

Again we have a value judgment—and this time one imposed upon the world as a whole. But freedom is for Hegel an ontological category: it means being not a mere object but the subject of one's existence; not succumbing to external conditions but transforming factuality into realization. This transformation is, according to Hegel, the energy of nature and history, the inner structure of all being! One may be tempted to scoff at this idea, but he should nevertheless be aware of its implications.

Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as "other than they are." Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is a faulty logic. Thought "corresponds" to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure. Here the principle of dialectic drives thought beyond the limits of philosophy. For to comprehend reality means to comprehend what things really are, and this in turn means rejecting their mere factuality. Rejection is the process of thought as well as of action. While the scientific method leads from the immediate experience of things to their mathematical-logical structure, philosophical thought leads from the immediate experience of existence to its historical structure: the principle of freedom.

Freedom is the innermost dynamic of existence, and the very process of existence in an unfree world is "the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny [*aufheben*] freedom." Thus, freedom is essen-

tially negative: existence is both alienation and the process by which the subject comes to itself in comprehending and mastering alienation. For the history of mankind this means attainment of a "state of the world" in which the individual persists in inseparable harmony with the whole and in which the conditions and relations of his world "possess no essential objectivity independent of the individual." As to the prospect of attaining such a state, Hegel was pessimistic: the element of reconciliation with the established state of affairs, so strong in his work, seems to a great extent due to this pessimism—or, if one prefers, this realism. Freedom is relegated to the realm of pure thought, to the Absolute Idea, Idealism by default: Hegel shares this fate with the main philosophical tradition.

Dialectical thought thus becomes negative in itself. Its function is to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core of things that the development of their internal contradictions leads necessarily to qualitative change: the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs. Hegel sees the task of knowledge as that of recognizing the world as Reason by understanding all objects of thought as elements and aspects of a totality which becomes a conscious world in the history of mankind. Dialectical analysis ultimately tends to become historical analysis, in which nature itself appears as part and stage in its own history and in the history of man. The progress of cognition from common sense to knowledge arrives at a world which is negative in its very structure because that which is actual opposes and denies the potentialities inherent in itself—potentialities which themselves strive for realization. Reason is the negation of the negative.

Interpretation of that-which-is in terms of that-which-is-not, confrontation of the given facts with that which they exclude—this has been the concern of philosophy wherever philosophy was more than a matter of ideological justification or mental exercise. The liberating function of negation in philosophical thought depends upon the recognition that the negation is a positive act: that-which-is repels that-which-is-not and, in doing so, repels its own real possibilities. Consequently, to express and define that-which-is on its own terms is to distort and falsify reality. Reality is other and more than that codified in the logic and language of facts. Here is the inner link between dialectical thought and

the effort of avant-garde literature: the effort to break the power of facts over the word and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts. As the power of the given facts tends to become totalitarian, to absorb all opposition, and to define the entire universe of discourse, the effort to speak the language of contradiction appears increasingly irrational, obscure, artificial. The question is not that of a direct or indirect influence of Hegel on the genuine avant-garde, though this is evident in Mallarmé and Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, in surrealism, in Brecht. Dialectic and poetic language meet, rather, on common ground.

The common element is the search for an "authentic language"—the language of negation as the Great Refusal to accept the rules of a game in which the dice are loaded. The absent must be made present because the greater part of the truth is in that which is absent. This is Mallarmé's classical statement:

Je dis: une fleur! et, hors de l'oubli où ma voix relègue aucun contour, en tant que quelque chose d'autre que les calices sus, musicalement se lève, idée même et suave, l'absente de tous bouquets. ["I say: a flower! and, out of the oblivion where my voice banishes all contours, musically rises, different from every known blossom, the one absent from all bouquets—Idea itself and delicate."]

In the authentic language, the word

n'est pas l'expression d'une chose, mais l'absence de cette chose. . . . Le mot fait disparaître les choses et nous impose le sentiment d'un manque universel et même de son propre manque ["is not the expression of a thing, but rather the absence of this thing. . . . The word makes the things disappear and imposes upon us the feeling of a universal want and even of its own want"].²

Poetry is thus the power "denier les choses" ("to deny the things")—the power which Hegel claims, paradoxically, for all authentic thought. Valéry asserts: "La pensée est, en somme, le travail qui fait vivre en nous ce qui n'existe pas" ("In short, thought is the labor which brings to life in us that which does not exist").³

He asks the theoretical question: "Que sommes-nous donc sans le

2. Maurice Blanchot, "Le Paradoxe d'Aytre," *Les Temps modernes*, June, 1946, pp. 1,580 ff.

3. *Oeuvres (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade)* I, 1,333.

secours de ce qui n'existe pas?" ("What are we without the help of that which does not exist?")⁴

This is not "existentialism." It is something more vital and more desperate: the effort to contradict a reality in which all logic and all speech are false to the extent that they are part of a mutilated whole. The vocabulary and grammar of the language of contradiction are still those of the game (there are no others), but the concepts codified in the language of the game are redefined by relating them to their "determinate negation." This term, which denotes the governing principle of dialectical thought, can be explained only in a textual interpretation of Hegel's *Logic*. Here it must suffice to emphasize that, by virtue of this principle, the dialectical contradiction is distinguished from all pseudo- and crackpot opposition, "beatnik-" and "hipsterism." The negation is determinate if it refers the established state of affairs to the basic factors and forces which make for its destructiveness as well as for the possible alternatives beyond the status quo. In the human reality they are historical factors and forces, and the determinate negation is ultimately a political negation. As such, it may well find authentic expression in non-political language, and the more so as the entire dimension of politics becomes an integral part of the status quo.

Dialectical logic is critical logic: it reveals modes and contents of thought which transcend the codified pattern of use and validation. Dialectical thought does not invent these contents; they have accrued to the notions in the long tradition of thought and action. Dialectical analysis merely assembles and reactivates them; it recovers tabooed meanings and thus appears almost as a return, or rather a conscious liberation, of the repressed! Since the established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world, dialectical thought is necessarily destructive, and whatever liberation it may bring is a liberation in thought, in theory. However, the divorce of thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and no theory can undo it, but theory may help to prepare the ground for their possible reunion, and the ability of thought to develop a logic and language of contradiction is a prerequisite for this task.

In what, then, lies the power of negative thinking? Dialectical thought has not hindered Hegel from developing his philosophy into a

4. *Ibid.*, p. 966.

neat and comprehensive system which, in the end, accentuates the positive emphatically. I believe it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegels' philosophy. This idea of Reason comprehends everything and ultimately absolves everything because it has its place and function in the whole, and the whole is beyond good and evil, truth and falsehood. It may even be justifiable, logically as well as historically, to define Reason in terms which include slavery, the Inquisition, child labor, concentration camps, gas chambers, and nuclear preparedness. These may well have been integral parts of that rationality which has governed the recorded history of mankind. If so, the idea of Reason itself is at stake; it reveals itself as a part rather than as the whole. This does not mean that reason abdicates its claim to confront reality with the truth about reality. On the contrary, when Marxian theory takes shape as a critique of Hegel's philosophy, it does so in the name of Reason. It is consonant with the innermost effort of Hegel's thought if his own philosophy is "canceled," not by substituting for Reason some extrarational standards, but by driving Reason itself to recognize the extent to which it is still unreasonable, blind, the victim of unmastered forces. Reason, as the developing and applied knowledge of man—as "free thought"—was instrumental in creating the world we live in. It was also instrumental in sustaining injustice, toil, and suffering. But Reason, and Reason alone, contains its own corrective.

In the *Logic*, which forms the first part of his system of philosophy, Hegel anticipates almost literally Wagner's *Parsifal* message, that "the hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand that heals it."⁵ The context is the biblical story of the Fall of Man. Knowledge may have caused the wound in the existence of man, the crime and the guilt; but the second innocence, the "second harmony," can be gained only from knowledge. Redemption can never be the work of a "guileless fool." Against the various obscurantists who insist on the right of the irrational versus reason, on the truth of the natural versus the intellect, Hegel inseparably links progress in freedom to progress in thought, action to theory. Since he accepted the specific historical form of Reason reached at his time as the reality of Reason, the advance beyond this form of Reason must be an advance of Reason itself; and, since the adjustment of Reason to oppressive social institutions perpetuated unfreedom, progress in free-

5. *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 55.

dom depends on thought becoming political, in the shape of a theory which demonstrates negation as a political alternative implicit in the historical situation. Marx's materialistic "subversion" of Hegel, therefore, was not a shift from one philosophical position to another, nor from philosophy to social theory, but rather a recognition that the established forms of life were reaching the stage of their historical negation.

This historical stage has changed the situation of philosophy and of all cognitive thought. From this stage on, all thinking that does not testify to an awareness of the radical falsity of the established forms of life is faulty thinking. Abstraction from this all-pervasive condition is not merely immoral; it is false. For reality has become technological reality, and the subject is now joined with the object so closely that the notion of object necessarily includes the subject. Abstraction from their interrelation no longer leads to a more genuine reality but to deception, because even in this sphere the subject itself is apparently a constitutive part of the object as scientifically determined. The observing, measuring, calculating subject of scientific method, and the subject of the daily business of life—both are expressions of the same subjectivity: man. One did not have to wait for Hiroshima in order to have one's eyes opened to this identity. And, as always before, the subject that has conquered matter suffers under the dead weight of the conquest. Those who enforce and direct this conquest have used it to create a world in which the increasing comforts of life and the ubiquitous power of the productive apparatus keep men enslaved to the prevailing state of affairs. Those social groups which dialectical theory identified as the forces of negation are either defeated or reconciled with the established system. Before the power of the given facts the power of negative thinking stands condemned.

This power of facts is an oppressive power; it is the power of man over man, appearing as objective and rational condition. Against this appearance thought continues to protest in the name of truth—and in the name of fact, for it is the supreme and universal fact that the status quo perpetuates itself through the constant threat of atomic destruction, through the unprecedented waste of resources, through mental impoverishment, and—last but not least—through brute force. These are the unresolved contradictions. They define every single fact and every

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single event; they permeate the entire universe of discourse and action. Thus, they define also the logic of things: that is, the mode of thought capable of piercing the ideology and of comprehending reality whole. No method can claim a monopoly of cognition, but no method seems authentic which does not recognize that these two propositions are meaningful descriptions of our situation: "The whole is the truth," and "The whole is false."

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RECENT DEFINITIONS OF LANGUAGE

I.

Definitions are often viewed with a skeptical eye. The most diverse definitions are successfully applied to a given subject; their discrepancies are noted, and conclusions are drawn concerning the vanity of quibbling over words. In the best of cases the writer, before beginning his own exposition, proposes the definition which he will follow exclusively, convinced that all terminologies are valid so long as they are explicit and respected.¹

This methodological hygiene is not without merit for discussions among specialists within a previously delimited field, sufficiently described. But, if we consider a series of definitions covering several centuries—those of language, for example—we see that we are not precisely concerned with a history whose possible meaning may be sought. In addition, contemporary logic has familiarized us with the idea that the

Translated by James H. Labadie.

1. See the opinions of Saussure, Meillet, Vendryès, and Hjelmslev in J. Marouzeau, *Lexique de la terminologie linguistique* (Paris: Geuthner, 1951), p. ix.

search for a definition is more than just an urgent academic need. A correct definition, adequate to all that is known on a subject, is both a working tool and a checking device, enabling us to describe better, to classify better, to elaborate better-founded criteria, to delimit our field of study less arbitrarily—in short, to organize our knowledge of things in a way that is more faithful to the nature of things.

II.

Without sketching out a history of the definitions of language, let us take the eighteenth century as an illustrative point of departure.² The *Encyclopédie* criticized the definition of Frain du Tremblay, who criticized that of Furetière's *Dictionnaire* (1704): "Language (*langage*), sequence of words on which each people is agreed; language (*langue*) in use in a Nation to explain to one another what each person thinks." For Du Tremblay it is "a sequence or mass of certain articulated sounds capable of being joined together, which a people uses to signify things and to communicate its thoughts, but which are in themselves indifferent in signifying one thing rather than another." In 1755 the *Encyclopédie* proposes: "A language is the total body of usages proper to a nation to express thoughts by means of the voice."

On the one hand, these definitions mark, unequally, the level the age had reached in its reflection on languages. Furetière is aware of two problems still quite alive: that of modes of speech (*langage*) other than (written) languages (*langues*); "Language," he notes, "is also used figuratively . . . of mute signs; of cries or inarticulate sounds which serve to make known various things") and that of animal communication ("Animals also have their speech [*langage*]," he adds, with some reservation). Du Tremblay attempts to characterize language by its articulated sounds,³ by their property of "being joined together," and he has a clear intuition, unusual for the time, of the arbitrary nature of the signs; the *Encyclopédie* already contrasts language (speech) to all means of expressing thoughts otherwise than *through the voice*. But, on the other hand, we also feel the weight of the ideology of the time on this last definition. When he defines language as the total *body* of

2. The *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1694) said merely: "LANGUE: Idiome. Langue que parle une nation. LANGUE: Idiome, termes et façons de parler dont se sert une nation."

3. So does Furetière, who contrasted this characteristic to inarticulate animal cries.

usages, the author is expressing the normative conception of the grammarians of his day. Very explicitly, the whole article establishes the fact that if, "like the Romans long ago and the French today, the nation is one in relation to the government, there can be in the manner of speaking only one legitimate usage"; this differs from the situation in ancient Greece, Germany, and Italy which, divided into governments equal in prestige, have a right to dialects equal in legitimacy. Everything outside this is patois.⁴

III.

A new sounding taken at the beginning of the twentieth century brings up a set of definitions very different from the preceding ones and almost all similar to each other. For Saussure (1916) "a language is . . . a system of distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas." For Lalande, in the *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (1926), it is "in the broadest sense, any system of signs capable of serving as a means of communication." For the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (article by Jespersen) it is "any means at all of communication between living beings." For Marouzeau, whose *Lexique de la terminologie linguistique* (1953) registers current usage, it is "any system of signs apt to serve as a means of communication between individuals."

All these definitions show concretely the progress made in a century of comparative linguistics opening the way to general linguistics, a progress which in every statement except one may be summed up by the presence of the word "system."⁵

This formulation, in which every writer follows his predecessor almost without modifications from 1916 to 1953, would seem to be evidence of established agreement. The fact is that at any given date it serves to raise as many problems as it solves.

4. What the *Encyclopédie* criticizes Du Tremblay for is this expression, "a mass of words," which places all usages on the same level. D'Alembert, in the "Discours préliminaire" to the *Encyclopédie*, employs the same idea of a "rather bizarre collection of signs of all sorts," but he does this to characterize the origin of language, that is, when there were no usages.

5. E. Sapir (1921) speaks at first of a "means of communication," as does Jespersen, but adds: "through the intermediary of a *system* of symbols" (*Le Langage* [Paris: Payot, 1953], p. 16).

IV.

To see language as a means of communication made up of a system of signs was in effect to raise it to the next order: the body of all systems of signs. The linguist who was probably the first to state this definition, Saussure,⁶ declared at the same time the necessity of founding a vaster science than that of linguistics, the science of all sign systems: semiology.⁷

But that was a new problem, which Saussure's definition did not clearly disclose (here we see the instrumental value of a definition); for it really defined every semiological system, implying that every system of signs is called "language," and, consequently, it provided no criterion allowing a distinction to be made between human languages and all other systems of signs or signals, although a difference between them is generally recognized or felt.

There is a historical reason for this state of affairs: at the time Saussure was developing his thought, between 1896 and 1916, very little study was being devoted to means of communication other than natural languages. The International Maritime Code with its flag signals was a rare exception. The study of animal behavior had barely begun. The new logics were still esoteric. In any case, all the definitions which were to replace Saussure's were to stumble over the same obstacle or were, rather, to dodge the issue: if a system of any kind of signs is called "language," everything is language—but then what is the *specific* difference between linguistics, the science of language, and semiology, the science of systems of signs in general?

If, as Vendryès writes in *Le Langage*, "all organs may serve to create a language"; if, as Giulio Bertoni states in the article *linguaggio* of the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, "human expression is not only articulate and auditive [but] all organs can contribute to the formation of language, which means that we have the language of signs, or mimic language, [if] tears are a language, [if] laughter is a language, etc.," why does linguistics not also study all these systems of signs? Or why was semiology so late in arriving on the scene?

6. Peirce, who died in 1914, had already said: "Signs are employed only in relation to each other, in a system of signs in action ('working system'), never alone." But he was a little-known logician.

7. See *Cours* (Paris: Payot, 1916), pp. 35 ff.

Jespersen, in the article already quoted, groups auditive languages ("ear-languages") and visual languages ("eye-languages") in the same way. He also admits that there exist "means of animal communication" different from human languages, but he provides no scientific criterion for the specific analysis of these various "systems of signs." He confines himself to stating—and this is the old established clause in the matter—that, "in its developed form, language is indeed a human characteristic, and may be considered as the principle distinctive trait of humanity." Methodologically, we have not escaped from this contradictory situation: every system of signs being a language, and linguistics being the study of language, there is by definition no such thing as semiology, properly speaking; however, since human languages are but one species of sign systems among many ("simply the most important of these systems," says Saussure), the human languages must then be studied separately from other systems of signs. Or rather: every system of signs utilized by living beings should be called language, and it is therefore possible to speak of animal languages. However, the human languages are systems of signs totally different from all the others (but no one ever states scientifically wherein the difference lies).

In fifty years no one has escaped from these vicious circles,⁸ not because we are concerned with a vain dispute on terminology but because the spontaneous "axiomatics" of this linguistic moment provided no adequate criterion for elucidating the specificity, intuitively presumed, of human languages as compared with all other systems of signs.

V.

The clearest innovation concerning definition of language since Saussure has come not from linguistics but from contemporary logic. Ordinary language had been exposed to close critical analysis in order to obtain an absolutely logical language of mathematics. In part continuing Peirce and in part rediscovering him, the new logics finally reached a careful distinction in language among the relationships of signs with things signified (semantics), of signs with each other (syntax), and of signs with their users (pragmatic). Carnap has given the definition

8. H. S. Sorensen, in 1958, argues again with Hjelmslev to maintain the old definition of language as "a system of signs" and nothing else in his work *Word-Classes in Modern English* (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad), p. 12.

most frequently quoted today, stemming from this research: "A language . . . is a system of signs with the rules governing their use."⁹

Just as the Saussurian definition could be traced for fifty years, the last quarter-century is marked by the various statements of the logicians' definition. Strangely enough, while the nineteenth-century *Larousse* continued the old seventeenth-century definition ("a language is the idiom of a nation"), that of the twentieth century is one of the first (1931) to transpose into linguistics the Carnapian formula: "Language (*langage*): the body of terms of an idiom and of the rules of its grammar." The *Oxford English Dictionary* likewise notes: "Language: a vocabulary . . . and way of using it." We find this transposition in Charles Morris (1946), who believes he can place on this base one of the first treatises of semiology: languages, to deserve the name, must constitute "a system of interconnected signs, combinable in certain ways and not in others. . . ."¹⁰ We find it again in G. A. Miller, who speaks of "a body of symbols and of rules for their use."¹¹ It is partially stated in G. G. Granger (1957): "A linguistic expression appears to us . . . as a discrete linear (or quasi-linear) sequence of elements drawn from a lexicon first known by its users, the choices being limited by syntactical rules."¹²

It is easy to understand why this definition of the logicians, enjoying the prestige of results obtained in their field (it explained the effectiveness of their earliest axioms and facilitated the construction of new and even more rigorous ones), was a legitimate temptation to semiologists and linguists—at least as a hypothesis to be verified in their own fields. But the results do not measure up to what might have been hoped for.

First of all, it occurs to us that this failure is partially due to the fact that in reality the logicians' definition did not really add anything to

9. This definition is given here as the most typical, though recent (1954), in *Einführung in die symbolische Logik* (Vienna), p. 1.

10. *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York, 1946), p. 34. On pages 34 and 36 Morris gives three other versions of the same definition, including: "A plurality of signs subject to restrictions in their combinations."

11. G. A. Miller, *Langage et communication*, trans. C. Thomas (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956). Despite the title, references to communication systems other than language are rare, and language and communication are almost invariably used synonymously.

12. See "Logique, langage et communication," in *Hommage à Bachelard* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), p. 33.

Saussure's: the obvious addition ("and rules for their use") merely rendered the meaning of the word *system* more explicit. At most the logicians, for their own needs, distinguished clearly the two periods of their creative procedure: to define signs, then to define the combining rules legitimate to these signs. But besides this, and especially, the logicians' definition allowed no escape from the old vicious circle: speaking of *language* as of "systems of signs" in general, they gave up, to all intents and purposes, any possibility of distinguishing in what the systems of signs might be irreducibly specific. (Only Lalande, in 1932, in the *Nouveau supplément* of his *Vocabulaire* suggests that such a specificity was recognized in the human languages: "The word language," he wrote, "is accidentally and in rare cases applied metaphorically to systems of signs or expressions other than words." But the *Larousse du XX^e siècle*, in its new logician's definition of language, significantly added: "any means of expressing ideas.")

The case of Charles Morris is here especially typical, because he proposed explicitly to erect "the science of signs, be they animal or human, linguistic or non-linguistic, true or false, adequate or inadequate, normal or pathological."¹³ Now in spite of this program he is unable to say what makes the specificity of each of the systems of communication he envisages, from natural languages to languages of gesture, to that of deaf-mutes, to written languages, to the plastic arts, music, etc.

Morris is indeed a pioneer; his failure is a first step. But he is justly criticized for skilfully avoiding the problems which offered resistance to his "system of signs." A "semiotician," interested in analyzing the specific traits of the various systems of signs, should have been alerted by these recalcitrant facts. Morris tosses off in six lines the *vocal* or *phonic* character of natural languages (the central problem of human language) by a comparison which is not a reason: "Finally," he says, "we should mention that many people, especially those who are linguists by trade, will protest the fact that we fail to include in our definition of language, the condition that linguistic signs must be vocal. As for us, we see no theoretical need to include this condition: to take it into consideration would be like insisting that houses made of different materials should not all be called houses."¹⁴ On another recalcitrant

13. Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 223; see also p. 2.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 38. For the theoretical reasons to include the phonic character in a definition of language, see below, André Martinet's thesis of double articulation.

fact, the clarification (if such be possible) of specific traits which oppose or might oppose animal communication to natural human languages, Morris responds with age-old generalities which can no longer be considered satisfactory: that it is "evident that meaningful processes in man presuppose meaningful processes such as occur in animals, and that the first develop out of the second"; that it is "evident that human behavior in language shows astonishing complexity, a refinement immeasurable with that observed in animals."¹⁵ Despite his more learned terminology, Morris teaches us no more on this point than does Buffon, who two centuries earlier had written: "It is due to the fact that a language supposes a sequence of thoughts that animals have no language."

Morris thus maintains that language, specifically, human language, should be defined as "a plurality of signs subject to restrictions in their combinations," although, as he notes with some embarrassment, "animal signs may be interconnected, and in such a way that animals may be said to infer; [but] there is no proof that these signs are combined, by the animals producing them, according to the limitations of combinations necessary for the signs to form a linguistic system."¹⁶ Morris had but to examine this thesis in the light of Karl von Frisch's descriptions of communication among bees to raise doubts in his own mind concerning the discriminating value of his definition. Colin Cherry, however, the author of one of the most recent and richest works on these questions, hardly goes beyond Morris even after examining von Frisch's work: no language among the bees because—pure Buffon once again—"no system of organized thought."¹⁷

Colin Cherry's work is by no means barren: we wish simply to note here that he too, for want of a good definition of language, fails to provide exhaustive criteria which, allowing a definition of what is specific

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53, 54.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 18. On communication among bees, he adds—to exclude it from languages—that it is neither developable, flexible, nor universal and that it is relative to the past, never to the future; the first, second, and fourth of these traits might be open to discussion. He states (p. 75) that "only man has the gift of language" without indicating a criterion. Generally, he adheres to Carnap's definition. Intuitively, however, he distinguishes *linguistic systems* (the natural languages) from *pure systems* ("systems freely invented or constructed with signs and numbers" [p. 221]).

to each of the most diverse "systems of signs," would provide a foundation for semiology.

The key to these various problems, which have remained unresolved for so long, has recently been provided. This achievement came not from an entirely new definition of language, bursting out in opposition to those which had preceded, but from a series of analyses out of which there developed an original view of language, at first implicit, then made explicit little by little, by very reason of its effectiveness.

The point of departure is doubtless to be found in Hjelmslev. He stressed the point that the linguistic sign is formed by means of a limited number of non-signs (phonemes) and repeated that it was one of the characteristic structural traits of human languages.¹⁸ But it seems to have been André Martinet who first (1949) drew all its consequences from his observation, concerning the definition of the language of men as opposed to other sign systems: this is his theory of the *double articulation* of human language.

The expression "articulate language," whose origin and history merit study, conceals the fact that human language, as a system of signs, is articulated twice. Before there was any science of language, this expression used to designate the groups of sounds produced by the voice in such a way that distinct signs, or words, are recognized. In this first meaning it is the phrase, the statement, that are "articulated," that is, cut into articles or segments, as a crab's claw is said to be "articulated." The statement "The earth is round" is formed of four of these segments (the + earth + is + round), as opposed to the "unarticulated" cries emitted by animals, children before they learn to speak, the sick, madmen, and monsters. But when it is said: "the articulate voice," "articulate," "your articulation is not clear," the term "articulate" is being used in another sense, with reference to the movements of the vocal organs which, this time, cut the statement into sequences of vowels and consonants, not of words. The statement, "the earth is round," is then phonically constituted of eleven distinct articulations ($\text{ø} + \text{i} + \text{ə} + \text{θ} + \text{i} + \text{z} + \text{r} + \text{a} + \text{u} + \text{n} + \text{d}$). (Note that animal cries, those of moaning patients, madmen, etc., which are called "inarticulate," do present this same sort of articulation.)

This antiquated expression, which confused facts of two orders, has

18. A. Martinet, "A propos des fondements de la théorie linguistique de Louis Hjelmslev," *B.S.L.*, 1946, No. 4, especially p. 27.

been given its fullest meaning in recent linguistics by an analysis which clearly distinguishes the functional place and meaning of these two types of articulation in the system of signs that is human language. The first articulation cuts the linguistic statement into signs, into units called meaningful, since each one has its own meaning: *grosso modo*, these are the words of the language, following traditional terminology. A second articulation cuts the signs themselves into smaller units than the sign ($la = l + a$, or two units of this type), these being non-significant units, or phonemes.¹⁹ Since the development of scientific phonetics, and even earlier as we have seen, everyone knew this, but nothing had been drawn from it on the theoretical level. Martinet's contribution lay in seeing that this descriptive trait was specific to human languages and set them apart from all other systems of signs.²⁰ He thus provided the instrumental criterion of a scientific separation—based on the nature of the things studied—between languages and the other means of communication by signs, between linguistics and semiology.

The criterion of double articulation as a fundamental trait of what language is has proved to be an excellent operational criterion. Pictographic-ideographic writings (from pure hieroglyphics to flag-signals); numerical and symbolic signs employed in mathematics and formalized logics; abbreviations either of recognizable design (the schematic silhouette of a locomotive to indicate a grade crossing) or arbitrary in design (a red disk crossed by a white bar to indicate "Do not enter" at a one-way street); the conventional signs of cartography, of standardized industrial drawing, schemas of all kinds, etc.—all these systems of signs have been shown to differ specifically from human language because all of them utilize only the first type of articulation: all cut their messages into meaningful units, never into distinctive non-significant units. And

19. A. Martinet, "La double articulation linguistique," in *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, V (1949), 30-37. These are eight basic pages, constituting a turning point in contemporary linguistics. See also Martinet's "Arbitraire linguistique et double articulation," in *Cahiers F. de Saussure*, No. 15 (1957), pp. 105-16, eleven pages which complete the preceding.

20. Linguistics distinguishes between original phonic language and its various *written forms*, some of which (ideographs, hieroglyphics) do not reflect the second articulation of language, while certain others (alphabetic writing, Morse code, Braille, the deaf-mute's alphabet) transcribe this second articulation. These writings are not systems of signs *sui generis*; they are systems called substitutive of the original phonic language. (See E. Buyssens, *Les Langues et le discours* [Brussels, 1943]).

the double articulation of human (phonic, or vocal) language provides the key to the richness and complexity of human languages, with which no other system of signs can be measured on a par. Martinet's analysis clearly shows that a system of signs utilizing only the first sort of articulation would have to multiply infinitely the distinct meaningful units to distinguish the multitude of things signified: the number of totally different signs would be immense. On the other hand, in the case of a system of phonic signs, if each distinct meaningful unit had a distinct meaningful sign, "the arbitrary character of the sign . . . would soon be sacrificed on the altar of expressivity." Martinet concludes: "The phonemes produced by the second linguistic articulation are thus revealed as the guarantees of the arbitrary nature of the sign,"²¹ which is the instrument of the prodigious combinatory fertility characteristic of human languages.

The double articulation of the human languages also provides the rational explanation of the differences, so often stated a priori between animal communication and human language. Whether we are concerned with communication among bees,²² or among crows, Martinet's criterion leads to analyses which are finally effective. Among the bees it will doubtless be shown to contain units of the first articulation, meaningful, expressing in several ways distances and directions—but these units (which we shall treat further) are not divisible exclusively in time: they are also "readable" in space (as "round," for example, or "lively dance"). As for crows, their productions are phonic messages like the human voice. Philippe Gramet's experiments tend to prove that these messages are in fact divisible into units of the second articulation (phonemes) but without any evidence within a statement of meaningful units of the first articulation (or kinds of "words").²³ In any case, these analyses would suggest that it will be possible, in semiology, to begin a rational classification of widely differing systems of signs: from those of signs readable in space to those of signs read in time; from

21. See Martinet's "Arbitraire linguistique et double articulation," p. 110.

22. Benveniste's analysis ("Animal communication and human language," *Diogenes* No. 1 [1952], pp. 1-7), the only one which studied von Frisch's results from a truly semiological point of view, also moved in this direction, by stressing the search for a presence or an absence of units (morphemes, or "empty" phonemes) in the messages of bees.

23. Philippe Gramet, "Recherches acoustiques sur les corbeaux," *La Nature*, February, 1959, pp. 49-55.

symbolic means of communication (in which the message reproduces mimes or sketches the thing to be communicated) to means of communication with arbitrary signs in which the smallest unit is the total message, or the meaningful unit, or the non-meaningful unit—all this without counting the means of communication which may, as among the bees, combine several of these systems of semiologically different signs.

VII.

Though rich in meaning, the criterion of double articulation—whose career has scarcely begun—has not exhausted the search for a definition of language. Just as, two or three decades ago, everyone leaped upon the logicians' definition, which was expected to work wonders, so today they rush from all sides to embrace the *mathematical theory of communication* of Shannon and Weaver. Not that this haste should be criticized: all who are interested in the science of signs foresee that this mathematical theory of the transmission of signals ought to help in the exploration, one step further, of the analysis of language. But up to the present all efforts to apply this theory to linguistics have proved to be partial failures because of the very avidity with which the theory has been embraced. Too often this leads to metaphorical transpositions of the terminology proper to this theory, which are then applied in the field of linguistics. As the theory itself has been called in French, apparently through a faulty translation, a *théorie de l'information*, uses of the term *information* have multiplied (loss of *information*, gain of *information*) where the term *champ sémantique* ("semantic field" or, in English, "area of meaning") had previously been used, without anything being added by the new terminology to our knowledge of the facts. In the same way, people are beginning to speak of "semantic noise" instead of saying "equivocation," "ambiguity," "homonymy"; they even speak of "quantity of information"—exactly as, twenty-five years ago, all terminologies were suddenly invaded by "restricted" and "generalized" relativities. This epidemic of terminological measles will pass, giving way to more serious application.

On one point, at any rate, the new theory has already introduced a new element²⁴ which has proved very useful in our defining criteria of

24. We shall here set aside as secondary to the theme of this article the notion of "redundance," whose use in linguistics has proved to be easy as well as enlightening.

language. This has been in bringing out insistently the fact that a linguistic message is composed of a *linear* succession of *discrete* signs or, in other words, differential, discontinuous, or digital signs.²⁵

Here we may surely recall the categorical page (*Cours*, p. 105) in which Saussure had marked the fundamental importance of the linear (i.e., articulated in a succession of units irreversible in time) character of language and its difference from other systems of signs articulated in space. But the semiological value of Saussure's indication had remained unexploited. It took on new value in the stress laid by the theory of information on this characteristic of language, as shown by its presence in Granger's definition. Granger, however, does not draw out of the statement all that he might: this very trait embarrasses him slightly, as shown in the somewhat regretful feeling of his parenthetical "or quasi-linear." He observed in fact that, if one follows his definition "mathematics is not only a language," then "mathematical language" would have several dimensions, since a part of its signs (figures, graphs, material arrangement of signs on the page, matrixes, etc.) are read according to structures articulated in space, like the plastic arts. But for different reasons Granger does not accept the plastic arts as languages, even though they are means of communication, because they do not offer discrete units of meaning. In the same way mathematics, according to him, is not merely a language because its "essential function is not to inform,"²⁶ a most dubious and non-discriminating reason. He fails to see how close he is to one of the great semiological classifications, that suggested by Saussure and formulated—though he, too, failed to draw anything from it—by Colin Cherry: that there are systems of signs which are read in time and others read in space.²⁷

The *discrete* character of signs is itself confirmed as a highly discriminating trait. It permits a separation, for reasons based on their very nature, of systems which are articulated in units of this sort, in discontinuity, from all systems of communication in which a *thing signified* of continuous size (e.g., the increasing breadth of a real river) is repre-

25. On this point, the most effective texts are still those of B. Mandelbrot, *Word*, X, No. 1 (1954), 1-27, or collected in *Logique, langage et théorie de l'information* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957).

26. Granger, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 37, 52-54.

27. Cherry, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

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sented by a *meaningful thing* which symbolizes this continuous size as continuing: the blue line on the map, gradually widening between the source of the river and its mouth.²⁸

Such is the already established contribution of the theory of information to the definition of language. Neither facile irony nor polemical enjoyment led us to begin by criticizing the imprudent use of its terminology without precautions: we did this rather because so much can be expected from the theory. Up to the present, linguistics has not yet truly assimilated the theory of information. When this has been done, a definition of language will doubtless have to be rewritten. This will probably be possible within a few years, but the time is not yet.

28. This example should not be considered as a very special case: let the reader recall all the graphic representations of the *scale*, where the signifying thing is found to be linked in a rigorously formal manner to continuous values proportional to the thing signified.

THE CINEMA AND POPULAR CULTURE

Every citizen has an equal right to culture. The development of the means of diffusion and of democratic ideas has unquestionably furthered a trend toward the unification of culture, but this process is often hindered and retarded. Profound disparities separate the cultural ideas and practices of society, the ideal or real cultural models of different social classes and categories, those of different groups, and, finally, those of the leaders and of the public. Imbalances result from this, and it is these imbalances that popular culture tends to modify. In order best to meet the continuously new cultural needs of industrial and democratic society, popular culture has adapted to modern life some of the features of traditional culture. It has initiated the masses into the elementary techniques of learning—writing and reading. An increasingly complex and extended primary education has become more widespread. Contemporary society raises problems that evolve so rapidly and are so intricate that popular culture must be continued after school

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and during a man's entire life. It finds its way into new systems of permanent instruction and training through the agency of large-scale means of diffusion, by means of groups or social relationships.

What fresh resources does the cinema offer to popular culture? In our present situation it is important for the artist, the propagandist, or the educator to know what the various subjective standards of cinematic culture are. Through this he will be able to assess the distance between observed standards and those expected or desired by the conscious or unconscious artisans of popular culture.

But how can we ascertain these different levels scientifically? The polling of opinion by large-scale national sampling is useful but insufficient. To be sure, it does provide precise information about such simple facts as the cost of admission to motion-picture theaters or the public's favorite cinema star or film. But when it comes to analyzing more complex problems, such as, for instance, the function of motion pictures at different levels of cinematic culture, it becomes necessary to employ the methods of cultural sociology in order to achieve a representative, small-scale sampling of the population.

For this reason, UNESCO's international group of social scientists, who are working on the problem of leisure, decided, in 1956, to undertake a co-ordinated study of the role of leisure in the social and cultural evolution of an average city.¹ This research is based on samplings in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Switzerland, Great Britain, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The results in each case will be compared with those in the others; they will also be contrasted to data drawn from research conducted in American cities. It is within this framework that a study is now in progress on the cultural levels of motion-picture attendance, integrated into the totality of leisure-time activities.

France initiated this type of research and from 1955 to 1957 has studied the development of leisure among the urban and industrial inhabitants of Annecy. It would take too long to analyze the scientific reasons for choosing this group of forty thousand people residing between Geneva and Lyon. Let it suffice to say that they were selected because of the dynamic quality of their industrial, social, and cultural life.

1. The international group in the social sciences studying leisure is sponsored and aided by UNESCO's Department of the Social Sciences as well as by UNESCO's International Institutes of Education and Youth. The group comprises sociologists from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Holland, France, Great Britain, Poland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

In order to examine the true levels of cinematic culture, we will give the answers to two questions put to a selected number of heads of families in this sample city. "Why do you go to the motion pictures?" "What do you expect of a good film?" We know that such queries only get at the conscious motivations, that moral norms color the answers, and that all the replies can and must be interpreted in the light of theories of withdrawal and frustration. Yet they represent a necessary beginning. The results we cite are partial ones. When the mechanographic tabulations of the five hundred records that served as the basis of our investigation have been further developed, we will publish far more searching statistical summaries and qualitative analyses. In particular, we lack for the time being the material we need to differentiate social classes from social categories. Nonetheless, since no other French source is available for a discussion of the problem of real-life cinema as we understand it, we thought that this initial glimpse, despite its limitations, would be useful.

Our examples are given not as conclusive evidence but rather as illustrations. Such illustrations are always typical of an ensemble of reactions, of one kind of audience. For the time being we have eliminated exceptional cases, not because they are devoid of interest, but because the sociologist, unlike the journalist, cannot fail to distinguish between the particular and the general. Finally, whenever our study enables us to do so, we have classified phenomena on the basis of their scope. Figures explain nothing, but without them it is impossible to differentiate among widespread, limited, normal, and exceptional phenomena. If we didn't have figures, all Frenchwomen might be redheads.

A. In our sample city, attendance at motion-picture theaters corresponds roughly to the French average; about 60 per cent of the population go to the cinema regularly, and of these a third do so once a month or more. A large proportion of the spectators seem to go not because they love the cinema but rather to break the daily routine. Their motivations are primarily negative. They are seeking *escape*. Motion pictures are but a release, a means of getting away from the "family setup," "they are a chance to go out . . . a way of breaking the monotony, the usual grind," of forgetting "the dullness," of "refreshing one's mind." The cinema-goer does not feel that he is the slave of a timetable. An engineer prefers motion pictures to the theater "not because I like them better but because I can choose my own time." A

Notes and Discussion

worker prefers the cinema to the theater because "you can go in even if the film has already begun." About 13 per cent of the answers contain this kind of reasoning.

This kind of escapism does not seem to be lived like a dream that is alien to daily life. On the contrary, it competes constantly with obligations as well as with various forms of daily leisure activity. Family duties are most often mentioned: "I very rarely go to the cinema. We can't go out because of the children and I don't like to go alone," says one workingman. Others, on the contrary, go to the cinema not because they want to see a particular film but merely to accompany their wives. "I go to the cinema when my wife wishes to go; otherwise it doesn't interest me much." We must not forget that 52 per cent of the people who see motion pictures are married couples, as against 35 per cent who are "friends." Family motivations usually coincide closely with purely cinematic ones and either reinforce, weaken, or counteract them. "Motion pictures? I am thinking of my new apartment and of the furniture I will need," says one among the 40 per cent of the Americans who do not go to the cinema. Motion pictures are even looked upon as an inadmissible antithesis to family obligations: "I haven't gone to the cinema since the death of my wife," a thirty-six-year-old worker confides. Research might usefully investigate the relationship between the influence of the cinema and that of the family in determining the real attitudes of spectators of varying ages and backgrounds.

When attendance at a motion-picture theater is possible, it is not regarded as a pastime in any way different from other leisure activities. It is merely one kind among many others, substituted or substituting and, depending upon the circumstances, competing with other pastimes in its function as a means of escape. Some people do, to be sure, exclude the cinema from their preferences: "I don't go to motion-picture theaters; I just go bowling where no one bothers me," a twenty-nine-year-old worker says. "Ever since he has taken up fishing he doesn't go to the movies any more," the wife of a thirty-year-old employee explains. "I prefer going in for sports instead of being a spectator at the cinema," an active twenty-eight-year-old small businessman declares. On the other hand, the cinema is preferred to other kinds of diversion, such as the legitimate theater, for example; comparisons with the latter abound in every social milieu: "Movies are less difficult to make out," or "I

prefer the cinema, the story is more realistic." At the theater "you have to guess, pay more attention"; or, finally, "I prefer the cinema; you can't say it is livelier but it does move quicker," a forty-year-old-worker says, and a forty-eight-year-old female baker says the same thing in approximately identical terms.

B. But in going to the cinema our citizens are not merely seeking escape; they are also seeking *enjoyment*. This pleasurable anticipation is as multisided and diverse as are the functions of leisure activities themselves. Everyone does not sit in a motionpicture theater as if it were "a cathedral." For many, the cinema is merely a pastime whose significance is probably quite similar to that of the escapist diversions we mentioned in the preceding paragraph. "I go to the cinema," says a thirty-year-old technician, "to pass the time, when I have nothing better to do on a Sunday." This elementary form of relaxation affords the kind of satisfaction that requires no effort to understand or think. "It's simply a diversion for me; I don't like pictures that are too complicated," one twenty-seven-year-old worker declares. Another says: "I don't remember anything about a picture I liked; I only go for diversion." This kind of satisfaction might at times put a spectator to sleep if the film has no action. For example, this observation was made by a thirty-six-year-old worker: "I liked *War and Peace*; I like a film where there is some action. If the film has no action, I fall asleep." This sort of reasoning appears in about 24 per cent of the answers.

A large number of answers (40 per cent) indicate a quest for some positive entertainment. For these respondents the cinema has a more precise and a richer meaning. They look forward to an emotional experience. It is true that the cinema affords everyone an opportunity to project or identify. Each spectator, whether or not he is imaginative, can "visualize dreams." With the help of the cinema, everyone can be in his imagination the person he believes himself to be, the man he does not dare to be or wants to be. To put it as Morin, Hoffman, or Artaud do, the cinema enables each of us to satisfy the "other self" that is part of our semi-imaginary reality.² In our investigation we have encountered various reactions to themes of love, eroticism, luxury, fighting, adventure, or comedy. But what is striking is that the largest number of those interviewed—20 per cent—prefer *gay* films. *Les Vacances*

2. E. Morin, *Le Cinéma ou l'homme imaginaire* (Paris: Édition de Minuit, 1958).

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de M. Hulot is often cited; the movie star most frequently mentioned is neither Brigitte Bardot nor Jean Gabin but Fernandel. "I don't go to sad movies, life is sad enough"; or, as one artisan put it: "I want to laugh when I go to the cinema because there aren't many occasions to laugh." "I prefer funny, very funny films," said one tradesman. Intellectuals reserve their praise for Charlie Chaplin. What Lefebvre calls the reverse image of daily life seems to be appreciated the most by this public.

C. To sum up: about 24 per cent of the answers indicate that the cinema is primarily a way of getting *information and instruction*—"to be informed," "to learn," "to think about problems." "I like something that has been experienced, that is true." A twenty-five-year-old worker states: "I go to the cinema mainly to see the newsreel"; "I only remember the documentaries and the newsreels; fiction doesn't interest me," asserts a fifty-year-old employee. "I like documentaries like *Monde du Silence*," a young workingman says. So far as these people are concerned, through the agency of motion pictures reality surpasses fiction.

It is apparent that the reasons for going to the cinema are complex. In order to complete, probe, and check our analysis, we have approached the problem from an entirely different point of view and have looked for ideal models that might guide the spectator in his appreciation of a good film, a good novel, or a good song. Although our questions referred to works of fiction in general, the answers for the most part had to do with the cinema. These are the answers that we will cite. About 12 per cent of the respondents stress primarily the form or the art of cinema. For them the film must be *beautiful*, and it must tell "a beautiful story." It must also be well acted. Vulgarly, in particular, is the greatest hindrance to enjoyment: A thirty-eight-year-old employee says, "The hardest thing to find is an amusing film that makes you laugh but is not vulgar." He very much enjoyed *The Wages of Fear*. Artificiality is as displeasing as vulgarity: "I don't like overly conventional or artificial situations or sentiments" (a thirty-nine-year-old worker). Finally, this particular audience subordinates the star to the performance of the actor or actress: "I can only remember *Gervaise* played so perfectly by Maria Schell."

Second, 13 per cent of the answers indicate a demand for a *true* picture of life. This audience stresses reality, objectivity, the realism of

work. To buttress such conclusions we can adduce the following typical examples: Newsreels and documentaries: "These are all that I can remember about movies; I don't care for fiction. I like the study of reality" (a fifty-year-old employee). Biographical films: "I like a story that has been lived, that is true," says a forty-five-year-old worker who liked *Moulin Rouge* because it tells the life story of Toulouse de Lautrec. Social films: a sixty-year-old tradesman likes a story that is real or a news story like *Voile bleu*. Sport films: a twenty-nine-year-old worker says: "I don't like movies very much except documentaries about sports." And, finally, travelogues: "What we are looking for is a film that teaches us something, particularly about trips to foreign countries where a film can show us the complexity of life at different social levels and demonstrate that everywhere there are honest and decent folk," observes one worker.

The majority (65 per cent) of the answers, however, emphasize not the quality, form, or reality of a picture but the story interest (theme or subject matter). On this point the results of our investigation into the properties of an ideal story are approximately the same as in the preceding sampling. Comedies (16 per cent) are about as popular as are films concerned with fighting, action, and adventure (15 per cent combined). Only 10 per cent of the heads of families we queried prefer love stories or sentimental ones. On the other hand, we believe it important to stress that about one-fourth of the answers (24 per cent) reveal a desire to see films that give an *idealized* picture of life. If the story is realistic, the wish that it won't be "too grim" is expressed (by more than 20 per cent); if it is a true story, a moral is expected. The story should have social, human significance. The majority of those interviewed betray a need to identify with a strong and magnanimous hero. Many things can be said about the motion picture *Limelight*, but one employee merely states that he liked it and that he was struck "by the magnificent courage" portrayed in the film. Another twenty-nine-year-old worker liked *La Bataille du Rail* mainly "because you saw people who made sacrifices." Noble gestures, exploits, high deeds are what make the greatest impression. "I remember a scene in a picture called *Les Héros sont fatigués* in which two aviators confront each other." The scenes most frequently mentioned are those depicting bravery in *Les Misérables* or *Notre Dame de Paris*. But this yearning for imaginary grandeur takes different forms. "I was thrilled by Napoleon

because he was ambitious," says a twenty-six-year-old employee. Pierre Fresnay is admired in the parts he plays: "There's a man who holds his own." Dr. Albert Schweitzer is also admired in the portrayal of his life "for the work he has done in black Africa." Examples could be multiplied. They all converge on the exaltation of "the inner hero" latent in a large number of spectators.

What tentative conclusions can we draw from this inquiry into cinematic motivations and ideals? The subjective effect of the motion pictures must be interpreted with extreme caution as regards cinematic theories. The complexity of attitudes toward the cinema is apparent. It is not enough to say that the cinema is part of the daily life of our times. Attendance at motion-picture theaters must be studied in the light of the problems of leisure and duty. The influence of the cinema cannot be studied seriously without taking this into account—the impact of leisure as a whole as well as the impact of family and social obligations. To be sure, E. Morin is right in emphasizing the difference between reality and the image of reality.³ The cinema always constitutes the charm of an image. But an image of what? Méliès and Lumière's images perhaps possess identical explicit features, but there is a fundamental disparity in content. Morin rightly stresses the importance of the imaginary man and of his other self, but there is a basic difference between identifying with Scarface as over against Pasteur, or Don Juan, or Dr. Schweitzer, even when the same individual identifies with diverse and contrasting heroes in turn. Finally, there are fundamental differences between those who attribute a major importance to the form, the art, and those who are indifferent to vulgarity or artifice. It is our aim not to plead for an ethics or an aesthetics but rather to stress the diversity and ambiguity of attitudes toward the cinema; and we would also insist on the necessity, from the point of view of the cultural dynamics of society, of differentiating between passive and active attitudes on the part of the spectator.

But one must be careful. First of all, a passive and an active attitude are not in absolute contradiction. The difference is largely a matter of which is uppermost, and this varies in accordance with the situations and the individuals concerned. Furthermore, the criteria of appreciation must be very general. Active attitudes seem to represent those

3. *Ibid.*

physical, affective, and intellectual tendencies most likely to further the development of the personality in cultural and social life. The opening up of one's personality is not limited to the deliberate act of building up the self. It must be balanced by relaxation and diversion. But, for a man to develop his maximum potential, diversions must not be degrading or destructive. In a democracy everyone has the right to play a major part in assimilating and helping to create the cultural works of a civilization and to do so with a minimum of conformity and a maximum of originality.

Everyone is entitled to participate as much as possible in social life and to enjoy a maximum of sociability, not merely being subject to interpersonal relationships among individuals and groups. Rather, he has a right to understand them, to be able to accept or reject them, to submit to them or alter them. He will not be content to be a conforming member of his family or of the social category to which he belongs, but will try to assume maximum responsibility in keeping with both the social requirements of society and those of his own personality.

These active attitudes can be defined as a dynamic ensemble of physical and mental dispositions resulting from the interaction of social and individual factors which tend to further an optimum development of the personality in its total participation in cultural and social life.

How can we characterize active attitudes in regard to the cinema? To begin with, an active attitude is selective. The spectator does not go to see motion pictures because he has nothing to do. And he doesn't go just because the theater is around the corner or because it is Saturday night. He chooses one picture and rejects another. When his choice is made, what is his attitude? First, he is sensitive to the images, action, words, sounds—the ensemble of the film. He tries to rid himself of ready-made images, ideas, of moral and social prejudices which might deaden or suppress a direct reaction to the production he is witnessing. Finally, the active spectator is understanding. The picture has its own special language, vocabulary, grammar, syntax; our spectator attempts to decipher all these during or after the show. Not only does he appreciate beautiful language, but mediocre dialogue hinders his appreciation of the story, the scene, the emotion, or the idea. His understanding grows in depth according to the form of a work. But comprehension of the film is not the final phase of an active attitude. An active spectator stands away from the work itself and evaluates it. He compares it

with others. He contrasts it with the reality it expresses. Finally, he seeks an explanation. He not only assesses the strength or weaknesses of a work but tries to understand the reasons for them. In this way a motion picture can furnish an opportunity to improve one's taste, to stimulate comprehension, a critical attitude, one's awareness of the cultural and social impact of such a work. By recreating the processes evoked by the cinema, one can also refine one's appreciation.

In order to stimulate an active attitude on the part of the public, it is essential that good pictures and good criticism be available to everyone. But this is not enough. The pressure of the local population is very strong. Telecommunications do not suffice to alter habits. The influence of leaders and groups with original ideas is both necessary and efficacious. As early as 1930 Warner stressed the importance of organizations in the democratic life of an American city with a population of about fifteen thousand—he called it Yankee City.⁴ He counted more than four hundred groups of all kinds, corresponding to all the sectors of social and cultural life. Subsequently, Lewin's studies established the fact that the norms of small groups were more effective than was the influence of telecommunications or of interpersonal relationships in changing the cultural level of an environment.⁵ This great psychosociologist of group dynamics emphasized the importance of the creation and development of organizations as agents of "socio-cultural ferment." Finally, Lazarsfeld very recently published studies demonstrating that the influence of local leaders had been underestimated in the initial American researches on mass media.⁶ All these general comments lead us to stress the important role that a local organization concerned with leisure can exert in gradually raising the cultural level of the general public. This is likewise true of many motion-picture clubs that often stimulate innovations on the part of those who make a living operating cinema theaters and trying to attract large audiences. In France most cities of more than fifteen thousand inhabitants have a *ciné-club*. Of the two hundred and fifty cities in this category about two hundred have active *ciné-clubs*. Our estimate shows that there are

4. W. Lloyd Warner, "Yankee City" series (4 vols.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941-47).

5. K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948) (French trans.: *Psychologie dynamique*, trans. Fauchex [Paris: P.U.F. 1959]).

6. E. Katz and P. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

more than seven thousand organizations concerned with cultural or educational motion pictures that select and discuss films. There are more than ten thousand noncommercial projection halls. If the leaders are well trained and if the active spectators express their reactions both within the organizations and outside them, these groups can become pioneering centers and as a consequence will tend to stimulate active attitudes.

The process is complicated. It demands a new type of research. A dynamic and experimental sociology requiring fresh leadership must be substituted for static and analytic sociology. Within the complex mass of reactions produced by the sociocultural situation, how will it be possible to augment the role of active attitudes in every society, every class, and every individual? How can we measure the variations, the lags and imbalances of active attitudes at the various cultural levels that we find within the average outlook of each different group? Finally, how can we study experimentally the changes, incidental or deliberately provoked by the action of films, leaders, groups, that are calculated to promote in the public active, pioneering attitudes at the expense of others? These are the most important questions.

BOOK REVIEWS

Herbert Drux

*Singende Steine: Rhythmus-Studien an drei katalanischen
Kreuzgängen romanischen Stils*

By MARIUS SCHNEIDER

(Kassel and Basel: Bärenreiter-Verlag, 1955). Pp. 92, with 22 illustrations and 3 tables, giving musical examples and a compendium of musical patterns.

*Igor Stravinsky: Zeitgeschichte im Persönlichkeitsbild.
Grundlagen und Voraussetzungen zur modernen
Konstruktionstechnik*

By HELMUT KIRCHMEYER

"Kölner Beiträge zur Musikforschung," ed. Karl Gustav Fellerer, Vol. X (Regensburg: Gustav Bosse Verlag, 1958). Pp. xvi+792, 11 illustrations.

Problèmes de la musique moderne

By BORIS DE SCHLOEZER AND MARINA SCRIBINE

(Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1959). Pp. 192.

Was ist Musik?

By FRIEDRICH BLUME

"Schriftenreihe Musikalische Zeitfragen," commissioned by the Deutschen Musikrates, ed. Walter Wiera, Vol. V (Kassel and Basel: Bärenreiter-Verlag, 1959). Pp. 21.

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An attentive visitor to the convent of San Cugat del Vallés, situated near Barcelona and built toward the end of the twelfth century, will discover a peculiarity in the capitals of the cloisters; inserted, apparently without order between capitals with biblical, historical, and purely ornamental motives, are some representing fabulous creatures and animals. At first sight this architectural use strikes us as strangely arbitrary and perhaps meaningless. Thanks to Marius Schneider, the famous ethnologist of music, our attention has been called "to new ways of investigating" this kind "of romanesque building." In his study *Singing Stones* his thesis is "that the place of no single head within the sequence of columns of the cloister is ever accidental, but is determined by a musical totality—rhythm." Considerably transcending the limits of one specialized discipline the author provides, in two chapters of his study, the indispensable preliminary knowledge for understanding his research. He concentrates and summarizes findings on the origin, the nature, and the development of the symbolism of sound, based on archeological, mythological, ethnological, and musicological research. The results of his research are published in more detail in *El Origen musical de los animales—símbolos en la mitología y la escultura antiguas* (Barcelona, 1946) *La Danza de espadas y la tarantela* (Barcelona, 1948), *Los Cantos de lluvia en España* (Barcelona, 1949).

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Basel:
Comprehension and interpretation of the animal symbols of the capitals

depend, according to Schneider, on one's familiarity with mythical conceptions which are current in all highly developed cultures and must have been known to the anonymous builder of the cloisters of San Cugat. The following are the most significant of these concepts.

The primary matter of all that is created is manifested in the strength of a primary light tone. As an acoustic substratum it remains latent in pure matter in an ossified form; the volcanic phonolith is in many places considered the oldest substance. Creators and creatures are—according to their natures—only able to participate in the deepest sense in the original matter by singing or rhythmic speaking in an original language. The sound of animals which can mediate between gods and man approaches the unity of the original language, lost because it was misused. The animal symbolically copied in stone corresponds to the utterance of its sounding archetype which in its turns possesses a substance of tone which engenders various mystical relations. In the course of a long development in the direction of a rational system this substances of tones can be rendered by a definite pitch.

Schneider refers to those mythical ideas and proceeds from the presupposition that the animal symbols of the capitals in San Cugat are not musical notations but a materialization of tone. Building on what is called the "classical" Indian musical theory from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, he translates the

sound symbols into our modern musical notation and obtains the following equations: the peacock is the symbol for the keynote (sometimes the subdominant), the singing bird the dominant, the eagle the subsecond to the tonic, etc. For each of the seventy-two pairs of columns Schneider uses a constant time unit (here a quaver), arranges the individual sounds into an aggregate rhythm, and thus gains forty-two of seventy-two tone values of a melody. It was indispensable to look for a pattern for the framework of melody thus found, a pattern which had to follow the framework minutely but also had, for each remaining gap, to show the same number of temporal values (that is, tones or intervals) which were missing in the symbolic representation because of the capitals without animal images.

At this point Schneider's research produced a surprising and even sensational result. The experienced musicologist who had been struck by a relationship between the melody frame, obtained by transcription of symbols, and the antiphonal hymn of the Gregorian choral *Iste confessor*, found at last in a variant of this hymn the melody which perfectly corresponds to the order of the capitals—a verse from the hymn to Saint Cucuphatus, the patron saint of the monastery on whose commemoration day the melody corresponding to the order of the capitals is sung even in our days. Schneider could adduce evidence, other than the melody pattern, which makes it plausible that there is a symbolic presentation of the

course of the year in the sequence of the capitals, a second structural idea, so to speak, which could play around the *cantus firmus* like a contrapuntal line, as well as a third idea which interprets the text of the next to last verse of the Cucuphat hymn.

The author applies the same method to investigate the cloisters of St. Mary's cathedral in Gerona. Again he finds in a hymn for the *Mater dolorosa* a melody which corresponds to the arrangement of the capitals. The result, however, is not so convincing as in the case of San Cugat, owing to the ambiguity of the representations of the peacock which here represent tonic, subdominant, and dominant at the same time.

In the second part of his study Schneider investigates the cloisters in Santa Marica de Ripoll. Here no melody can be detected on which the capital-figures might be based. However, referring to a "megalithic world view and its symbols," Schneider assumes that "the mystic journey of a man" or the "probable epic of the descent into hell and the merciful salvation of a woman sinner" have been expressed symbolically. It is impossible to discuss here the author's train of thought, which is extremely condensed in the study itself, especially since in this case his interpretation of symbols must be granted greater freedom than in investigating the cloisters of San Cugat and Gerona, where the compelling pattern of melody excluded such freedom.

Schneider's study, only eight-four pages long, will challenge those read-

ers who approach the considerations of the author without prejudice to pose a number of questions or to raise objections. This is because of the concentration of its contents and the novelty of his theories. Scholars may take exception to the fact that several assertions cannot be proved. Obviously it cannot, for example, be determined unambiguously in which cases the peacock represents the keynote, in which the subdominant, and in which the dominant; or when the long-eared mythical animal represents the third to the tonic and when an interval. A new and unsolved problem is posed by the alleged fact that the animal symbols are the materialization of a sound, while, on the other hand, the mythical animals are equated with signs of punctuation. Nor can Schneider's study give exhaustive answers to such questions as: How far did mythical ideas which have their origin in different regions of the globe remain effective in the occidental culture of the Middle Ages, and were they perhaps reinterpreted in the Christian spirit? How far were the occidental builders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries aware of a symbolism of tones, specifically rooted in Indian theory of music? On the other hand, the testimony of A. Kircher from the seventeenth century (*Musurgia universalis*, X, 393) confirms the fact that oriental tone symbolism, at least from the Egyptian area, was received in Europe. Besides, modern researchers become increasingly aware of relations between India and the occident, although

only in particular cases (e.g., travel diaries from the early Middle Ages). The author, accustomed to scrupulous scholarly research, is, of course, aware of the gaps in his chains of evidence. Again and again and with special emphasis he draws our attention to the fact that there is no evidence for some of his assumptions: "Such interpretation is no doubt highly unscientific for the lack of any document which might prove such an opinion" (p. 50; similar statements are found on pages 39, 69, 88 and 92).

On the other hand, we should point to the inner logic of the results of his investigations offered in the case of the San Cugat cloisters. This should be confirmed, above all, by every musicologist and every musician. Even though the equation of the individual animal symbols with certain pitches of tones and with certain meters had been made on a merely hypothetical basis and without any mythological background, the amazing congruence between the melody frame derived from the capital symbols and the corresponding tonal and rhythmic structure of the Cucuphat hymn would remain. This alone would entitle the author to our appreciation and gratitude for his bold publication and the publishers for their tasteful format and the most welcome insertion of a number of fine photographs. Not only will the reader greatly enrich his knowledge from the actual content but he will also enjoy the simple beauty of the language which has become so rare in professional literature. Let us hope that

Book Reviews

Schneider's request for confirmation of the correctness of his attempt by "analyzing other cloisters under similar points of view," directed in the first place to art scholars, will be complied with. His study shows that it is worthwhile to learn once more to hear by seeing, in order to become receptive of the spiritual background of a phenomenon which eludes the immediate understanding of the present. For "what does not meet the eye is not visible to him who is not receptive. It neither strikes him with deafness nor does it deprive him of the light of his eyes, but it passes him soundlessly and without lustre."

Helmut Kirchmeyer's voluminous publication sketches, in the image of the personality of Igor Stravinsky, the history of his time. The author endeavors to connect history and the present meaningfully, since—as he states in the Introduction—the observer of actual problems often loses the sense for the historical; the historian, on the other hand, the sense for the interests of his own time. To represent contemporary history, limited on the personal side to Stravinsky and on the objective side to the modern technique of musical construction, is an enterprise which should interest not only the specialist but any one whose mind is occupied with the spiritual conflicts that have contributed to form contemporary culture.

In the first and most significant part of his book Kirchmeyer investigates Stravinsky's position in music

and generally in the culture of his time. I shall summarize the author's results from his point of view and without commentary.

When, under Peter the Great, influences from western Europe could penetrate Russian unimpeded, Russian puritanism disappeared and made room for music as an art. It is true that a considerable length of time had to elapse before, in the first half of the nineteenth century, music could reach a rooted originality with the works of Glinka. The general philosophical and cultural tendency of the nineteenth century which turned away from idealism towards realism was also expressed in the demand of the well-known Petersburg circle of musicians (composers such as Cui, Borodin, Mussorgsky, and Rimski-Korsakov, headed by Balakirew) that in music real life should be reflected. These composers considered musical doctrines, patterns of form and style unreal and, likewise, rejected academism as a spiritual principle. In place of academic forms they studied folksongs which, according to them, represented the reality of life in its purest form. A trend toward the technically formal and, with it, to a new determination of the contents of music was not inaugurated until Rimski-Korsakov, after the death of Mussorgsky, became the leader of a new group of composers of which Balajew is considered the founder. The Belajew Circle, consisting of educated musicians, soon freed itself from the radicalism of the group of Petersburg

dilettantes. Pure form rather than musical expression, a retrograde movement in favor of pure order away from an inner life which emphasized expression, representation instead of experience—this is a brief formula for the way in which the Russian composers had to proceed from Musorgsky over Rimski-Korsakov to Stravinsky.

Stravinsky's drive toward the tangible makes him conceive being as a state, in opposition to Schönberg who—in the German way of thinking—considers being as a constant becoming. The essential difference between these two renowned representatives of modern music is also characterized by their teaching methods: Stravinsky presents the result of his work, Schönberg offers the method to be followed.

According to the ethnopsychological analysis of Karl Nützel, one of the great errors of the Russians which can be observed again and again in various periods of history is to equate the objective with the impersonal and the impersonal with truth. Since they are liable to forget the difference between object and subject, they often obtain a false view of reality. This leads them to rapid changes in opinion, which they hardly perceive consciously. Entanglement in insoluble contradictions is elementary experience for the Russian, who believes in his objectivity as the Frenchman believes in his nation and the German in his sentiment. Stravinsky, too, shows this Russian characteristic, which explains the egocentricity of

his statements and the numerous contradictions in his "musical poetics." His predilection for the concept of dogma does not prevent his "dogmatics" from being far too deeply in the personal and from being exhausted in subjectivistic norms. A false evaluation of art criticism is based on his dogmatism. He dogmatizes his subjectivisms because he presumes to know the truth; and the dogma thus reached, obligatory for the Russian, makes him feel that he is morally obliged to polemicize. On the other hand, the Russian realism which he experienced as inner compulsion and which became so fruitful for Europe, strongly impresses us. Insight into Russian peculiarities of thought makes us understand Stravinsky's claim to exclusiveness for his construction, its static rigidity, and the absoluteness with which it is applied, as well as the fact that this construction was never systematized by the composer himself.

Besides Russian influence the spiritual and musical development in France was decisive in forming Stravinsky's personality. Many caricatures of France are due to an overemphasis on the pessimism which served to explain the spiritual attitude of France, the weakening of the national will, and the vital energies of the French after the political catastrophies, particularly of the 1870's. A special worship of the self which paved the way for a new constructive scale of values was a starting point for the country's spiritual rebirth. When, after the turn of the century, the self, liberated from

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egotism, did again have significance, the strength of the "other France" mounted—the France that was often enough overlooked and which even the Russian, L. Sabanejew, in his mordant description of the musical life of Paris, written in 1927, still disregarded.

In France everything undesirable in art, scholarship, politics, and intellectual life in general had been rejected as romanticism. Perfect form, creation governed by reason, subordination of the individual to a whole, avoidance of outbursts of emotion, and subjection of arbitrariness to tradition were demanded. Culture of the self and classicism in a new synthesis formed a connection between asceticism and classical reserve. This paved the way for modern construction aesthetics; Stravinsky could be welcomed with open arms. His emphasis on the self, a national characteristic, affected the French culture of the self, developed as an antidote in the struggle against the futility of pessimism.

But Stravinsky, as his "poetics" reveal, misunderstood the French spiritual attitude and tried, in his theoretical works, to degrade art to craft by overlooking the delicate feeling for intuition peculiar to the French, by replacing the concept of inspiration with that of talent, by eliminating the subjectively human, thus separating artist and work of art in an objective sphere. He transformed the French aesthetics of order in the Russian vein and limited it to dogma and objectivity. While for the

French the juxtaposition of classicism and romanticism had not been mere artistic polemics but part of the process of national recovery, it degenerated with Stravinsky into a formula oversimplified in two ways.

Discipline led the French to classicism in art, back to Catholicism in religion. This explains the striking inclination of French intellectuals toward Catholic dogmatics, which by many was hailed as the culmination of the process of recovery. The deeply religious Stravinsky immediately adopted the idea of "art for God" propagated by Cocteau, Maritain, and others. This explains in part his polemics against Wagner and Beethoven, although he highly esteemed the latter's skill. But the almost blasphemous worship of Beethoven was bound to be intolerable for French Catholics.

With growing nationalism, the receptivity of the French for Wagner's ideas caused by nineteenth-century pessimism gave way to a resentment against the cultural power of German art in France. This attitude was bound to lead, after the war, to German nationalism, which, strange to say, made the New Music the chief loser in Germany, because in reacting against the French attitude the polemic against modern trends was equated with a polemic against France and, incidentally, also against Russia. The New Music was considered to be of French origin. While France opposed the overpowering Beethoven with the argument of the New, in order to be heard again her-

self Germany argued for Beethoven's great art and against the New Music in order to annihilate the latter's possibility of success.

Among others, Franz Liszt, recognized friend of the French, and Mussorgsky had given important aid toward creating a new, rooted French music. Liszt's significance for both the French and the Russians as a pioneer of French Impressionism which attained its climax in Debussy's works has been emphasized over and over again. "Art for art's sake," the motto of French Impressionism, became the perfect artistic expression of the French culture of the self. Debussy as chief protagonist of this movement detached himself from the conventions of his contemporaries. Satie and Fauré, however, two composers whose early works had influenced Debussy, did not really share the development toward impressionism and began to produce again only after it was on the decline. They rejected impressionism as a romantic style, while—by resuming contrapuntal forms, among other things—they approached a neoclassicism. Satie mainly fought for classicism proceeding from an artistic demand for a new simplicity. It was this inheritance which Stravinsky could take over.

One of the musical tendencies of that time led away from program and back to absolute music. Liszt, himself one of the first significant representatives of so-called program music, did not want the independence of music to be sacrificed to any pro-

gram. But his concept of a program was, from the beginning, exposed to misunderstandings. Both New Music and Stravinsky very early fought against the misinterpreted idea of program music, especially against its use for political ends. In opposition to Schönberg, who judged with more understanding, Stravinsky not only denied the possibility of interpreting a non-musical idea musically but ignored all musical expression, although his own compositions contradicted his theories.

Nevertheless, the word gained from a program of music could back modern music against the danger of being fragmented; it could justify aesthetically as a means of musical characterization what was disagreeable to the senses (accumulation of dissonances). Indeed, New Music was often introduced by means of a program, a method abandoned only when the unconventional combinations of sounds had become more or less legitimate in musical theory.

From the blending tones of constituent parts that stand in the close relation of harmonic tones of a consonant accord to the discord tones of an accord full of dissonances, a further tendency of development leads towards modern music. The richness in harmonic tones corresponding with physical data and the strong degree of blending of tones of accords of strings had to be subordinated to the idea of discord tones in New Music; therefore, modern music prefers wind instruments. The pure effect of the instruments, become shopworn in

program music, was definitely overcome by Stravinsky in his octet for winds, where the differentiation in instrumentation was not introduced except for stressing the form.

The idea of progress which had led to orchestras of mammoth size was hollow, and this could not remain hidden for any length of time. It made the composers rediscover the principle of chamber music and at the same time develop new ways for expressing their creativity. The financial distress of orchestras in the economic crisis of the 1920's also pointed in the direction of chamber groups.

The year 1923-24 can be considered the "fatal year of New Music." With the first performance of Stravinsky's octet for winds which confused the public and led to a "scandal of silence," with the composition of Hindemith's *Marientleben*, with a perceptible change of style in Bartok, tendencies appeared which from this time on obviously attempted a resumption of the musical tradition. The longing for clear forms and quieter content could be observed in many places. All those musicians, however, who regarded this new tendency as "reactionary" turned against it, among them Honegger and Schönberg. Stravinsky's music adjusted to the conception of *serenitas* peculiar to Romance people, and in agreement with his own religious conviction it soon avoided the adopted standards of contemporary musical theory and was often thoroughly misunderstood.

The demand to include all tones

in New Music as formulated by Busoni, one of its theoretical pioneers, seems reasonable and convincing; but the style itself opposed this as well as the elimination of certain groups of tones. What remained was the demand for the non-functional comprehensive use of all musical elements in the system of construction. For New Music the difference between tonal and atonal accords became meaningless; there remained two different systems, it is true, that of functionality and that of construction. Both made use of the same forms of tones, but they excluded each other as systems, differing in their combinations of these forms.

Kirchmeyer asserts that our era has perfected the method of rejecting the work of art without examination as well as ruining the artist economically by even preventing its creation. The author supplements his historical sketch in the second part of his work with "documents of contemporary history," making use of them as well for presenting criticism and polemics against New Music. The critical struggle with the problems of modern music he describes in the first place as the rejection of extremes. He then discusses the objections raised again and again against New Music as being unnatural, arbitrary, and intellectual. Discussions of the concept of nature and construction occupy a central place in his book. As in the first part the author investigated Russian and French influence on contemporary music, especially that of Stravinsky, he now describes the same

events by tracing the controversies which were particularly violent in German-speaking countries of that period.

In the third part Kirchmeyer treats "the transformation of the musical material" by referring to the well-established research of such authorities as Ernst Kurth (*Romantische Harmonik und ihre Krise in Wagners 'Tristan'* [Berlin, 1920]) and limiting himself to supplementing briefly their scholarly results. Finally, he tries to find the key to the modern technique of construction, which will not be discussed here in detail since it is directed at musicians and musicologists.

Even in our fast-moving era nobody will expect that a book which appeared a few decades after New Music came into existence can now already legitimately systematize such heterogeneous facts as those of contemporary music. Kirchmeyer stresses that the object of his investigation is "predominantly the presentation of conditions between 1920 and 1930." He prefers that methodical pluralism of letting documents speak for themselves—adapted from the ideal historical method of Leopold von Ranke. Where the same events are repeatedly described, though from different points of view, this method results in diffuseness, which not even Kirchmeyer is always able to avoid. On the other hand he succeeds, because of his emphatically European attitude, in avoiding political discussion, although a discussion of nationalistic tendencies is frequently

indispensable. He describes history with all its contradictions; thus, contradictions in his presentation arise inevitably from the material but might, occasionally, have been more sharply characterized as such. The author is young (born in 1930); his ways of thinking clearly owe much to Kant and Jaspers. Not so his diction, which is at times refreshingly spirited, although occasionally a little clumsy. The chapters concerned with purely musical questions remain problematic. This is not to reproach the author. Kirchmeyer's book, in common with all writings about New Music, shows that the theory and practice of modern music is apparently not yet ripe for elucidation in a historically oriented scholarly treatise.

However, those inevitable critical objections do not diminish the very positive impression made by Kirchmeyer's book. Already, a few months after its publication, it may very well be called the most significant scholarly publication on the history of New Music. Avoiding the conventional patterns of almost all biographies of musicians, it reveals in European approach and in a sketch strikingly clear and brilliant with an immense amount of material, the intellectual background of a phase of development toward New Music. In spite of the comprehensive aims of the book, it contains more qualitative facts which show the nature of Stravinsky's personality than any enumeration, however careful, of biographical dates alone could hope to offer. This impression is intensified by an

extensive bibliography which contains, so far as available documents permitted, precise statements of original and translated titles, exact instrumentation, duration of performances, dates of composition, first performances, printed editions, phonograph records, editions, revisions, and secondary literature referring to Stravinsky's compositions. There are also brief comments on the history of their creation, on the response of the public, and on the practice of performances. A concise report on attempts to find a notation suitable to the character of modern music, about forty pages of references, and the literature of New Music compiled in sixty pages give an eloquent testimony for the thoroughness of the author and a lexicographical value for musicology which K. G. Fellerer has emphasized by accepting the volume for his series, *Kölner Beiträge zur Musikforschung*. Last but not least, the publishers deserve our appreciation for the production of this book, distinguished by its typography as well as its layout and illustrations.

The following review confronts an extensive publication on the problems of modern music with the reprint of a public lecture of not more than fifteen pages. This procedure is justified for two significant reasons: First, the problems in question cannot be solved without taking into account the "central musical question of our time: What is music." Second, the lecture, which deals particularly with the music of our day, has a special

importance because it was written not just by any author but by a leading historian of music (Blume is president of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Musikwissenschaft and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Musikforschung) who focuses his investigation on a "burning question of our time" and whose presentation undoubtedly is representative of the point of view of a vast group of musicologists and even of musicians who are seriously interested in modern music. This question and the present situation of music, which might be called a crisis, is also discussed by Schloezer and Scriabine, whose book attempts "to understand this crisis, to discover its significance, to disentangle its problems and the vistas which it opens."

No one has yet found a definition of music which is tolerably comprehensive and satisfactory. Blume, in order to overcome this difficulty, limits himself to describing attempts "to collect from experience what is and what is not regarded as music, what is and what is not required in order to produce the phenomenon which we are accustomed to call music" (p. 9). Schloezer and Scriabine, too, avoid from the beginning a dubious attempt at definition and in the first chapter of this book treat in detail "the language of the musician," outlining the limits of the language of music as compared with other media of communication, and analyze, from historical, psychological, and physiological points of view, the special features which music has de-

veloped in the course of a long history. They continue by investigating "the sonorous universe of the musician" and pay special attention to three sections: "*le matériel*" (the tones, the points of the disconnected sonorous space) corresponding to Blume's concept of "tone-material or building material," and "*le matériel*" (the instruments with whose help the musical process is made audible). In Part II they devote the second chapter ("structures, operations, functions") to a detailed consideration of the prerequisites of musical events, their origin and their effects, as well as to the relations between the individual elements of music (among others, rhythm, melody, harmony).

The authors agree in stating that the differences between the music in the cultures of different times and places are based on two processes of selection, the first of which chooses a definite system of tones from the abundance of potential tones and the second of which connects the tones thus obtained with a specific timbre, both processes, however, representing abstractions from empirical sounds. According to Blume all tones, however complex, of all musical systems known to us are based on "sounds of nature," from which the selections were made in the processes described above. The tone material is based on the natural without being natural itself. "The 'pasture' of the musician is not natural, it is artificial; its very elements must be gained by conquering the chaotic universe of noise" (Schoezer and Scriabine, p. 64).

Human spirit creatively forms the tone material into musical products. "Diastematics" as (roughly) successive up-and-down movement of frequencies, and "color" as (also roughly) motionless synchronism of tones are closely related in music with the elements of "duration" and "intensity" ("pitch, timbre, duration, intensity" in Schoezer and Scriabine, pp. 95 ff.). The "sensory-spiritual appropriation" of the relations between the elements of tones in a piece of music is the starting point for the *understanding* of music. Blume considers it indispensable for human understanding to organize tone material in certain "fields of gravitation" and sees the limits of music reached where "such tonal orders"—no matter of which kind—"are neither intended nor comprehended" (p. 13). The demand of Schloezer and Scriabine, directed to the Dodecaphonists and the serial composers, moves in the same direction: "He should organize, which means in this context to create a whole, the form of which, the actual unity makes sense; for music as poetry is only then living language" (p. 154). Blume—it should not be overlooked—uses the term "tonality" in a very broad sense when he says: "Relations between tones, functions, in one word, 'tonality,' arise automatically" (which of course need not be identical with that tonality which is derived from the functional harmonics of the major-minor system.) Schloezer and Scriabine, too, emphasize: "dodecaphonism did not

ipso facto suppress tonality" (p. 140).

Blume fears that in abandoning all functional relations in the sense mentioned above we run the risk of abandoning music itself: "Here is a genuine borderline of the concept of music: There cannot be a tonally unrelated music, free of tonality. The transgression of this borderline would lead from music as ordered tone material into the chaos of pre-musical and noises" (p. 13). "As there is no music without the tone material of nature, however complex the sounds may be, there is no music without tonality however difficult it may be to grasp it" (p. 15). This notion is obviously not shared by Schloezer and Scriabine, as is made particularly clear if we juxtapose the opinions of the authors in regard to the so-called electronic music, since they consider electronics the logical goal of the development of Occidental music. Once reached, it liberates the musician from the old restrictions, even from any coercion, and imposes on him the urgent task of a voluntary self-restriction in building a new, sounding cosmos (p. 87). Blume, on the other hand, energetically refuses to recognize as music "this product entirely deprived of natural elements and originated from the assembly of physical sounds," because "here something is produced which we cannot apprehend because our hearing, adapted to natural sounds and their derivatives, is not capable, either physically or mentally, of appropriating these products," although "this generation of sounds which can only be produced

and reproduced by appliances may be something which reflects our age of atomic fission and complete automation" (p. 17). He thus transcends the purely musical point of view and alludes to the additional possibility of considering the question from a superior ethical stand point. Schloezer and Scriabine, however, answer the question of whether the freedom granted to an interpreter of Boulez' third piano sonata or of "piano piece 11" by Stockhausen, which may even interfere with the formal structure of the composition, should be regarded as reaction to the subjugation of the musician to electroacoustic appliances—whether electronic music, as many assert, is inhuman: "Nothing could be more wrong. To handle electroacoustic appliances does not dehumanize the musician, does not mechanize music, but rather humanizes the appliances. In a certain sense we might even call this music 'human, all too human'; it in fact allows the author to express his life experience, to reveal his intimate being as he never could when using the instrumental language" (p. 185).

From the abundance of problems Blume chooses to examine the central one: musical form whose nature lies in limiting the unlimited, giving order to what is unordered. The more freedom the musician gains in handling the tone material, the more rigidly he must observe strict forms in relating sound events with each other in order to make them comprehensible for the listener. "Repetition

of the observable in observable dimensions" is for Blume a fundamental law of all form in music (p. 19). Similar ideas are uttered by Schloezer and Scriabine, who use not only the concept of observability in an adequate relation of meaning but also with frequency the concept of "coherence." With the unrelenting strictness of form of the most recent technique which started from the twelve-tone composition and "was made by some composers into a strictly arithmetical task in which the form is no longer a result of planning to produce observable orders and relations but results from the pure logic of mathematical construction," according to Blume, a further limit of music has been reached; "the '*humanitas*' of music has been sacrificed to the absolute perfection of a mathematical equation" (pp. 19-20). Toward the end of his lecture he writes: "The seemingly boundless freedom which was showered upon the composer by shattering the old system of tone material and the boundlessness of creating, which seems now to be open to him, entail the paradox that no longer the mind but only the machine, no longer the *ethos* of responsibility but the *logos* of the formula are capable to reign in this region." Schloezer and Scriabine, too, devote the fifth and last chapter of their book to the "paradoxes of liberty" after having earlier discussed the technique and method of dodecaphonal and serial composition ("the stages of autonomy") in all detail. Although they appreciate the histori-

cal importance of the twelve-tone theory inaugurated by Schönberg, they point out its inconsistencies—not to say mistakes—more relentlessly than does Blume in his short treatise, indicating again and again, like him, that in view of the "excess of the actual powers" it is indispensable to "limit one's self" and also to demand auditory comprehensibility of a composition. In their opinion musicians in our day are beginning to master the boundlessness of the newly won material "by a rigorous economy of means"; "this asceticism, however, does not solve the difficulty, for it is a question of knowing whether the unity thus obtained is audible" (p. 155). They, too, reproach the young musician for frequently seeking "the explanation and the justification of their enterprises in most recent physics, mathematics, cybernetics," etc., and ask: "Is it not indispensable for us to know how and under what conditions we hear what we hear, now that we are renewing the language of music, turning its material upside down? There is no doubt that our auditory organs are remarkably adaptable, yet this nonetheless has its limits" (l. 190).

Unlike Blume, Schloezer and Scriabine do not try to define a borderline beyond which a tone product ceases to be music; that would contradict the perspective in which they view the historical development of music. "In seeking to understand the present condition of music we considered it indispensable to place it within the framework of a history which has di-

rection and meaning. Beginning with the late Middle Ages and the first attempts at contrapuntal polyphony, this history has appeared to us to be a sequence of stages in which musicians have won autonomy from their material; stages, the most important of which were: the constitution of complexes of the second degree or accords; the recognition of their statute and the development of the harmony which follows from it; then, the direct action of the composer upon the primary elements or notes, realized by dodecaphonism, the extension of the series to all the sonorous aspects, and, at last, the complete mastery of the totality of the material by the composer, which electronics made possible" (p. 189).

In spite of their differences of opinion, fundamental attitudes of the authors toward the most recent musical productions do not differ as much as it might seem. The purely mathematical mechanical construction which pays too little attention to the auditory comprehensibility of a work of music is condemned as much by Schloezer and Scriabine as by Blume. They, too, pose the question: "Must we really expect that the sonorous art, whose complexity even now discourages so many listeners, should become still more complex and consequently less and less comprehensible until it is finally reserved for specialists exclusively?" (p. 89.) Studying modern methods of composing, they emphasize "the problems, particularly urgent and poignant, which concern the perception and, in gen-

eral, the relations between the work and the listener." In principle they approve of electronic music, yet are by no means content with its present condition; they consider the reintroduction of an interpreter, a "human intermediary," indispensable (pp. 180-81). (Boulez, by the way, complies with this demand in his work *Poésie pour pouvoir*.) All restrictions, however, which they impose, all reservations with which they examine the most modern compositions, and all the warnings which they address to young composers, bring no answer to the question: How far are sounds comprehensible, depending on our sense of hearing; under which circumstances can they be inserted meaningfully into a system of relations, the reproduction of which gives the hearer the experience of a complete whole which he is willing to recognize as music? Perhaps this question cannot be answered accurately. But that does not prevent it from being posed again and again, nor does it prevent those who are caught completely helpless in the new situation from turning for help to a forum from which they expect to receive an answer: musicology. We therefore gratefully recognize Blume's courageous attempt to take an unequivocal stand with regard to the present situation of music. For the time being it does not matter whether or not we agree with him, especially since, as is evident, "it was not an easy task for him" to "venture onto the thin ice of such a delicate subject." Both publications show an

extraordinarily high level of scholarship. While Blume's lecture, of course, must limit itself to a brief discussion of some cardinal points, Schloezer and Scriabine deserve praise for having treated or indicated practically every point of view referring to the problems in question. He who wishes to approach the situation of modern music "without anger or partiality" should therefore be urgently encouraged to study both works intensively. A certain subjectivity is almost inevitable when matters are discussed which are still in the process of developing. The decision for or against the latest development of occidental music is everybody's individual responsibility. Therefore, the following ideas are expected to offer only a small aid to the interested reader who wishes to reach an opinion of his own.

In the music of all cultures and all periods natural elements are connected with those that are artificial and against nature. The predominance of one of those elements, however, depends not only on time, race, or culture but also on the present sociological function of the music heard. It makes a difference whether music is supposed to entertain, to satisfy aesthetically, to stir up, to move us deeply; whether it has a function within a cult or is supposed to exercise a magic charm. To clarify this, let us examine an analogous phenomenon: The unrestricted right to dispose of words, syllables, and even letters permits the poet to construct products which are completely nonsensical and unnatural. He does oc-

asionally when he wishes to withdraw language from any rational comprehensibility to make it serve a magical purpose. This is shown in the magic formulas of witches (the scenes in Goethe's *Faust*) and it still lives in the rhymes children use in their games, where some of the magical powers of sounds deprived of their rationality have been preserved (in German, for example: *I-dri-schneck, du bist weg!*). The occidental listener or reader accepts without objections this anomaly related to a particular situation, perhaps even (as in the magic formulas) as a correlate to a work of art. But he will emphatically deny its legitimacy in an abstract form of art, if it is not sociologically warranted, as the example of short-lived dadaism may show.

Electronics creates a similar situation in the field of music. Its tonal material is abnormal, "completely unnatural" in Blume's terminology, if we agree to call a "natural sound" the tone caused by the freely flowing human voice, the vibrations of a chord or of a column of air in tubes, and to consider the use of electronic tones as justifiable only when this use avoids the tones which can be produced by the human voice or conventional instruments and makes full use of its advantage of disposing of *accontinuum sonor* (see Schloezer and Scriabine, p. 178). This limits it, in principle, to a substance of sounds which is defined as noise. It is not purely accidental that one of the elementary products of electronic

music is called "white rustling." Noise, however, cannot be unconditionally introduced into "highly developed music without causing a break" (see Blume, p. 16). A well-ordered combination of noises can move the listener, can even affect him more strongly than genuine music is able to do. But then the question arises whether the occidental listener can evaluate the effective, well planned organization of noises as a work of art, perhaps as music.

The majority of all consumers of music listen strictly emotionally, which means that the relations existing between the individual tones are not consciously reproduced by these hearers but sensorily comprehended in their totality. For instance, a listener may infer the meaning of a spoken sentence in a foreign language unknown to him from the situation, from the cadence and gestures of the speaker. In the same way, music can be meaningful to him without his understanding it in the sense of "sensory-spiritual appropriation." These are facts to be considered by the sociologist and the psychologist of music, but the musicologist (in the narrower sense of this word) cannot start from these listening habits to arrive at results concerning music itself. If Blume and Schloezer and Scriabine make auditory comprehensibility of music a condition for its sensory-spiritual appropriation, they are in the tradition of millennia of the Occidental theory of music, which places rational comprehension of tone relations above

the sensory aspect of music. Occidental music was primarily determined by this rational comprehensibility, and thus a basis was formed on which the acts of different individuals, such as composition, interpretation, perception, and even theoretical determination, could be performed, so that they obtained universal validity both for musicians and listeners. The musical pitches firmly rooted both in the Occidental system of tones and in the Occidental sensation of hearing and their precise fixation in writing by notation (if we neglect problems of temperament) have led to unique development: they have produced a characteristic polyphony which arranges the simultaneous tones in their verticality and the relations between this complexity of sounds just as they arrange successive sounds into a system, rational and at the same time comprehensive for audition.

Unlike frequency, the sound elements of color (generally), of intensity (apart from rough gradations), and of duration (detached from a musical connection) cannot be grasped auditorily so that they can be inserted by the listener as absolute quantities into an a priori scale. The difficulty in the perception of many works of modern music is caused by the emancipation of just these elements, that is to say, by their not being audible "absolutely" as are the frequencies. The West shares the primacy of the movement of pitches with all singing, highly developed cultures. Yet on account of the pecu-

liarity of Occidental music as it has just been characterized, we should beware of adducing processes from non-European music as evidence in favor of the practices of the most recent occidental musical production, which Schloezer and Scriabine, unfortunately, occasionally do. The single elements of an individual musical culture formed by racial talents, habits of listening, and sociological functions of music cannot be isolated from the total way of life in order to be transposed into a different culture. These attempts are made again and again, particularly with respect to sound elements of color and of intensity.

If Blume, following Schönberg's thesis "that tone color is thus the larger area, pitch one of its segments," states that the nuances (the tone colors in the narrow sense) determine the character of music more strongly than do absolute movements of pitch, this is undoubtedly correct for the rough differentiation of musical cultures and periods, but not—and that is what Schönberg apparently means—for the sphere of occidental music down to Schönberg himself. How much for example, does an organ fugue by Bach lose of its musical substance by being played on the harpsichord, on the piano, by a string orchestra, or even by an ensemble of concertinas or guitars so that the tone color is completely altered? Does not the soloist, whether singer or instrumentalist, even today study the score arranged for the piano—even of Schönberg's works—

in order to penetrate into the nature of the music without thinking first of tone color. If in New Music, therefore, the composers follow a trend, observable for decades, to place the tone elements of duration, color, and intensity as equally important beside the element of pitch, it seems only consistent to eliminate, first of all, the primacy of the element of the pitch as is done in the so-called serial (puntal) and even more unequivocally in electronic composition. Nobody will deny that in this really atonal music the elements of duration, color, and intensity can appear much stronger than in any music which is still at all tonal. The effective impression of such a work on the listener can under certain circumstances be extraordinary; but in the last analysis it leads "back" from the sensory-spiritual assimilation to purely emotional listening or, as Blume says, "to the chaos of pre-musical tones and noises," because with the elimination of the element of pitch the tone material is to a large extent deprived of auditory comprehensibility. These facts are particularly and unequivocally supported by the development of Occidental notation. The new and different notation which electronics had to create for itself shows how radically it breaks away from tradition.

With the elimination of sound relations which can be reproduced by a trained ear, the formal order required for a work of art must be submitted to new laws. These laws split the sensory-spiritual appropria-

tion into one which is purely sensory (emotional listening) and one which is purely spiritual (rational construction or analysis)—no longer immediately connected with the former, but isolated from it. Here the mortgage with which Occidental music was encumbered by introducing the notation (which, to be sure, helped to make possible the magnificent development of polyphony) yielded unexpected and undesired dividends: the range of sounds which could be auditorily comprehended and acoustically organized becomes "music" which is no longer auditorily comprehensible but is optically organized. Concepts such as *inventio*, *modulatio*, melody, etc., are necessarily replaced by structure, construction, etc. Nothing shows more clearly how far this purely mathematical and constructive thinking has gone than the fourth section of Kirchmeyer's book, which bears the title "Construction." The headings of its individual sections deal with "constructive chromatics," "constructive interlacing," "constructive combination of intervals," "constructive sonority," "complementary constructions," "constructive determination," with the "principles, the presuppositions of musical theory, the consequences, and the special forms of construction." When Kirchmeyer tries to analyze the fourth variation of the second movement of the sonata for two pianos by Stravinsky (p. 493) we are fully justified to assert that the constructive arrangement of the tone material which he

wants to make plausible cannot be apperceived by the listener in spite of the best training; it seems even very improbable that that was intended by the composer, while the structural elements of this musical example (quoted incompletely by Kirchmeyer) which are much more easily perceived, that is, which strike the auditory sense right away—the horizontal tones in the treble which create tonal centers, the diatonic sequence in measure 2 and 3—are not even mentioned. This example is particularly suited to show the great danger of a mathematically constructed analysis (as a parallel to adequate musical creation) which is separated from the reality of tones comprehensible to the ear. The work of music entirely surrendered to the "logos of the formula" loses living contact with the listener; its composer can shun all responsibility and no longer bears any obligation towards what, for the time being, is still generally understood by the concept of "musicality."

However, the absolute loss of contact of many products of modern music and the consequent isolation of the work of art from the consumer reduces, sociologically speaking, the criterion of quantity to one of quality. The work of art meaningful in the last analysis only for an individual or for a small group ceases to be an integrated constituent part of culture; it exists in the often used and abused term "ivory tower." Champions of modern music often argue that Beethoven's late string

quartets are model examples of "ivory-tower" music. We should ask them: Would Beethoven be even mentioned today if he had produced nothing but those string quartets?

In this connection let me cite a new fact in the history of music, which has so far had little notice; popular and folk music in its various branches (folksongs, hymns, "hit" songs, entertainment music, and, to a certain degree, jazz and marches) still cling to the traditional order which the new classical music is on the point of completely ignoring. This signifies that music is split into two camps which have lost contact due to the elimination of similar tone material and of its systematic order. This situation is bound to lead to consequences which can be indicated here only in a few brief remarks.

In our accelerated pace the avant-garde of modernism considers the compositions of a Schönberg antiquated and makes tremendous efforts to contrive new possibilities for the combination of tones, even of notation, probably guided often by the desire of being sensational. If such attempts, for example, leave it to the interpreter to realize confusedly written notes into which a system of lines was inserted afterward as "music" *ad libitum*, if the meaning of instruments developed in a historical process supposed, among other things, to abstract a specific

color from the totality of tones is turned completely around, if "pianists" armed with stop watch and percussion instruments preferably belabor their instruments outside the keyboard, these practices surely prove that it is justifiable to attempt to become aware of the limits of music. How much Blume hit the mark when he tried to indicate such limits is shown by the attitude of those who apparently are taken aback and feel threatened by his arguments. Their reaction, predominantly worded in the jargon of the streets—of a characteristically low level and untouched by any real knowledge of the field—was published in March, 1959, in *Melos*, German music journal. The objection often raised against Blume's analysis, that the limits of music are determined not by scholarship but rather by man in his situation, which changes with every period and with every cultural region, does not do justice to the personal freedom and responsibility of the scholar as a human being. Not only is he permitted in the name of scholarship to offer any reasonably plausible hypothesis, but he is expected in times of general uncertainty to take an elucidating stand. Blume knows, of course, that one day our descendants will say with Schloezer and Scriabine: "In those days the compositions, not the theories, molded the fact of music and determined its fate."

Notes on the Contributors

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KOSTAS PAPAIOANNOU's last contribution to *Diogenes* appeared in No. 25, where he wrote on the Greek conception of the cosmos. In addition to his bibliography printed in that issue, he has published *La Théorie des classes* (Athens: Éditions du Centre d'Étude Sociales, 1959) and *La Genèse du totalitarisme* (1960).

The application of the social sciences to the problems of the individual and the community in modern society is the theme of GEORGES FRIEDMANN's "Re-evaluation of Modern Society," in this issue. The author's study, "Psychoanalysis and Society," appeared in *DIOGENES*, No. 14, where a brief résumé of his background and bibliography can be found. He has

since published *Le Travail en viettes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1956) and *Problèmes d'Amérique latine* (1959).

GEORGE BOAS, a distinguished American figure in philosophy and aesthetics, was born in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1891. He has studied at Brown, Harvard, and Columbia universities and at the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his Ph.D. degree in 1917 and taught for several years. Since 1921 he has been professor of the history of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He has published many significant books, among them: *An Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921); *French Philosophies of the Romantic Period* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925); *The Major Traditions of European Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1929); *Essays on Primitivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948); *Philosophy and Poetry* (1933); *The Acceptance of Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950); *Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Ronald Press, 1957); *The Inquiring Mind* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1957); *Some Assumptions of Aristotle* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1959); and *The Sphere of Reason* (in press), as well as numerous articles and translations.

Born in Berlin, HERBERT MARCUSE studied philosophy and literature at the universities of Berlin and Fribourg. He emigrated to the United

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Notes on Contributors

JOFFRE DUMAZEDIER, born in 1915, studied at the Sorbonne, and organized *Peuple et Culture*, the national association of popular culture. Since 1952 he has directed the studies in leisure at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and, since 1959, has been associated with UNESCO, in charge of a mission of experts in the social sciences concerned with leisure. He has published many articles on leisure, popular education, and pedagogy, including "Contenu de l'éducation des adultes," in *L'Education populaires des adultes*,

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